"MULTIPLE REALITIES" AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ETHICAL PROVINCE OF MEANING: A STUDY OF ALFRED SCHUTZ

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ABSTRACT

The word "reality" is an interpretive term that is given to an object of our attention. While they are attended to, the joke, the stageplay, the dream, the idea, the conversation, the painting, the belief, the football game, the future, and innumerable other entities with which we are consciously engaged are what we call *real*. The word "real;" words such as "dream," "painting," "football game," and so forth that we use to label items of experience; and the countless other terms in our language evidence the human attempt to render experience meaningful. But there are, according to Schutz, *multiple* meanings at the language level as well as at other less articulatable levels; there are also multiple ways in which the word "real" may be legitimately employed. A dream is real but not in the way that a personal conversation is; the football game is real but not in the way that belief is; and the future is real but not in the way that the stageplay is. Each is a "*finite* province of meaning," to use Schutz's phraseology, which is created in a particular kind of manner with its own "accent of reality." Different realities result from different patterns of meaning, from meaning modification.

Each reality is created in its own fashion. It reflects what Schutz calls its own "cognitive style." This style has seven generic features: (1) an attention of consciousness, (2) an *epoché*, (3) an experience of time, (4) a form of subjectivity-objectivity, (5) an experience of one's self, (6) a form of spontaneity, and (7) a form of sociality. These features common to all realities take on a particular texture in each. For instance, the items of one's consciousness are one thing in a dream,

another in a social encounter; the experience of time at a football game is different from that at a stoplight. One particular reality cannot be reduced to the terms of another without doing violence to the manner in which it is experienced and interpreted on its own ground. To treat a sunset solely in the terms of the physical scientist destroys it as aesthetic experience. For this reason Schutz claims that reality is non-reducibly pluralistic.

Finite provinces of meaning, however, are related to each other by the experiencing, social person. Although one may not be contorted into the categories of another, there is a "paramount" or vivid reality for Schutz in terms of which the others are viewed. He conceives of this as the world of common-sense, a world which stems from everyday, lived experience or, in Husserl's terms, the Lebenswelt. The movement into other realities reflects a modification of those perceptions and interpretations constructed at this level, a shift in the cognitive style of everyday life. When the curtain on the stage is raised, we shift our attention away from our experience of the leading actor as our next door neighbor and treat him as that character he is presently portraying. In this process the world of the stage becomes the "real" world, and our emotional and thoughtful activities are correlated with it.

The ethical province of meaning is likewise a definite type of reality, one in which moral goodness is the central theme. It is in terms of this that we interpret our experience and the experience of others. Here intentions, actions, and results take on a special kind of meaning, a meaning different from that constituted in the sphere of social science reality or aesthetic reality or musical reality.

But this reality is no less "real;" it has simply been constructed in a modified manner.

The pluralistic treatment of reality that Schutz suggests is based upon a sophisticated understanding of meaning construction and meaning modification. It implies that a meaningful statement such as "S is p" is the result of a selective, interpretative process and that S may also be q, r, s, t, and so forth. What S is is dependent not upon what it is "absolutely" or "in itself" but upon its constructed relationship to other elements. With a shift in attention away from the p-ness of S, which is related to our purposes and interests, S ("really") may be innumerable other things. It is the purpose of this essay to suggest the multiplicity of meaning construction, the process of meaning modification, the pluralism of reality, and the texture of the ethical province in relation to these three items.

INTRODUCTION

An Introduction to Alfred Schutz

Throughout the better part of four decades Alfred Schutz persistently struggled with those philosophical issues which undergird the social scientist's efforts. His creative contributions were noticed, however, only by a perceptive few during his lifetime. It will be for biographers and not for us here to illumine the specific reasons for this lack of attention given Schutz by the American scientific community. But the fact that he was forced from Austria just when his influence was gaining momentum in Central Europe, that this necessitated the tedious learning of another primary language, that much of his work was left either unpublished or untranslated until after his death, and that Schutz was hesitant to force himself prematurely into print - all of these and other factors undoubtedly contributed to his relative obscurity.

There are positive indications, however, that Schutz's remarkably sensitive efforts will gain an increasing hearing. First, the Schutzian corpus is all being published in English. His first major work, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der socialen Welt[1], was translated and published in 1967 as The Phenomenology of the Social World.[2] The third and final volume of the Collected Papers was printed in 1966, bringing together Schutz's scattered essays.[3] At this writing a previously unpublished essay, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, is in the press.[4] These important publications are to be followed shortly by a final systematic statement entitled Die Strukturen der Lebenswelt. It will be edited and in part written by Thomas Luckmann on the basis of a partially completed text and a detailed outline which Schutz wrote before his death. An English translation by Richard Zaner of the University of Texas is projected to appear concurrently.

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[1] Alfred Schütz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der socialen Welt (Vienna: Springer, 1932). References here will be to the second unaltered edition of 1960 published by Springer and shortened for reference by us to Der sinnhafte Aufbau.

[2] Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans. by George Walsh and Frederick Lehnert (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967). Subsequently referred to as P.

The second indication that Schutz is gradually being recognized as, in George Walsh's words, "one of the foremost philosophers of social science of the present century"[5] is more indirect. It stems from the fact that such men as Aron Gurwitsch, Maurice Natanson, and Herbert Spiegelberg - all recognized as highly competent - have dedicated recent volumes in phenomenological psychology, the philosophy of the social sciences, and the history of the phenomenological movement respectively to Dr. Schutz.[6] Maurice Natanson has recently edited a memorial volume entitled Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz.[7] Secondly, reference to his work is increasingly evident. For instance, The Social Construction of Reality by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann and Gibson Winter's Elements for a Social Ethic draw heavily upon Schutzian themes.[8] Recent journal articles further underscore the expanding appreciation for Schutz, his philosophy, and his social thought. Gurwitsch concludes, "His influence is growing steadily. At no time during his life was his work as well known and as widely discussed as it is at present."[9]

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[3] Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, 3 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, 1964, and 1966 respectively). Subsequently referred to by number, I, II, and III.

[4] Alfred Schutz, Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, edited by R. M. Zaner.

[5] P, p. xv.

[6] Aron Gurwitsch, The Field of Consciousness (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1964); Maurice Natanson, ed., Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: Random House, 1963); Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960).

[7] Maurice Natanson, ed., Phenomenology and Social Reality: Essays in Memory of Alfred Schutz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969).

Schutz's contributions have been in various areas, and several interpreters suggest this. Maurice Natanson, in his "Introduction" to volume one of the Collected Papers, ventures that Schutz's "single intuition" regarding and primary contribution to the philosophy of the social sciences stems from his description of the highly textured Lebenswelt, the world of daily life.[10] An article called "Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Schutz" by Richard Zaner suggests that intersubjectivity provides the "fundamental theme"[11] for which Schutz will be remembered. A further indication of his varied applicability is given by the Stonier-Bode article in the 1937 volume of Economica in which it is claimed that Schutz has constructed a "new approach" to social science method.[12]

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[8] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966); Gibson Winter, Elements for a Social Ethic (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966).

[9] II, p. x.

[10] I, p. xxv.

[11] Richard Zaner, "Theory of Intersubjectivity: Alfred Schutz," Social Research, XXVIII (Spring, 1961), 71-93.

[12] Alfred Stonier and Karl Bode, "A New Approach to the Methodology of the Social Sciences," Economica, IV (New Series) (November, 1937), 406-424.

When confronted with the suggestions of these authors, we are reminded of a comment by Robert Frost. Asked if his interpreters were reading things into his poetry that he did not intend, he replied that a poet is worthy of all that can be found in him. Certainly, Frost's poetry allows greater interpretative freedom than does Schutz's philosophy, but it is fair to say that Schutz presents a kaleidoscopic collage in which single portions are fascinating in their own right. We are going to investigate one of these themes, one which deals with reality, and thus may be considered a color that permeates the whole collage.

This theme Schutz titles "multiple realities." It emerges explicitly in his mid-career, although adumbrated in The Phenomenology of 1932, in a major essay entitled "On Multiple Realities" and was published in June, 1945, six years after his arrival in this country.[13] He returned to the concept again in 1954 and 55 with a manuscript called "Symbol, Reality, and Society," which was the outgrowth of a symposium on symbols and society.[14] Between 1945 and 1955 Schutz's concern for this topic was reflected in two other essays. The first, "Edmund Husserl's Ideas, Vol. II," was published in March, 1953.[15] The second, more directly related to multiple realities, was printed in December, 1953, and called "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality."[16] Mentioning these four essays does not imply that they constitute Schutz's total efforts on the subject. They are the most extended treatments, but, since "multiple realities" is both an integrating and a foundational concept, other relevant discussions permeate his total corpus.

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[13] I, pp. 207-259.

[14] I, pp. 287-356.

[15] III, pp. 15-39.

[16] II, pp. 135-158.

The major task of this paper is not biographical or historical, but the general placement of Schutz within an intellectual tradition and several words about his life and career may help in orienting the reader for what will follow.[17] Alfred Schutz was born in Vienna one year shy of the 20th Century. While studying law under such men as Hans Kelsen and social science with Friedrich von Wieser, he was attracted to Max Weber and the methodological problems of the social sciences. To be captivated by Weber, however, was to inherit the problems of later 19th Century German philosophy. These unresolved philosophical issues sprang from the controversy over _Geisteswissenschaften_ and _Naturwissenschaften_, over the suggested difference between the cultural sciences and the natural or physical sciences. Under the influence of Weber and through him Rickert, Schutz came to emphasize the accuracy of this distinction and, consequently, the central place of subjective _meaning_ in human experience. In fact, these two concepts played leading roles both in Schutz's first book, _The Phenomenology of the Social World_, and in his subsequent publications.

With regard to the theory of meaning, however, Weber was not Schutz's final teacher. As was evident in _The Phenomenology_, Edmund Husserl provided the key, a phenomenological key, with which to unlock the passage between meaning and action. To run the metaphor in a different direction, it was with this phenomenological key that Schutz closed the doors to reductionisms of various kinds, an enterprise to which he dedicated a large portion of his academic life. Husserl responded positively to Schutz's initial attempt at the phenomenological analysis of social (meaningful) action and even offered him an assistantship in Freiburg, although, for personal reasons, Schutz declined. It was in 1938 that the Nazi move toward occupation of Austria forced him to Paris, where he stayed for a year before emigrating to the United States in July, 1939. While in this country, until his death in 1959, he was a member of the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research in New York. Through the influence of Marvin Farber he was also invited to aid in establishing the *International Phenomenological Society* and was an editorial board member for its journal, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. He became known as a warm, sensitive, and delightful person - at home with music, philosophy, and sociology - who gained the academic respect and affection of both his colleagues and students. It was thus with a great sense of personal and intellectual loss that his friends learned of his death in 1959.

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[17] For further, more detailed biographical information, cf. Hans Jonas, "Alfred Schutz, 1899-1959," _Social Research_, XXVI (Winter, 1959), 471-474; H. L. Van Breda, "Preface," I, pp. vi-xiii; and George Walsh, "Introduction," P, pp. xv-xxi. For further information on the intellectual milieu out of which Schutz comes, cf. the general works on the period such as H. Stuart Hughes, _Consciousness and Society_, Vintage Books (New York: Random House, Inc., 1958), esp. pp. 188-200.

An Introduction to the Dissertation

In comparison to the number of pages devoted to discussions of the *Lebenswelt* and intersubjectivity, "multiple realities" represents a small investment on Schutz's part. It does suggest, however, his attempt to put these more emphasized conceptions into a broader context and to direct disciplined attention to the more inclusive question of reality. In doing so, he sets forth a relational concept which has high relevance for such diverse topics as social science method,[18] the phenomenal-noumenal split of the Kantian tradition, phenomenological social psychology, value judgments in scientific investigation, the "functional prerequisites" for the establishment of sociality, cross-cultural analysis, and, for us here, an ethical pluralism based upon the inherent, multi-directional character of human consciousness. By interpreting Schutz in relation to his notion of "multiple realities" we realize that we diverge from others who begin with the *Lebenswelt* or intersubjectivity. To use Schutz's words, this "attentional modification" assuredly will influence the manner in which the Schutzian corpus is viewed. The *Lebenswelt* becomes in the process a "paramount" (Schutz) reality but, nevertheless, only one among others; intersubjectivity is one of the foundations for human consciousness and for the experience of reality, but it is a contributing, not an inclusive factor. It is with the full knowledge of the interpretative character of this investigation that we proceed.

In order to introduce the subject of this essay, several general themes should be underscored.[19] As far as Schutz is concerned, reality is a matter of attention. In his words, "reality means simply relation to our emotional and active life; whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real."[20] We may have reservations about this kind of simple definition here, but, if what we consciously attend to *is* reality, then we could expect plurality or "multiple realities" from the outset - we attend to many things daily. We attend to dreams, casual conversations, cross-word puzzles, stage plays, formal speeches, mental problem-solving, jokes, paintings, and so forth. These are all realities from Schutz's viewpoint, and, when our conscious experience of each is investigated, it is found that differing rules for perception, selection, and interpretation are used in the experience of each reality. For instance, while I attend to a stage play I treat myself as an onlooker who is peeking in upon the interaction of human beings as they live their lives. I may weep or laugh with the actors, forgetting that "it's only a play" and that the people on stage are public citizens playing a role. To a degree I suspend certain judgments and plunge myself into the world of the stage, the reality of the stage. While I listen to a joke or a story, while I look at a painted landscape on the wall, while I plan a fascinating vacation trip, and while I fitfully dream, these experiences are also real for me. I interpret them in certain ways; they have a certain kind of meaning for me. The shape of the reality, in other words, is based upon my meaningful interpretation of my experience. The kind of meaning the stage play has for me is different from the kind of meaning the death of my parents has. These are both realities, however, each with its own texture.

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[18] Harold Garfinkel has begun to develop what he terms "ethnomethodology" on the basis of Schutz's suggestive philosophy. cf. his *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), esp. pp. 1-34.

[19] A more detailed outline can be found in the *Abstract* for the dissertation.

[20] I, p. 340.

Each reality is, in the Schutzian system, a constellation of meaning or to quote him, a "finite province of meaning." It is made up of seven elements: (1) a tension of consciousness, (2) an epoché, (3) a particular time-perspective, (4) a form of subjectivity-objectivity, (5) a form of experiencing one's self, (6) a form of spontaneity, and

(7) a form of sociality.[21] Six of these are proposed explicitly by Schutz. We are suggesting "the subjective-objective dimension," which is the topic of our third chapter, as an additional element. Also, in the process of our analysis the phrase "the tension of consciousness" will be expanded into what we will call "the attention of consciousness." Both of these additions will be further justified, of course. The seven elements form a composit that Schutz terms "a cognitive style." Each reality or finite province of meaning, then, has a particular cognitive style, reflecting the seven individual elements in a particular form. Cognitive style, in other words, is generic to all realities even though its shape is different in each.[22] The next four chapters will analyze the particular elements in cognitive style and indicate the modifications that are possible in each. The fifth chapter will deal directly with the overarching concept called "multiple realities."

The final chapter will develop the implications that "multiple realities" has for the ethical province of meaning. Ethical reality is a finite province of meaning, too. It has its own cognitive style with a focus of attention, form of time-experience, and so forth. More than that, however, Schutz's concept of "multiple realities" relativizes this province, as it does others. It suggests, also, that the ethical sphere is itself multi-layered with various, even conflicting, ethical systems. The challenge is to adequately face the non-reducible pluralism that exists in this world as well as in the other realms of actuality.

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[21] I, p. 230.

[22] I, p. 232-233 and 341.

Before initiating the analysis of cognitive style, several words need to be said about Schutz's philosophical preferences. He makes it quite clear in an appended note in his first book[23] that he is a phenomenologist. His concern, in other words, is for the analysis of the experiencing, conscious person. This person may be living in his activity or reflecting upon it; he may be awake, day-dreaming, or asleep. As we will see, these activities all differ in their composition, and they are, in terms of Schutz's conceptualization, modifications of experience in daily life. But, nonetheless, the analytical focus is on experiencing. At least theoretically, Schutz's attention is not given only to cognition or to emotion or to perception. The Cartesian formula is by implication changed. It is no longer "I think; therefore, I am" or, indeed in Hume's case, "I perceive; therefore, I am" or even "I feel; therefore, I am." The phenomenological starting point is "I experience; therefore, I am."[24] For instance, because Schutz wishes to take human experiencing seriously, he is not initially concerned with the causal origins in psychological, sociological, or other terms for the experiencing. In the language of our essay, he deals with reality as it is experienced and as it is conceptualized in that experiencing. For the purposes of his investigation, however, he performs the "phenomenological epoché;"[25]

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[23] P, pp. 43-44.

[24] This starting point has many ramifications for contemporary philosophy which it is not our task to explore here. Suffice it to say that it calls into question those philosophies which begin from a less inclusive base; Husserl attacks them for reductionism.

[25] It is important to note that Schutz consciously uses the phenomenological reduction only to clarify and to show the importance of internal time-consciousness. Then he applies the insights to the phenomena of meaning in "ordinary social life." He is not searching for "transcendental knowledge" and does not linger within the "transcendental-

he brackets the belief that the experiencing person has in the reality of his experiencing. This allows Schutz a certain detachment so that he can ask the question: What kind of consciousness and meaning system is necessary for reality to appear to a person in this manner?

We close this Introduction with an exercise in "boundary maintenance." It goes without saying both that Schutz draws upon others for significant portions of his thought and that the Labrynthian question of reality could impel us into an endless number of other important side issues and authors. However, even though men such as Husserl, Weber, Bergson, and James heavily influenced Schutz, we are concerned primarily with Schutz himself and with his explication of "multiple realities." We deal with these other men here - and the fact that we do treat them is obvious - only in so far as Schutz explicitly uses them. This is not to deny the importance of a more detailed analysis of these influential authors in their relation to Schutz, but it will have to take place in a study outside the defined boundaries of this essay. Secondly, we are not setting out here to relate Schutz's philosophical sociology to the philosophical or sociological tradition in general. Granted, this would be most interesting and productive, taking us into the philosophical conflict with positivism and into the work of such men as Aron Gurwitsch

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phenomenological reduction," as Husserl had done. As a matter of fact, Schutz, later in his career, had reservations regarding Husserl's transcendental solution to the problem of intersubjectivity. He writes in 1957, "It is to be surmised that intersubjectivity is not a problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere, but is rather a datum (Gegebenheit) of the lifeworld." (III,p. 82) But cf. the complete article entitled "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," III, pp. 51-84, with comments by Eugene Fink and Schutz following, pp. 84-91.

or even Talcott Parsons.[26] Neither do we attempt a focused analysis of Schutz's philosophy in relation to the way in which his system evolved. All of these matters and many more are highly provocative, but they would entice us out of those areas that provide the focal point for our study of "multiple realities."

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[26] Shortly after Schutz's arrival in this country (July, 1939) he undertook a lengthy analysis of Parson's The Structure of Social Action (1937). Only the constructive portion was ever published (cf. II, p. xi), leaving the critical sections unknown. But Schutz did relate himself to the contemporary sociological scene and in a manner that would prove quite informative for current discussion.

Chapter One

THE TENSION OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE EPOCHÉ

Introduction

In this opening chapter we elevate two elements of the cognitive style for scrutiny. The first, termed by Schutz "the tension of consciousness," is his metaphorical way[27] of saying that human consciousness exists at various levels. He places these levels, following Bergson, upon a continuum which ranges from "sound-asleep" to "wide-awake," from relaxation to engagement in the everyday world - hence, the use of the word "tension." At a particular moment a human being is conscious at one of these levels, and a specific cognitive style includes, indeed is highly influenced by, this.

The second element in cognitive style, made prominent by phenomenological philosophy, is the "epoché" or, to use a mathematical term also employed by Husserl, "bracketing." Just as there are many tensions of consciousness, so this generic concept is plural. It is concretized, for instance, as the epoché of the "natural attitude," the "phenomenological epoché," the religious epoché, the dramatic epoché, and so forth.

In general, the tension and the epoché are reciprocal; the first determines what the conscious person includes or highlights and the second what is thereby excluded or darkened out by the awareness of a particular, coherent field of experience. For instance, dream-consciousness brackets the successive, chronological time of daily life.

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[27] Schutz is obviously not referring to a muscular, physical contraction of some kind.

The Tension of Consciousness

It is in "On Multiple Realities," an essay which is crucial to our understanding of Schutz, that he explicitly presents his notion concerning "the tensions of consciousness."[28] Characteristically, Bergson's philosophy is employed to suggest that conscious life is experienced on an "indefinite" number of levels, each with its own tension. At one end of the spectrum there is action-consciousness, the consciousness of the wide-awake working person which evidences the highest degree of tension, and, at the other, dream-consciousness which reflects the lowest. The particular level at which a person's consciousness exists at a specific moment is determined by his attention à la vie (Bergson), his attention to life. This attention is a basic, regulative principle of consciousness since it delimits the realm that is relevant at a point in time. When Schutz suggests, therefore, that "a specific tension of consciousness" is present in a cognitive style,[29] he is referring to a level along the "sound-asleep" to "wide-awake"[30] continuum influenced by attention to everyday life.

Up until this stage, the matter is quite easily understood and quite straightforwardly put by Schutz. However, in light of what he develops in other sections of his corpus about human consciousness, we are pressed to expand this element of cognitive style. The tension of consciousness as Schutz conceives of it underscores, of course, the modifications that levels of sleep and awakeness cause in the awareness of reality; it is a necessary concept for understanding the part that consciousness plays in cognitive style. But, as he himself graphically indicates in other places, consciousness includes more than this kind of tension. It has direction, may to varying degrees reflect upon life or participate in it, is to varying degrees conceptual and selective, and so forth. All of these factors contribute in their own manner to the creation of a reality or cognitive style. This will become more evident as we uncover in Schutz what we call an "attentional" concept of human consciousness and propose that each cognitive style has an attention of consciousness.

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[28] cf., I, p. 212.

[29] I, p. 230.

[30] For a further explanation of what he means by "wide-awake," cf. I, p. 213.

Prephenomenal and Phenomenal Consciousness

It is in the second chapter of The Phenomenology of the Social World that Schutz presents his most extended treatment of human consciousness.[31] The title "The Constitution of Meaningful Lived Experience in the Constitutor's Own Stream of Consciousness" quickly relates the discussion to meaning[32] and restricts it to a concern for the individual Ego's consciousness. Treatment of the topic commences, characteristically, with a distinction from Henri Bergson's philosophy of duration.[33]

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[31] P, pp. 45-96.

[32] The concern for meaning does not arise ex nihilo in the opening pages of this second chapter. Schutz announced the investigation of meaning as thematic for The Phenomenology at the outset of the book, pp. 6-15, esp. 12-13. We are exploring the second chapter at this point because here Schutz addresses our present topic, the constitution of consciousness in the individual experience of the Ego. The equally important problems of intersubjectivity and their relation both to individual consciousness and to meaning will be confronted later. We say "equally important" because, in probing for origins, human consciousness is found to be created by the Other.

For Bergson there is a marked contrast between life within the inner stream of consciousness and life within the world of space-time. The first in its most extreme form includes consciousness of "*pure* duration"[34] or, as Bergson puts it, pure "*durée*."[35] The manner in which spatial categories of extension and spatially influenced temporal categories of succession overlay the experience of duration make it difficult for us to appreciate duration itself. According to Bergson and Schutz, however, consciousness of duration is primordial and is the foundation for the subsequent acquisition of spatiotemporal concepts. It is felt most directly when the Ego is freed from its use of reflective categories and lives *in* its acts. Here there is no segmentation, no relation, and no objectification - all spatial notions. "Time" is simply duration, fluid and melting from a "*now*-thus" to a "new *now*-thus"; "past," "present," and

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[33] The influence of Bergson upon Schutz is notable. There are approximately twenty-nine references to Bergson in Schutz's four volumes. Extended sections show the influence of Bergson upon such diverse subjects in Schutz as the theory of choice (free-will and determinism), language, "appresentation," music, and here the philosophy of time (duration). Thirteen years after the publication of *The Phenomenology*, Schutz began his essay "On Multiple Realities" with a review of Bergson's concept of consciousness similar to the one given in chapter two, an indication of Schutz's continued respect. For a bibliography of the Bergsonian literature that Schutz found relevant to his discussion of consciousness in 1945 cf. I, p. 213, ftn. 7.

[34] From the outset it should be said that "*pure* duration" is a limiting concept. The relationship between prephenomenal and phenomenal consciousness below will place it at the extreme prephenomenal end of the prephenomenal-phenomenal spectrum. In *The Phenomenology*, pp. 45-53, Schutz does not make this especially clear. Later he clarifies himself by refusing to equate *pure* duration with prephenomenal consciousness.

[35] Cf. Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1960), pp. 90-110.

"future" which are the result of segmentation, relation, and reflection do not exist. There is simply a constantly flowing now.[36] Consciousness at this level has not been garnished with reflection and is in many ways similar to the experience of William Faulkner's Benjy in The Sound and Fury. Mental retardation, in Benjy's case, inhibits the development of spatiotemporal categories. He does not separate, therefore, the shadows cast upon the wall by a fire from the fire itself but perceives them as "fire on the wall."[37] Benjy to a large degree lives in his experience. He does not stand back from it and isolate "fire," "light," "wall," and "shadows" as he would do if he were less conscious of fluid duration and more intent upon applying those spatiotemporal categories which separate and then re-relate.

The second level of consciousness distinguished by Bergson is of space and time. It is the most familiar to us because it is the consciousness experienced in everyday life. Here the textures in the field of consciousness are strikingly modified in relation to the consciousness of the durée. Through the activity of reflection - which is essentially a turning against the continuous stream, a reflective activity - there is conscious experience of discrete, spatialized-temporalized entities. Here the intellect focuses upon something like an automobile, gives it a specific name, distinguishes particular sensible characteristics, relates it to a specific place, time, and function - fashions a peculiar interpretational matrix. This is not to say that consciousness at this level is disjointed. There is a fluidity, a stream-like-connectedness, but it emerges in the process of relating particular, distinguishable entities, be they chairs and tables or words and concepts. In the case of the durée, in contrast, fluidity emerges because there are no such entities to relate.

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[36] According to the Bergsonian view, pure duration does not include spatial reference at all. Cf. Ibid., pp. 100-104.

[37] We are not suggesting here that the stream of consciousness is only for the mentally ill nor that Faulkner's description captures the stream, since description is from the beginning a distortion. Retardation of the reflective processes, however, does allow for a more direct experience of the durée. Faulkner's narrative simply indicates the lack of distinction within the pure stream. What follows is a passage from The Sound and the Fury, Vintage Books (New York: Random House, Inc., n.d.), pp. 75-6, which has given rise to the comments above: "Versh set me down and we went into Mother's room. There was a fire. It was rising and falling on the walls. I could smell the sickness. It was a cloth folded on Mother's head. Her hair was on the pillow.... We went to the bed. The fire went out of the mirror...Caddy went and leaned her face over the bed and Mother's hand came into the firelight. Her rings jumped on Caddy's back." Emphasis ours. Cf. also pp. 90-91.

Schutz's use of Husserl at this point[38] makes it clear that, regardless of what Bergson may have thought,[39] the stream of consciousness is, for Schutz, a unity capable of two legitimate employments. He states that Husserl viewed the stream of consciousness as possessing a "double intentionality." Husserl's The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness calls this "longitudinal" and "transverse" intentionality.[40] The first represents consciousness of the "flux-form," the melting together of flowing now-phases, which Bergson called the durée. It partakes of a "pre-phenomenal," pre-immanent temporality.[41] The second represents consciousness of elements within the flow, the objects of space and time. It is part of phenomenal temporality. But the definitive suggestion of Husserl's analysis is: consciousness is motile and multi-directional in its activity while being unified at the same time. Husserl distinguishes two directions that consciousness can take.

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[38] It is unfortunate that Schutz did not clarify the relationship between Husserl and Bergson, document Bergson's distinction explicitly, state Bergson's justifications for establishing the durée as a separable phenomenon, or suggest Husserl's phenomenological (Erlebnis) foundation for the double intentionality of consciousness. For Husserl, as he states in the eight opening pages of his The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (Subsequently referred to as Internal T-C), duration emerges through a phenomenological study of lived experience. Objective or spatiotemporal consciousness is contrasted and separated from this primordial experience. Thus the "double intentionality" of consciousness that Husserl speaks of here is justified to the extent that one accepts the phenomenological investigation. This background is not illumed by Schutz, and the impression is given to the reader that these conclusions are being somewhat forced upon him. What Bergson's intentions were we are not told either, but an uneasy feeling remains that he and Husserl have come to a similar conclusion, which appear that way certainly on the surface, but for different reasons. As in the case of "atheistic" and "Christian" peace marchers tromping side by side, the underlying but quite divergent rationale of each may be highly instructive. Schutz would have been less confusing if he had simply begun with Husserl, who is his most definitive inspiration in these matters.

[39] There is evidence that Schutz, at least, found Bergson dualistic - with good evidence from Bergson. Bergson is far less willing to see the durée and spatiotemporal consciousness as two manifestations of one consciousness. For him, according to Schutz, the latter is an alienation from the former, something of a perversion. Cf. P, p. 47.

> Like two aspects of one and the same thing, there are in the unique flux of consciousness two inseparable, homogeneous intentionalities which require one another and are interwoven with one another.[42]

Schutz writes in a similar vein about these "two levels of consciousness."[43] Taking his cue from Bergson, he suggests that in everyday life the Ego lives on the second level of consciousness, the level of the spatio-temporal world, through a particular "attention to life." The movement from this level of consciousness to that of pure duration is accomplished by a relaxation of the "psychic tension" peculiar to the everyday world. With this de-tensioning emerges consciousness of "a coming-to-be and passing-away that has no contours, no boundaries, and no differentiation."[44]

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[40] Cf. Internal T-C, pp. 105-110.

[41] Ibid., p. 109.

[42] Ibid. Emphasis in the original.

[43] P, p. 47.

Even at this initial stage in our study, it is obvious that lived experience (Erlebnis) is hardly monolithic. There are at least two activities of consciousness. And the character of human experience varies significantly with the consciousness employed. In the durée, a person, to use Husserl's words which are later picked up by Heidegger, lives in his activity, in his living; in the spatiotemporal world of reflection, a person lives outside his acts and views them in the past tense as objects. Also, and this holds special relevance for the Weberian notion of verstehen, human action can be viewed in at least two ways, "as enduring conscious processes or as frozen, spatialized, already completed acts."[45] The differences and implications arising from each perspective are striking. For instance, completed acts do not reveal intention, whereas activity as a conscious process does - an important distinction in the free will-determinism controversy of the ethical realm.

In accordance with Husserl and Schutz, then, human consciousness is both prephenomenal and phenomenal. But, since they are two manifestations of one consciousness, how are they related? Schutz does not dwell at length with this subject,[46] but it is possible to venture several comments. First of all, Schutz adheres to Bergsonian themes in maintaining that the acquisition of spatiotemporal concepts is built upon the bedrock of experienced duration. In this sense prephenomenal experience precedes phenomenal experience in the life of the maturing child. Secondly, however, because of our immersion in the spatial world of the everyday, it is only by "a painful effort" (Bergson) that we can turn from the spatiotemporal realm long enough to uncover the primordial stream of duration.

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[44] Ibid.

[45] P, p. 46.

[46] In fact, in The Phenomenology, p. 45ff, the impression can be gotten that these are two discrete categories. Later Schutz corrects this, as we suggest here.

Thirdly, the most profitable way to relate prephenomenal and phenomenal consciousness is in terms of a continuum. Handling the constructs in this way properly corrects the temptation to treat them either as necessarily antithetical or as mutually exclusive. As we view the matter, the spectrum moves from consciousness of pure duration through varying kinds and degrees of reflective conceptualization to highly formalized predication. The kind of experience, the degree of immersion in my living, the discreteness with which I perceive objects and their fields, and the degree of reflection - in short, the data of consciousness - change as I move from one end of the spectrum to the other. Let us be more concrete about this by tracing the possible movement along the continuum. It should be remembered that at a given moment I may be conscious at any one of the innumerable "points" on this spectrum.[47] At the prephenomenal end - Schutz also calls this the "prepredicative" level - I live in my activities. My attention may be caught involuntarily by an object in the spatial world or by a thought within my stream of consciousness; I may voluntarily attend to something of the same nature because of my current interests. At any rate, I do not stop the flow in order to reflect upon that "object" of my experience. It is not "well circumscribed"[48] in a cognitive sense. Schutz claims, and we think correctly, that this is closest to what can be called "original" experience. This experience is not of isolated entities with discrete borders and contours but of fringed objects within a field of experience. In Husserl's terms these objects are only slightly removed from their background and retain their "halos." For instance, as I walk down a wooded path I am aware of "trees" around me but not of "this tree" and "that tree" or of "redwood tree" and "pine tree." As a matter of fact, at the level of pure duration the category "tree" is not even used. The manner in which a baby learns to distinguish a tree from other objects reflects the movement from the flow of pure duration to the experience of isolated, labeled phenomena that we are tracing. As I move toward the phenomenal end of the spectrum, I begin to reflect upon my experiencing, begin to put it within a learned interpretational scheme based upon the relation of present experience to past, and in this way "step out" of the flowing present by objectifying it. Schutz places such conceptualizations as "mountains," "trees," and "dogs" within the prephenomenal,[49] but this is moving us very close to the phenomenal realm. With the increase in categorization ("typification" in Schutz's terms) and interpretation I move into the phenomenal portion of the continuum. At its extreme, phenomenal consciousness includes a high degree of reflection upon my experience. Furthermore, I no longer take my experience for granted; it becomes problematic for me, and I use concepts outside the common-sense world in order to understand. The conscious activity of scientists and philosophers with their highly rational conceptions is placed at this end of the continuum.

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[47] The foundation for Schutz's thoughts in this area can be uncovered in his understanding of Husserl. He gives clearest expression to this reliance in his essay "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy," III, pp. 92-115. There he deals with the movement from "prepredicative" to "predicative" experience. These words replace their synonyms "prephenomenal" and "phenomenal" in Schutz's later writings.

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[48] Cf. I, p. 112.

[49] Cf. I, pp. 7-8; II, p. 233; and III, p. 127. Cf. also his treatment of the "Thou-orientation" (II, p. 24f) and the "We-relation" (P, p. 172 and 181) as in the same sense "prepredicative."

In summary, the movement from prephenomenal to phenomenal consciousness involves modifications in the following factors: (1) the immersion in my activity; (2) the discrete or circumscribed nature of attentional objects (with their fields); (3) the cognitive reflection upon experienced objects with its related linguist precision; (4) the relation of entities;[50] (5) typification (categorization); (6) reception-creation; (7) the taken-for-granted; and (8) experienced time. The motility of human consciousness is reflected in its ability to successively exist at an indefinite number of levels, with modifications in the above elements, along the prephenomenal-phenomenal spectrum.

Consciousness and Intentionality

Throughout the previous analysis, consciousness was always "consciousness of...,"[51] e.g. duration or space and time. The phrase "consciousness of...," Husserl learned from his teacher Franz Brentano,[52] indicates that consciousness and the "object" of consciousness are, although "intentionally" linked, analytically separable.[53] Descartes, whose mantle Husserl inherited, had not made a radical distinction at this point; Husserl did and thus moved beyond him. Use of the phrase "consciousness of..." also suggests that consciousness is by its very nature directional, directed toward something else; in Husserl's words, consciousness is "intentional." There is, therefore, no such thing as thought, fear, or remembrance as such. Every thought is thought of, every fear is fear of, and every remembrance is remembrance of the object that is thought, feared, or remembered. Husserl, and it is fair to include Schutz, thought of this intentionality as, in the words of the Ideas, "the main phenomenological theme."[54] In fact, it was Husserl's conviction that "it is intentionality which characterizes consciousness in the pregnant sense of the term..."[55]

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[50] The process of coupling or pairing is called "appresentation" by Husserl and Schutz and is a subject worthy of study in its own right. Cf. I, pp. 294-305 and III, pp. 61-69.

[51] The ellipsis is inescapable here since the alternative would be to say "consciousness of something." The word "something", however, implies an object, a spatialized existent. But there is obviously consciousness of non-things such as thoughts, bodily sensations, dreams, and duration. This probably says, among other things, that language is fashioned primordially within the spatiotemporal sphere and must be stretched ("symbolicated," possibly) to fit others. When the word "object" is used in this essay it may refer either to a "thing" in the spatial-physical sense, to a "thing" in the non-physical sense such as an idea, or to both, depending upon the context.

Although the concept is briefly sketched here, we do not wish to leave the impression that it is a simple one. Spiegelberg, for instance, separates at least five major themes in Husserl's concept of intentionality,[56] and the texture that Husserl himself gives to it, both in his Ideas and in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, indicates that we have just begun to scratch the surface when we speak of intentionality as directional. In relation to our present chapter, it is enough to say here that consciousness does not simply evidence a tension between wake-fullness and dream-fullness. For Schutz, following Husserl, it also reflects a relatively focused attention to a particular object, even though this object may be of various kinds and have various dimensions.

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[52] Cf. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, Vol. I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 39-42 for a brief introduction to Brentano's theory of intentionality.

[53] Although this is not our topic at present, the separability of consciousness and its object make it possible for Husserl to perform the phenomenological reduction, i.e., bracket the object as existent and focus upon the consciousness of it (the object as-it-appears-to-me) as a separate phenomenon. For a helpful, preliminary description of this largely misunderstood operation, cf. I, pp. 104-106.

[54] Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Collier Books, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1967), pp. 222-224. Subsequently referred to as Ideas. Cf. also for a major section on this theme by Husserl, Ideas, pp. 107-113.

[55] Ideas, p. 222. Emphasis in the original.

Before closing this section on intentionality, one more important comment should be made more explicitly. Consciousness may be of various objects; it is multi-intentional or, in terms of our emphases, multi-attentional. In the daily experience of the human being there is constant intentional modification, attention being given to such diverse things as the amber intersection light, the pleasant conversation of the evening before, and the annual meeting one month hence. It is this multi-attentionality, which brings with it both subtle and bold changes in the field of consciousness, that creates experienced multiplicity. This multiplicity holds profound implications for the problem of reality and for the polytextured province of ethical meaning.

Consciousness and Reflection

Several paragraphs ago we dealt with two levels of consciousness, the prephenomenal and the phenomenal. It was indicated there that phenomenal consciousness involved a turning-back against the "temporal, uni-directional and irreversible" stream of duration. This general activity may be termed "reflection" and, in varying ways, accomplishes modifications in awareness or, put differently, in the direction of consciousness. Viewed in temporal categories, reflection is directed toward the past as "remembrance" and toward the future as "protention." We will consider these two manifestations of reflexivity now.

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[56] Spiegelberg, Movement, Vol. I, pp. 107-109.

Following Husserl's lead once again,[57] Schutz distinguishes "primary remembrance" or "retention" from "secondary remembrance" or "recollection."[58] In terms of temporal sequence, primary remembrance is the closest to the act of perception in the Now of duration. The initial perception or "impression" always terminates, according to Husserl, in a "now-apprehension" which is the "nucleus of a comet's tail of retentions."[59] To be concrete, when we hear the opening three cords in the first movement of Beethoven's First Symphony, the now-apprehension of the first chord is carried as a retentional comet's tail into the now-apprehension of the second chord. This second now-apprehension is likewise carried as retention to the third chord, and so forth. In the process two basic things are happening: (1) the retentional process provides a "sense" of continuity (context), (2) as the retentions are successively removed from the current now-apprehension, they run off[60] into imperceptibility through a continual "shoving back" process.[61] It should be noted, however, that the retentional process is non-contentual. That is to say, when we apprehend the third chord we do not experience the first chord as a specific content "played" concurrently; retention provides a "sense" of field, not of focus.[62] It is through secondary remembrance that content appears.

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[57] Cf. Internal T-C, pp. 40-97 and Ideas, p. 77ff and 144f.

[58] P, p. 48 and Internal T-C, pp. 51 and 57 respectively. Emphasis ours.

[59] Internal T-C, p. 52. Emphasis ours.

[60] For a detailed and diagrammatic treatment of this running off phenomenon cf. Internal T-C, pp. 44-50. The presentation is clarified through Husserl's comparison of retention and echo on pp. 52-54.

After primary remembrance (retention) is past the second form of remembrance, which Husserl calls "a new memory," arises. The emergence takes two forms. The first may be termed involuntary and the second voluntary remembrance. Through what Husserl calls "laying hold"[63] a person may spontaneously or involuntarily remember an isolated event from the past. It arises to consciousness and then recedes; there is no concentration upon it, and it is experienced as fleeting. For instance, the smell of a certain perfume may thrust into passing consciousness a woman from the past who once wore it. This involuntary remembrance is contrasted with voluntary remembrance, a polysynthetic activity of consciousness in which the original event(s) is serially re-constructed or "re-collected" in a "continuum of presentifications" so that it is "perceived" again but only "as if."[64] Here the person wills the reconstruction.

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[61] By concentrating upon retention or any other factor we do not wish to leave the impression that our analysis is life itself. For the experiencing person retention and protention and the Now and other elements are interwoven so as to be experienced almost simultaneously.

[62] "Reflection" as used earlier was defined as "a turning-back" against the stream of the Now. It may seem strange, then, to consider retention as a form of reflection since there is no objectified turning-back to a content. Granted, this is a marginal case. But retention is reflection not because the experiencing subject turns to it as object but because it is removed, if only to a small degree, from the center of the Now, shading into the just-has-been, and because it "reflects" the Now. It is difficult to place analytically, nonetheless, because it is a shading, a bridge rather between the Now and the meaningful, the Now and the past. Schutz himself responds variously to this analytical ambiguity. At one juncture, while writing of the We-relation, he places retention outside reflection, suggesting that it is accomplished "in a flash" and that there is no need "to reflect on it." Cf. P, p. 172.

[63] Internal T-C, p. 59.

The three types of remembrance - retentional, involuntary, and voluntary - exhibit certain similarities and differences. All three are in some way removed from the original now-apprehension, retention being the closest. Although, theoretically, retention is the most faithful to the original impression, its clarity or "indubitability"[65] is non-contentual and, therefore, inaccessible except to the experiencing subject. Involuntary and voluntary remembrance are unclear in comparison but accessible. Projected action, consequently, is dependent upon these last two forms of remembrance.

In conclusion, the importance of this study of consciousness and remembrance is twofold for us: (1) remembrance is not monolithic but multi-layered; (2) remembrance, regardless of its specific variety, is a modification of the now-apprehension or original impression.[66]

A second reflexive activity of the consciousness is future-directed. Although it was called simply "protention" above, it is composed of both "protention" and "anticipation," which parallel primary and secondary remembrance in certain respects. Protention into the future, Husserl and Schutz claim,[67] is part of every memory and is merged in the natural attitude with retention. It is immediate to the now-apprehension and provides, in a manner parallel to past-oriented "retention," a noncontentual future orientation. To return to the illustration from Beethoven's First Symphony, protention operates during the now-apprehension of the second chord as the "sense" that something will follow, that there will be an "and-so-forth." It "presents" or introduces the new "now-thus" while itself remaining empty (*leer*) or noncontentual in the cognitive sense. In contrast, "anticipation" (*Vorerinnerung*) or "foreseeing expectation" "*re*-presents." It is directed not to the immediate future but to the distant future and is constructed in a fashion which parallels that of secondary remembrance. That is to say, it is re-collective; through reflection (remembrance of past experience) it orders or phantasies an object and projects it into the future as "will-have-been." For instance, at the beginning of the Beethoven concert a conscious person may anticipate, based upon his or the communication of another's (remembered) past experience, that the conductor will leave after the last selection. The conductor's leaving is projected as "will have left." This "projection" may be fleetingly considered or highly developed through concentration, but there is conscious content involved. In the ethical realm projecting and the conceived project are highly significant. It is in the future perfect tense that anticipated, moral behavior is considered and evaluated. Ethical activity and the notion of moral responsibility are founded on the acknowledged capacity of human consciousness to project and choose between projected alternatives.

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[64] Ibid.

[65] Cf. P, p. 48 and Internal T-C, pp. 57ff and 72f.

[66] For the extensive Husserlian background to Schutz's notions on impression, retention, and recollection, cf. Internal T-C, pp. 50-79, 105-110, and 115-117 - in short, the whole book. The concept of remembrance will arise again when we deal specifically with the problem of time.

[67] Internal T-C, p. 76; P, pp. 57-63.

Consciousness, the Creation of Meaning, and Its Modification

We have already mentioned Schutz's distinction between the lived life of duration and reflection, no matter how formal or immediate, upon this continuous stream. It was also indicated that the durée is experienced as melted phases in which there is no inherent relation or discrete separation. Because meaning is created, for Schutz, through the cognitive relation of either ideal or "real," separable objects, the experience of duration itself is meaningless. We will discuss this further, but here, by way of introduction, it can be said that experiencing in and of itself does not have meaning in Schutz's scheme. It is given meaning through cognitive reflection upon what has been experienced.[68] "Meaning" is, in Schutz's terms, "a certain way of directing one's gaze at an item of one's experience." It is created, in other words, through the Ego's voluntary or directed attention to his past experience. This needs further explanation.

As far as Schutz is concerned all experiencing is not meaningful. Much which is not focused upon consciously to some degree remains only part of the fluid durée. It is prephenomenal and, given Schutz's use of the word "prephenomenal" in this context, meaningless.[69] To be sure, all experiencing includes consciousness, but not all conscious is engaged in meaning-creation. That consciousness which does create meaning is reflexively thrown back against the stream to remember, relate, and compare the objects it captures within its net. For instance, let us say that a perfectly new object, which we will call a "glaboo" but which has not been named at all by the experiencing self, is seen. As seen within the durée it is meaningless. It is through the, possibly, quite rapid comparison of this glaboo with other objects of one's past experience that this meaningless object becomes meaningful. And it becomes meaningful, according to Schutz, because it is taken from immediate experience and mentally related to a stock of meaningful categories which form a sedimented field of meaning. The constitution of meaning is more complex than this,[70] but it follows this general pattern. Schutz says it best:

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[68] Cf."Clarification of the Concept of 'Attaching Meaning to an Act,'" P, pp. 38-43.

[69] Schutz calls these "essentially actual" experiences. Cf. P, p. 70.

> The concept of meaning and its problematic have no application to life considered as duration. It would be trivial at the very least to say that the unreflected-upon Here and Now is meaningful. The Acts of the cogito in which the Ego lives, the living present in which the Ego is borne along from each Here and Now to the next - these are never caught in the cone of light. They fall, therefore, outside the sphere of the meaningful. On the contrary (and this also emerges from our argument): the actual Here and Now of the living Ego _is the very source of the light_, the apex from which emanate _the rays spreading out conelike_ over the already elapsed and receding phases of the stream of duration, illuminating them and marking them off from the rest of the stream.[71]

Meaning constitution is further complicated because meaning can be attentionally modified. A shift in the object being reflectively attended to and a shift in the sedimented meaning to which it is related can significantly change the created meaning. This is an important matter, because meaning modification is one of the major sources for the emergence of pluralistic reality. To understand attentional modification more thoroughly, we must begin with Husserl. In the _Ideas_[72] Husserl gives extended treatment to the distinction between _noesis_ and _noema_. Generally, this distinction is between thought and the "object" of thought, between the consciousness of and the "object" attended to.[73] A piece of chalk, for instance, may remain the same while my thoughts about it change; a flowing river may be ever-changing while my thoughts about my perception of it remain relatively constant. Other combinations are possible, and the shift in either noesis or noema also can be to varying degrees. Although there is a certain stability in the noema as physical objects, other "objects" of consciousness such as thoughts are obviously less stable. Because of the possible shift in both noesis and noema, "all experiences admit of attentional modification: experiences of the perceptual world, of the world of memory, of the world of pure phantasy and consequently projects."[74] Attention itself is shaded "from actual comprehending to merely noting to hardly noticing to leaving completely unobserved."[75] Such attentional shadings also affect our attitudes, whether neutral or positive, toward some content of consciousness.[76] The crucial implication for our investigation is: when there is a shift in attention, and there are many kinds, there may be a shift in meaning.[77] To be somewhat simplistic, if attention is focused upon a wooden chair, its meaning is constructed in terms of "solidity," "brownness," "comfortableness," and so forth. If attention shifts to the atomic structure of the chair, its meaning is established in terms of "movement," "colorlessness," and "space." Thus, through attentional modification the chair's primary meaning slides from "solidity" to "non-solidity." In performing such operations, therefore, it is important to specify the object that is attended to by the consciousness and the context of relevances that this establishes or else there is hopeless contradiction.[78] Meaning, in summary, is related to a particular focus of consciousness upon past experience within a particular field of past experiences, to a particular field of sedimented meaning, and may be transformed over time through a shift in these elements.[79]

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[70] For instance, there are times when the stock of interpretative knowledge does not provide the clue or when one object can be placed within several fields of meaning at the same time.

[71] P, p. 70. Emphasis in the original

[72] For an extended treatment by Husserl cf. _Ideas_, pp. 257-259 and 335-349.

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[73] William James mirrors the same distinction in his separation of the "topic" from the "object" of thought. Cf. III, p. 12.

[74] P, pp. 72-3.

[75] P, p. 73.

[76] Ideas, p. 270.

[77] P, pp. 73-4.

Consciousness, the Non-Cognitive, and the Unconscious

Schutz's conceptual scheme relies heavily upon the cognitive dimension; his roots in Husserl and Husserl's roots in Descarte are obvious. The construction of meaning that we have been discussing is based upon the conscious, volitional, and cognitive reflection upon past experience and its cognitive relationship with a coalesced meaning system. At this level Schutz's description is persuasive. However, is there not another, non-cognitive dimension to the meaningful? Even though this complicates the picture somewhat, we venture that there is and that an encompassing phenomenological treatment of experience must take it into account. It is not our intent to do that here, simply to suggest a hole in the line of Schutz's system through which further investigation must move. In fact, the field has been explored to a large degree by Eugene Gendlin in his Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning.[80] According to this author, meaning is not only cognitive but also "felt"; it is experienced. When words "just don't say what I mean"; when we grope for gestures, create metaphors, and pause for words to come; when we cry during a motion picture but cannot say or think why; and when we find something cognitively meaningful only after we have expressed it, we are in the domain of "felt-meaning." Meaning is, in other words, more than the cognitive relationship of symbols or things; it is felt and experienced.[81] If we were to develop this in relation to Schutz, his cognitive meaning would be placed at one end of a spectrum moving from consciously felt-meaning to consciously cognitive-meaning. In terms of chronological sequence, cognitive meaning often emerges from felt-meaning.

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[78] These operations were performed in the wide-awake state. What would happen if they were accomplished in the dream-state or the mystic state or any other state which variously modifies the normal categories of space and time?

[79] We have not treated the constitution or relationship of meaning groups; called by Schutz "contexts of meaning" (cf. P, pp. 74-78) and "the ordering under schemes" (cf. P, pp. 78-86). But these are built upon the fundamental processes of meaning construction and meaning modification with which we have dealt. We also have not faced the relation of value and meaning. Schutz does not either. It seems necessary to introduce some notion of value to account for the various kinds of ways that objects are ranked in relation to the stock of meaning.

Just as cognitive-meaning is variously precise so felt-meaning is variously conscious. It may be felt strongly or imperceptibly. In other words, felt-meaning may trail off into the unconscious. How does Schutz, in his discussion of human consciousness, deal with this important psychological concept? He doesn't. Although he suggests the justified use of depth psychology in dealing with motivation,[82] he makes little or no reference to Freud, to Jung, or to the unconscious. This hiatus as well as that created by the absence of felt-meaning in his system reflects his cognitive approach to meaning and to experience. It is of no slight importance that we are developing Schutz's notion of cognitive style. In spite of this lack, however, he is remarkably sensitive to non-cognitive dimensions or, better, to the limits of cognition. His study of the slippage between symbols and intended meaning shows this.

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[80] Eugene T. Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962).

[81] Schutz himself does deal with this level indirectly when speaking of "protention" and "retention," but he does not exploit it - probably because Husserl's framework makes it difficult. The notion of the pre-phenomenal also provides an opening.

But a further word in his behalf can also be said regarding his skirting of the unconscious. The task that he gives himself includes the phenomenological inspection of direct human experience. Granted, this has gradations, but it focuses his attention upon conscious experience. He would thus be concerned, if he were at all, with the unconscious as it is reflected in the conscious and would point to the fact that Freud, for instance, had to become conscious of the unconscious before it could take on meaning for him. Furthermore, it must be admitted that the unconscious is a difficult category to deal with since it is definitionally outside a person's awareness. He must be informed of its operation by another who supposedly has the "clue" to its manifestation. This means that there is always the danger of imputation; it is always the other's evaluation that I am or am not influenced by unconscious factors. This may or may not jibe with my own evaluation of my experience. Since Schutz's starting point is "my" experience - and this is one of the strengths of the argument - certain restrictions are naturally placed upon the data open for his inspection.

The Attention of Consciousness and Cognitive Style

Human consciousness at a particular moment attends to an object within a field. This object is discrete to varying degrees, depending upon the degree to which it is treated as a categorized phenomenon. The attention of consciousness can be arrested by the object, and, hence, attention is involuntary or it can be voluntarily directed toward the object of focus. In either case consciousness is of something; in Husserl's terms it reflects "intentionality." We use the phrase the "attention of consciousness" because the word "intention" connotes volition - "I intend to do this" - whereas consciousness may be involuntarily employed at times. This attention is also influenced by "the tension of consciousness" caused by wakefulness and sleep.

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[82] Cf. III, p. 123.

The attention of consciousness establishes, therefore, a focus and a field in present experience. This selectivity immediately rules out other focus-field combinations, but it also provides one of the two bases for the establishment of meaning. The focus-field is related through cognitive reflection, according to Schutz, to one's present experience with its established meaning system and becomes itself meaningful through its fit, regardless of kind, with this meaning system. The two together, focus-field and sedimented meaning, form a constellation or meaning context. Schutz calls this a "finite province of meaning." The cognitive style of each reality or finite province of meaning has this attentional focus and correlated meaning system. The difference in realities is based upon the difference in the objects attended to and the meaning constellation that is created. The ethical province differs from the aesthetic province, for instance, in that the former has a meaning configuration related to moral goodness whereas the latter relates to "the beautiful." In all cases, however, meaning is the crucial delimiting element.

Another significant feature of the attention of consciousness is that it is motile. It shifts from focus-field-meaning to focus-field-meaning; ever new meanings and meaning provinces are capable of establishment. In other words, consciousness, both analytically and experientially, is best viewed more as *process* than as punctiform, a continual and dynamic re-attentioning, in which meaning is always being modified. "Multiple realities" is a notion founded upon this attentional and meaning-modification.

The Epoché and Cognitive Style

It is on the basis of the attention of consciousness that a particular domain of meaning is established. This element of cognitive style thus performs a positive, constructive operation. Because the human being cannot attend to everything at the same time, however, certain other objects with their meaning contexts are left unattended. This means that there are possible entities for experience at the unfocused periphery of current attention and to varying degrees removed from, even completely outside change, but exclusion of something is constant. In Schutz's terms, with each attention there is an *epoché*. This is a Greek concept employed by Husserl which means "suspension of judgment." The attentional focus of each cognitive style suspends judgment or, to use another Husserlian term, puts in "brackets" those things outside its purview.[82] For instance, the natural *epoché*, correlative to attention to the natural world of the everyday, brackets doubt in the existence of physical objects. What might be called the dramatic *epoché* or the *epoché* of the stage brackets consideration of the actors as citizens or as anything but the persons they are portraying. Put simply, the attention of consciousness designates what a person consciously attends to and the *epoché* pinpoints what he suspends outside attention.

This raises a provocative question. To what extent are the brackets solid lines? The answer to this depends, we think, upon the attentional situation and the kind of *epoché* performed. Suspension of doubt in physical existence, the *epoché* of the everyday world, may be solidly constructed. Few persons, as they live their lives, keep in the back of their mind the qualification "but the object I am touching or the thought I am thinking may not be there at all." The brackets here are solid, in other words. A person viewing a dramatic presentation, however, may suspend doubt that the actor is other than the character he is playing, but the lines of the brackets are dotted: the person may hold the qualification "but I know he's only acting" in the back of his head, and this influences the manner in which he attends to the drama itself.[83]

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[82] Cf. III, p. 5f and I, p. 233.

Whatever our answer might be to this question, the *epoché* with its contents may be as instructive as the positive meaning created by the attentional focus. At least what is excluded from view puts what is included in a wider perspective and suggests that a particular attention of consciousness is not the only or absolute one. Schutz's conception of multiple realities is based upon this kind of attentional and *epoché*-pluralism.

Toward an Understanding of the Ethical Province

The ethical province of meaning, like any other, is created by a person's attention of consciousness correlated with a meaning system. The meaning system in the ethical sphere, we would expect, is based upon a conception of "moral goodness." The experienced attentional focus seems, at this point, to include my own or another's intentions, my own or another's actions, and the accomplished state of affairs brought about by these actions. At a less specific level, attention may also be directed to my intentions as a whole, to what may be called the indications of my character; I may treat another's character in the same fashion. Actions and resultant conditions may also be attended to in relation to a long period of time. The fact that each person attends differently to each of these factors; that there is often slippage between intention, action, and result; that the sedimented ethical system, in terms of which evaluations are made, differs from person to person; and that the data open to my attention (e.g. the intentions of another) is variously concrete indicates that the ethical province includes a high degree of pluralism.

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[83] Another question which we do not answer here also appears: To what degree does the *epoché* include *unconscious* elements? Is the *epoché* in other words, a conscious suspension alone or both a conscious suspension and an unconscious omission? If it is the latter, then areas open up which may not be attended to within a phenomenology of human experience. Or, better, in line with what we suggested earlier, a phenomenology of human experience may need to include a cross-referencing of experience, the experience of the depth psychologist for whom the unconscious is consciously used and the experience of his patient for whom the unconscious is, obviously, not consciously experienced. This is what Schutz would call a cross-referencing of realities.

Chapter Two

THE TIME DIMENSION

Introduction

In this second chapter we treat "the time perspective," the third element in Schutz's cognitive style. But time has entered the discussion before and has played an intimate part in the exposition of human consciousness. In fact, the interpretation of consciousness suggested by Schutz relies so heavily upon Husserl's investigation of time-consciousness and upon Bergson's conception of the durée that consciousness may not have been sufficiently distinguished from duration. In this chapter we are not going to dwell at length upon duration as the foundation of consciousness but upon particular time dimensions that the experiencing person may be conscious of. But before doing that we must clear the way by making explicit the primordial relation between duration and consciousness.

Both prephenomenal and phenomenal consciousness of something - let us say a physical object[84] - demands time-passage or duration of some kind. For instance, we flash a visual object on a screen for a hundredth of a second. Prephenomenal consciousness of the object, i.e., consciousness of it previous to categorization, is experienced as instantaneous, but some form of time-passage, however minimal, must exist. First, the image on the screen must continue for some period; a ten-thousandth of a a second[85] would not be enough for the human eye to perceive the object. Second, there is a minimal amount of time necessary for the image to pass to the retina and still a longer period of time necessary for it to be transmitted to the brain. Third, since human consciousness requires a minimal duration for the employment of the mechanisms of "perception"[86] and interpretation,[87] without it there would obviously be no consciousness, either prephenomenal or phenomenal. It should be noted here, however, that at this level there is no consciousness of this time-passage as time-passage, although it is obviously necessary for consciousness of the visual object even at the prephenomenal level. In other words, prephenomenal consciousness demands duration of some kind, but it does not demand consciousness of duration. As we have said, the image is experienced "instantaneously." Schutz expresses this dependence of consciousness on duration only obliquely in a comment about Husserl.[88] Temporality of some kind is the "relational form" which is necessary to connect the now with the just now.[89] Without this relationality and without consciousness of it[90] there would neither be an experienced stream of consciousness nor consciousness at all. Duration is necessary for awareness to emerge with its concomitants such as the awareness of the present now, sensation, and spatiality. Consciousness at the phenomenal level also necessitates some kind of time passage. Because it is here that refined categories and linguistic precision are developed among other things, time is an important ingredient; conceptualization does not emerge instantaneously. To return to our illustration, the perceived image, whether familiar or unfamiliar, becomes that through the mental comparison of it with previously perceived objects. The person is both conscious that he has seen something like this before (or not) and that he has seen it before. Nonetheless, even though consciousness - in this case involving what we call "memory"[91] - depends upon time-passage, it does not necessarily focus upon it as time-passage. The visual image on the screen is compared with an object from the past but need not focus upon this object as past or upon the time-passage necessary for the comparison. In the natural attitude of the everyday there is usually no concentration upon these time dimensions.

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[84] This is only one illustration among several possible. The following statements hold true for non-physical "objects" as well.

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[85] Even though we write of time in terms of thousandths of a second, i.e., use the calibrations of the space and time world, we are dealing with time-passage as such and could just as easily drop the spatiotemporal terminology. Use of it, however, makes the illustration more concrete.

[86] Here we use the word broadly to include the "perceiving" of an idea or of a bodily state.

[87] Even claiming that the image "is there" is interpretative.

[88] III, p. 11.

[89] Again, the experienced length of this passage or the experience of time passage is not necessary.

[90] This necessitates "retention" and, over a longer period of time, secondary remembrance (memory).

Even though consciousness is functionally and analytically dependent upon duration for its existence, duration and conscious of it are two different things. This was demonstrated in the illustration given above; duration may underlie consciousness of the flashed image on the screen, but it is experienced not as time-passage but as "instantaneous." In order for duration to be experienced at either the prephenomenal or the phenomenal level[92] the conscious relation of at least a now and a just-now, a present and remembered past, is necessary. In other words, experienced duration - in contrast to duration as the precondition for consciousness - calls for the focus of attention (no matter how prepredicative it may be) upon at least two phases (prephenomenal) or points (phenomenal) and their remembered relation. In this chapter we are dealing with the various ways in which this experienced duration appears to the conscious person; briefly, it may appear as, in Schutz's scheme, "inner time," "outer time," or as a combination of these times.

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[91] There seems no need to distinguish memory at this point as some separate "entity." Memory is a word for "consciousness of beforeness" but also "consciousness of an 'object' before," i.e. a function of consciousness.

[92] At the phenomenal level duration is spoken of in spatiotemporal terms and is dealt with in terms of discrete succession, but it is still time-passage.

Inner Time

In his Collected Papers Schutz writes about inner time in relation to musical communication. "Music," he suggests, "may be defined...as a meaningful arrangement of tones in inner time. It is the occurrence in inner time, Bergson's durée, which is the very form of existence of music."[93] Here, as at other places,[94] he appositively equates inner time with durée. In order to give the meaning of inner time more substance, however, let us begin by drawing upon some comments in chapter one. At the prephenomenal level, consciousness of time fixes upon the now-apprehension or, better, upon an experienced, non-chronological succession of now phases. There are also what Husserl calls "fringes" or "horizons"[95] to each now phase, designated "retentions" and "protentions." We illustrated this by alluding to the experience of three successive musical chords. When hearing the second chord, the first is apprehended as just past and the third is apprehended as just ahead; the one is the aft and the other is the fore fringe.[96] The recognition of fringing underscores the fact that meaningful activity takes place in a context and that consciousness extends beyond immediate, present-tense experience. Multiplicity can be seen emerging in the slippage among what is protended, what is directly experienced, and what is retained. It was also suggested in the first chapter, although peripherally, that prephenomenal time is irreversible, (*unumkehrbar*), a *continuous* stream.[97] In his insightful essay "The Homecomer"[98] Schutz illustrates the ever-transient, unrepeatable, and unstoppable nature of the present. As he puts it, we constantly "grow older" and experience novelties in our stream of thought, additional interpretative meanings, and, thus, changes in our state of mind. In a real sense the homecomer is not returning to the home that he left, if to "home" at all, but to a geographical and social setting that has irretrievably changed, even as he has. Schutz concludes:

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[93] II, p. 170.

[94] I, pp. 85-87, II, pp. 172 and 196.

[95] Cf. Ideas, pp. 218-219.

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[96] This fringe phenomenon is, however, universal. (Cf. III, p. 9, ftn. 16 for Schutz's comments in relation to Husserl.) It may be related then to words and meanings (cf. I, p. 220), to emotions (cf. II, p. 197), or to actions (cf. I, p. xxxvii). On the concept of "horizon" also cf. P, p. 83; III, pp. 93-98 and 116-117.

[97] Cf. P, p. 47. Schutz is correct in speaking of the irreversible or, better, *unstoppable* nature of the *stream* of consciousness. The notion of reversibility enters, however, when time is dealt with at the *phenomenal* or *reflective* level, at a level at which we *remove* ourselves from conscious involvement in the lived present. (Cf. I, p. 243 for Schutz's comments about "reversibility" as an "illusion.") Then we talk of going forward in time or backward in time; we think of the future or reverse direction to relive the past. But Schutz's point is that, regardless of the past-future *contents* of our consciousness, the conscious *process* takes place in the *present*, and this process is experienced as *unstoppable*. Even while we are aware of the past or the future in a state induced by LSD or by dreaming, we are "growing older."

[98] II, pp. 106-119, esp. 114-115.

> Repetition might be aimed at and longed for: what belongs to the past can never be reinstated in another present exactly as it was. When it emerged, it carried along empty anticipations, horizons of future developments, references to chances and possibilities; now, in hindsight, these anticipations prove to have been or not to have been fulfilled; the perspectives have changed; what was merely in the horizon has shifted toward the center of attention or disappeared entirely; former chances have turned into realities or proved to be impossibilities - briefly, the former experience has now another meaning.[99]

There is, of course, similarity between experiences, a similarity which is conceptualized in terms of what Schutz calls "typifications" or types, but this is a necessary standardization which does not capture fully the flow of unique now-experiences. In other words, sameness emerges at a level of generality removed from immediate, prephenomenal experience. But this carries us into areas that are beyond our present subject. It is enough here, in relating our comments to what was said in chapter one, to say that consciousness of inner time is awareness of the fluid now with its fringes, coming-to-be and passing-away, and with its irreversibility.

A note is in order here. As we understand Schutz's conception, consciousness of inner time is interwoven with, indeed we think created by, the awareness of both prephenomenal and phenomenal elements. There is consciousness of inner time at the prephenomenal level of the melting now-phases; there is consciousness of inner time at the phenomenal level of theoretical contemplation. It is not so much the content of the objects of consciousness, be it prepredicative or predicative, but the free-flowing, individually directed consciousness that forms the basis for the experience of inner time.[100]

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[99] II, p. 115.

[100] While we say this we also recognize that consciousness of phenomenal objects has a greater tendency to bring with it consciousness of phenomenal, categorized time than does consciousness of prephenomenal or uncategorized objects. This is the reason for Schutz's suggesting that the experience of inner time is closest to the experience of prephenomenal duration.

We have dealt with inner time as a focus, as a fringe, and as irreversible, but what of its character as inner? In order to come to some conclusion in this regard, we will turn to Schutz's analysis of temporality in dreaming, phantasizing, and theorizing.[101] After describing the manner in which he deals with inner time in these areas, we can then turn to the general notion of interiority that pervades the treatment of all three activities.

The experience of time in the world of dreaming evidences, according to Schutz, a complex structure that is difficult to exposit.[102] It is cut off entirely from or has "no position" in the order of clock and calendar time, and shows an often random intermingling of ~~the~~ time perspectives peculiar either to prephenomenal or phenomenal time. Future events are conceived as past, and past events are assumed reversible, reflecting a strange futurity. The succession of protention and retention is often exchanged for simultaneity and vice versa. There remains, nonetheless, a stream of consciousness - at least this is indicated in the remembrance of dreams - and a certain sense of durée with its irreversibility.[103] But the objective time experienced by the past self has toppled as a house of cards and is indiscriminately snatched into the dream only in bits and pieces.[104] Furthermore, there is no possibility of the dreamer's communicating these experiences of time from within the dream-state to those in the wide-awake world. The inner character of dream temporality is two-fold. Unlike "day-dreaming" or phantasizing, time consciousness is radically removed from the external world of wide-awakeness. We do not dream together but in isolation, and the time pattern, although drawing sporadically upon the experiences of the wide-awake self, is the (involuntary) fabrication of the sleeping person. Second, dream-time is interior in the sense that it is a phenomenon of mental life.

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[101] Although there is an interrelation between inner and outer time, we are concentrating here upon the inner time dimension of these three activities. We will not deal, therefore, with Schutz's complete analysis of dreaming, phantasizing, or theorizing.

[102] Cf. I, pp. 243-244.

[103] Since the notion of "growing older" is tied to a consciousness of one's physical body, the on-going character of dream-consciousness is remembered in the wide-awake state as a flowing movement from event to event, weird as these may appear.

The time perspective of the world of phantasy or "imageries," as Schutz often calls it,[105] is also complex, if in a manner different from that of the dream world.[106] Although the pattern of phantasy usually approximates the "logical" order of the objective world, the imagining self can eliminate all the characteristics of objective time except its irreversibility.[107] It can employ a "time-retarder" or a "time-accelerator," but, because phantasy-time originates along with dream-time or any other activity of the mind within the durée, it is experientially continuous. The inner time structure of imagining can be experienced in isolation as in day-dreaming or socially as in the mutually oriented intersubjective play of children.[108] Unlike dream or sleep-time, the time perspective of phantasy is informed by perceptions of the external world. These may be radically interpreted so as to render the objective time of the external world meaningless but not necessarily. Phantasy may even jump back and forth between inner time and clock time, forming even weird configurations as in the case of Don Quixote; it is certainly informed both by the time of the external and of the internal world.[109] It may even errupt into the external world as words and gestures. But there is not the extreme confusion of time levels that is possible in the dream state. In the "normal" person the just past is recognized as just past, although possibly not wished so. Secondly, as in the dream state, but with less chaotic spontaneity, phantasy-time is an internal, mental phenomenon. It may be revealed to others through language of various kinds but is the creation of the individual person and essentially non-reproducible.

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[104] Freud's understanding of the purposiveness behind dreams is not expressed by Schutz.

[105] Cf. I, pp. 239-240.

[106] Cf. Edmund Husserl's Erfahrung und Urteil, sections 39-42 for his discussion of this problem.

[107] Husserl has probably said it more accurately when he suggests that phantasies have no fixed order of objective time, although there is some relationship to it.

The time perspective of the theorizing self[110] presents the third illustration of what Schutz means by inner time. Unlike phantasizing, theoretical contemplation has an explicit connection with objective time. That is to say the intentional objects of theorizing occupy a well defined place in the objective order of chronological time. Sociological theorizing,

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[108] Cf. I, p. 240.

[109] It should be noted here and will be in the next paragraph that "to be informed by" external time is not the same thing for us as participating in external time. The objects of phantasizing may exist in external time, but the process of phantasizing itself exists in internal time. This follows Husserl's distinction between noema and noesis. To move ahead of ourselves slightly, cf. I, pp. 252-253.

[110] When Schutz writes of theorizing, he usually equates it with scientific theorizing, which is more formally structured than phantasizing, for instance.

for instance, deals with social change and social structure which exist in the realm of objective time, the former viewed over a chronological time span and the latter analyzed in relation to a particular segment of the temporal continuum. The time structure of the objects, however, is not the same as the time perspective peculiar to the process of theorizing itself.[111] The theoretician lives within his inner durée. As Schutz so often puts it, he is growing older. In this respect he is like the dreamer and the phantasizer, although the content of his thought is more rigorously ordered, more closely related to that of others in his discipline, and more commensurate with clock time. The past for the theorizer is composed of his previous experiences and their sedimentations, and the future is the "open horizons of the problem at hand." But theorizing, according to Schutz, does not gear into the present with bodily movements or speech and is thus removed from social, intersubjective time and from clock time. The theoretician puts his body in brackets and exists as a solitary entity.[112]

With these thoughts about theoretical time in mind, let us now answer the question, "What does Schutz mean by inner time?" First of all, although there are relationships between internal and external time, inner time is not a shared time. In dreaming, phantisizing, and theorizing there is no public clock on the wall of the mind with which all mental activity is synchronized. The process is accelerated or retarded by the individual. The possible discrepancy between internal duration and external chronology is reflected in such everyday questions as "Where has the time gone to?" or in the statement "I was so engrossed that the time slipped right by without my knowing it." Shared time, on the other hand, is represented by the clock in Times Square eagerly watched on New Year's Eve. Inner time is thus a creation within the person and is a non-social time. Secondly, inner time is interior in that it is the product of a conscious, mental process. When one communicates it to others and what one expresses vary in dreaming, phantasizing, and theorizing. But the time process itself is mental. It is thus observable to another only through expression of various kinds, be it a bodily gesture, a spoken word, or a written symbol.

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[111] Cf. I, p. 252.

[112] Schutz has highly refined his category here and in so doing has underscored the internal, non-social character of theorizing. Theoretical contemplation does, obviously, break out into words and figures. Theoreticians obviously talk to others about their work. But Schutz would say that these are mechanisms which reflect and aid the process; they are not the theoretical process itself. Cf. I, p. 256.

To bring this section to a conclusion, Schutz's general notion of inner time can be outlined in the following way. First, inner time is experienced as a temporal, moving field with a focus and at least two horizons.[113] Second, its direction is irreversible, although its experienced speed may be varied. Third, inner time is originally an unshared time; it is constituted and experienced by the individual person.[114] Fourth, consciousness of inner time is experienced, for want of a better word, mentally. Fifth, although in the sleep-state inner time and clock time may be quite independent of each other, phantasizing and theorizing often reflect an interrelation of the two times. This interrelation is influenced by the fact that phantasizing and theorizing are accomplished in the wide-awake state which is more closely tied to clock time than is dreaming.

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[113] The now-apprehension with its retention and protention illustrated the concept of focus and fringe in the sphere of prephenomenal inner time. Although Schutz does not explicitly speak of this, it is fair to assume that dreaming, phantasizing, and theorizing each have the focal now with its fringes. But the word "apprehension" may be confusing since we commonly associate this with physically seeing something like a tree. Although dreaming differs from phantasizing and theorizing because the person is not conscious, in the wide-awake sense, of his apprehending, in all three activities there is consciousness of "something," even if it is the thought of "something" or the dream of "something." Because phantasizing and theorizing are done in the wide-awake state they are closer to apprehending in the physical sense. Both, in fact, flip intermittently from thought to physical apprehension.

Outer Time

In light of our discussion of inner time, the central features of outer time have no doubt been shown in relief. Outer time, according to Schutz, is that time which is measured in terms of "a path run through."[115] The wall clock is an instrument for such measurement, although there are others such as the metronome. At this level, time is segmented into equal, successive units such as a minute or an hour. It is related to observable phenomena in the external or outer world such as the rising and setting sun. Schutz also calls this "objective" or "cosmic" time, the time which is thought of in everyday life as present, past, and future.[116] This

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[114] Communication of it is, however, a modification of the original time-experience and, in relation to this primordial experience, is a distortion. It may be asked, "To what extent are my thoughts about and my communication of this original experience a distortion?" In other words, is it possible for the "me" to know the "I" and to talk about it? This does not touch upon the equally difficult problem of "knowing" the Other.

[115] Cf. I, pp. 214-218.

[116] The "future" is necessarily a projection of the clock time applied to the present and past. It is this time that Schutz uses to systemize social relationships in terms of "contemporaries," "predecessors," and "successors." Cf. P, chapter 4, esp. pp. 139-144 and 176-214.

time perspective is interpretational, as is inner time at a different level, but an interpretation based upon the observation and relation of externally perceived objects such as the position of the sun or the successive actions of another person. It is a temporality influenced by *spatial* referents. We may refer to this in a shorthand manner as "clock time," but it is not the *clock's* time, as if the clock were an independently creative entity, simply a particular kind of *human* time. The "new math" emphasizes that our "base-ten" system is the result of our own constructive, perspectivistic, and even accidental efforts. There are other numerical systems that are usable. Clock time is likewise a human, indeed a *social* product, even though of a specific kind, which can be both observationally verified and publically shared or acknowledged. When we deal with outer time, in contrast to inner time, there is no contextual slowing down or speeding up; the segments are all equal. It is also universally applied and applicable. Because of these differences, Schutz can write of the "*incommensurability* of inner and outer time."[117] As he spent his life demonstrating, this has major implications for understanding human activity, something that existentialists for different reasons were quick to point out. For instance, the time objectively traversed in a hospital waiting room by a nurse and by the husband of an expectant mother is the same, but the meaning and the felt-passage of this time is quite different for each.[118]

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[117] II, p. 171, esp. ftn. 17. Emphasis ours.

[118] Schutz is ambiguous if not inaccurate in relating *history* to inner time. In *The Phenomenology*, pp. 213-214, he suggests that *history* and inner time (related to the stream of consciousness) are similar in that they both are a "continuous manifold." History, however, differs from inner duration because, according to Schutz, it exists in objective time. Then he goes on to say that history may be written objectively (a chronicle of "facts") or subjectively (a history of human behavior). (It should be noted that Luckmann's adaptation of this passage in II, p. 62, does not make the subjective-objective split so obvious.) Which is it?

In summary, outer time is equally segmented, quantifiable, social, and universally applicable. It may be thought "outer" for three reasons. First, it is based upon perceived regularities in the physical or so-called outer world. Second, it is a socially created, recognized, and approved interpretative scheme inherited by the individual. From the standpoint of the new born person, therefore, it is outside his personal creation and is externally imposed upon him. Third, as the social person lives his life, he experiences outer time not simply as imposed upon him but in a real sense often outside or removed from his subjective experience of (inner) time.[119] This is not to deny the fact that "outer" time is also internalized, i.e., taken into subjective experience.

The Vivid Present and Standard Time

We have to this point distinguished, described, and to some extent contrasted Schutz's inner and outer time. The time perspective appropriate to a particular cognitive style, however, may be a combination of these two analytically separable elements. To be sure, the separation aids

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In light of what he says about the ideal type, it would seem that subjective elements can be made "objective." Thus, one would have two kinds of "objective" history. However, the "objectivity" of objectivity at all levels is problematic, and it may be better to say that there are varying degrees and kinds of subjectivity. The point to be made in this context is that written history possesses a relationship to outer time, although unclarified.

[119] In certain cases, however, outer time provides the unifying factor for inner time. Schutz makes this explicit in his discussion of the "tuning-in process" or "making music together." "Making music together is an event in outer time, presupposing also a face-to-face relationship, that is, a community of space, and it is this dimension which unifies the fluxes of inner time and warrants their synchronization into a vivid present." (II, p. 177) This kind of statement guards against the false bifurcations that often emerge in analyses of this kind. Inner and outer time are often interrelated in the conscious person.

us in appreciating the complexity of experienced and interpretative time, but their interrelation allows us to see how a particular time perspective contributes to a particular finite province of meaning, or, better for us at this juncture, a cognitive style.[120] Schutz identifies what he terms the "vivid present" and "standard time." We will continue by treating these two combinations of inner and outer time and will indicate the possibility of others.

For Schutz the primordial social relationship is the "we-relation." It has various dimensions,[121] but one of them is experienced in a face-to-face context, involving communication both verbal and non-verbal. Interaction between persons at this level is accomplished in what Schutz calls "the vivid present." This does not mean, it seems to us, that the vivid present is restricted to the face-to-face relation. It is also experienced to some degree in a telephone conversation where there is co-temporality or co-present but not a co-spatiality or co-presence. Yet the most intense or pure vivid present exists in the face-to-face relationship between two living persons. Others are derivations or modifications of it. Without moving into the labyrinth of problems involving intersubjectivity and communication, let us illustrate the combination of inner and outer time in face-to-face communication.[122] We will do this from the interpreter's viewpoint as he attends to the on-going process of the Other's speech.[123]

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[120] To be more precise, a cognitive style creates a "finite province of meaning."

[121] For example the "pure we-relation," cf. P, pp. 167-168.

[122] The following section relies heavily upon I, pp. 218-222, for its basic outline and content. It is adapted, however, for our purposes.

In this process the Other expresses himself to me through vocalized words and accompanying gestures. This is a visible and audible activity in the outer world, in the world we both share, of what the Other means to convey.[124] He builds up "polythectically," to use Husserl's word, or step by step with word after word, sentence after sentence, and paragraph after paragraph his intended meaning which I, in a vivid simultaneity, follow interpretatively in the same rhythm. This process of communication takes place in the vivid present, a present in which, for each participant, there is interwoven inner and outer time.[125] This becomes obvious when it is recognized that the Other, in Schutz's words,

> does not merely experience what he actually utters; a complicated mechanism of retentions and anticipations connects within his stream of consciousness one element of his speech with what preceded and what will follow to the unity of the thought he wants to convey.[126]

In other words, inner time and those "contentual" elements of it are mixed with or are expressed in his speaking, which is conducted in the outer world, in outer time. I, although in a distinct manner, experience the speech (and accompanying gestures) in outer time but interpret, through retention and protension, within my inner time. The communicator's activity is unified by his intention to express himself to me, and my responding activity is unified by my intention to understand his meaning. There may be slippage here, i.e., the Other's words may carry a meaning I do not understand or one that he does not intend, but, regardless, the activity takes place in the vivid present, or, as Schutz terms it, "our vivid present."[127] There are other fascinating features in this social action,[128] but here it is our concern to sketch the creation of the vivid present, a particular time perspective shaped by a particular intersection of inner and outer time.

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[123] There may also be interpretation of the Other's completed communication, for instance, of a note he has left, but, as will be obvious, this is noticeably different from what takes place in the face-to-face encounter.

[124] The behavioristic interpretation of communication, as Schutz points out, is correct in emphasizing the part that these external manifestations play, but it is incorrect in assuming that the external sign - be it speech or gesture - is the intended meaning.

[125] Thinking in terms of multiple realities, the question can be raised: For whom are these two times "interwoven?" Are they mingled for the experiencing persons in the relationship as Schutz implies, for an external observer, or for an observer who has the outer time perspective "in the back of his head" as he watches? Schutz does not answer nor raise these questions here.

[126] I, p. 219. Emphasis ours.

It is obvious to the reader that, although we are concentrating upon the time dimension in cognitive style and here upon the vivid present as a particular kind of time dimension, the experience of time is a polygenetic product. Co-presence, intentional direction, communicated words and gestures, a mutually understood vocabulary, wide-awakeness, and a shared social surrounding with its mutually understood protocol, e.g. typifications and the speak-listen pattern, are some of the factors which allow for "our vivid present." And these elements form a relatively discernable and separable pattern.

Yet they can obviously be modified. What would happen, for instance, if any one or several of these elements were changed? Would not the character, the texture, of the experienced present be even radically reformed? We have suggested the modifications possible when the spatial component is rearranged. A telephone conversation reflects a shared present, but it is a shared present with a disembodied voice. What does this do to the meaning that is communicated through bodily movement or the intensity of the vivid present?[129] Similarly, in what manner do two persons in adjoining rooms have a shared present? To pursue this further, how does the present change for our interpreter in the above conversation if he is asleep? These questions may be enough to suggest that the vivid present is only one, although for Schutz the primordial, time dimension. It is created in its primary form by the intersection of inner and outer time in a face-to-face relationship. Time derivations emerge as this community of time and space with its particular social relationship is modified in various ways. The interpretation of the mere outcome of communication, e.g. a written letter, is done in what Schutz calls a "quasi-present."[130] Here the interpreter's durée intersects an outer time which is reflected in the time of composition and the time of reception. There is also the present-tense time dimension which connects the individual with contemporaries he has never met, an anonymous-present of sorts. These are, Schutz is concerned to point out, nonetheless derivations of an "originary" vivid present. He concludes in this suggestive if rather general manner:

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[127] This is to leave room, we take it, for other "vivid presents" such as that reflected in the telephone conversation.

[128] For instance, the actual words spoken with their halo of facial expressions both voluntary and involuntary, voice inflexion, and the larger physical and social setting.

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[129] "Intensity" is a word that is not easily handled in outer time. Light intensity is one thing; the intensity of personal involvement is another. It is an element common to inner time and experience, although it is reflected in external behavior to be sure. Since the vivid present is a hybrid of inner and outer time it inherits an intensity potential from the durée. The word "vivid" implies this better than James' word in his synonymous phrase "the specious present." Cf. I, p. 172.

[130] I, p. 221.

> All this occurs in the different modes of potentiality or quasi-actuality, each type having its own forms of temporal diminution and augmentation and its appurtenant style of skipping in a direct move or 'knight's move.' There are furthermore the different forms of overlapping and interpenetrating of these different perspectives, their being put into and out of operation by a shift from one to the other and a transformation of one into the other, and the different types of synthesizing and combining or isolating and disentangling them. Manifold as these different time perspectives and their mutual relations are, they all originate in an intersection of durée and cosmic time.[131]

Within the natural attitude toward life, the attitude of the man on the street, these various, subtle intersections of inner and outer time are apprehended as homogeneous. In other words, the distinctions we have been making do not experientially exist for him. The average person brackets doubt in the unbroken fabric of time. All those time perspectives of the individual and those common to all persons in the wide-awake state appear unidimensional. Schutz terms this supposedly homogeneous time "civic" or "standard time."[132] To quote him at this point:

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[131] I, pp. 221-222. To extend Schutz, it may be suggested that there are various kinds of social time. For instance, there is the time of group panic or the social time of the football stadium clock. In the former case, the experience of this is based upon one's involvement in a social group. Certainly, the person experiences this kind of time himself although while being in company with others, but he would not be aware of it by himself, i.e. removed from the group. His social involvement helps create what we call this social time. In the latter instance, the stadium clock is stopped and started according to socially created and accepted rules, i.e. it is another social time. The notion of "the appropriate time" reflects this same social time at another level. Often one cannot determine the appropriate moment for a particular social act either by looking at the wall clock (outer time) or by consulting subjective, inner time. When, for instance, is the appropriate moment for honesty with another about his appearance? The "unthinkingly" honest person, who operates solely from his sense of inner time, might "inappropriately" comment in front of a group of persons. He is judged "unthinking" because he has not chosen what is the appropriate social time, a moment that is outside (although related to) the framework of both inner time and outer time. Outer time as we have treated it is, indeed, social time, but it possesses a rigidity and an externality that these other social times do not.

[132] I, p. 222.

> It, too, is an intersection of cosmic time and inner time, though, as to the latter, merely of a peculiar aspect of inner time - that aspect in which the wide-awake man experiences his working acts as events within his stream of consciousness. Because standard time partakes of cosmic time, it is measurable by our clocks and calendars. Because it coincides with our inner sense of time in which we experience our working acts, if - and only if - we are wide-awake, it governs the system of our plans under which we subsume our projects, such as plans for life, for work and leisure. Because it is common to all of us, standard time makes an intersubjective coordination of the different individual plan systems possible. Thus, to the natural attitude, the civic or standard time is in the same sense the universal temporal structure of the intersubjective world of everyday life within the natural attitude, in which the earth is its universal spatial structure that embraces the spatial environments of each of us.[133]

The vivid present, then, which is analytically a particular kind of present, is caught up in standard time, which is experientially the time of the natural attitude.

Inner Time, Outer Time, and Cognitive Style

Now that we have covered the specific issues, several words are in order about the general structure of the time dimension. Inner time, because of its continual ebb and flow, is variously experienced as temporality. For instance, the temporal succession in the dream-state may intermingle, in its extreme[134] form, the slow, ponderous struggle through hardening syrup with the rapid, "split-second" progression through twenty years of a person's life. In contrast, inner temporality in the theoretical attitude may be experienced as lock-step progression through a logical analysis of intersubjectivity's origin. Inner time, thus, may reflect various shades or speeds which may or may not be similar to the ordered passage of clock time. It is relatively fluid, depending, for instance, upon conscious efforts in the wide-awake state or involuntary mechanisms in the sleep-state for its acceleration or deceleration. Regardless of the speed of passage, however, it is unstoppable and is experienced as such. Inner time is also uniquely personal time, although it need not be eccentric time. Just as I cannot experience the bodily sensations and movements of someone else as he experiences them, I cannot be conscious of the unceasing time-flow of another's inner duree. I assume that he experiences this inner flow because I do, in a manner similar to the way I experience, and because he communicates to me that he does. Yet the actual, experienced time-passage differs from person to person since each individual differs. I may judge the inner experience of time by the "mentally ill" person to be "abnormal," but I can only say this on the basis of his communication of it to me, not on the basis of my personal experience of it. Furthermore, the very judgment "abnormal" or "normal" is, relative to the ill person, an external standard I erect, be it on the basis of my own experience or on the basis of what I think a number of others experience. Outer time, on the other hand, although variously constructed in different cultures, is an external objective time. It is a shared or interpersonal time with its mechanical means of measurement, varying in precision, such as clocks or moon phases, which can be appealed to, by those who have so agreed, as the standard for this shared time. Although outer time is individually appropriated, and thus may mean various things to different persons, it itself is constant and unchangeable. While the day-dreamer phantasizes, the clock hands continue to move, the sun continues to rise and set. Outer time is similar to inner time in

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[133] I, p. 222.

[134] That is to say, "extreme" relative to the ordered succession in everyday life.

that it is unstoppably on-going. It differs from inner temporality in that its speed does not vary and in that the individual is not its creator, although he may be its "assentor."[135] All its segments are equal, and it can be universally applied. External time is also a social product which exists previous to the birth of any present person and must be appropriated by the individual. Inner time, to a degree that is not true for outer time, is the creation of the individual person. There are certain generic features of inner time. For instance, it is either slow, fast, or faster - all standardizations taken from the outer world of the metronome - but the individual is at the helm of its movement. For outer time, the question is appropriate, "Is it accurate?" For inner time, this is a meaningless question because there is no standard for accuracy in inner time; it just flows. It does not flow in a certain manner or at a certain speed. In other words, inner time is; it isn't in a certain way. The comparison between inner and outer time is striking. If one were to experience life only under the accent of outer time, life would be mechanistically processive. Under the accent of inner time, it would be fluid, with no prescribed, slow-fast contours. When separated, there is thus an "incommensurability" as Schutz has put it, between the two times. Life as lived, however, evidences a poly-textured combination of inner and outer time. Social activity and manipulation of physical phenomena reflect this necessary interconnection of the two times. Meaningful communication is dependent upon the intermingling of inner time and outer time and, at a more general level, internal experience and shared experience.

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[135] Certainly, an individual may have created or invented a clock or a particular way to objectify time, but on the basis of experience common to "all" and for the sake of making this time-experience common to all.

It is the multifarious combination of inner and outer time, illustrated by what Schutz called "the vivid present" and "standard time," which provides a basis for multiple meaning structures, for what Schutz terms "multiple realities." Each reality has its own time perspective, the time perspective being different, for instance, in the world of phantasizing and in the realm of lunar probes, the world of expected death and the world of teen-age life. This time perspective is one distinguishable element in what is called collectively the cognitive style.

Toward an Understanding of the Ethical Province

All activity is accomplished in relation to some form of temporality. But the experience of this time is felt with varying intensity, is therefore to different degrees influential, and involves differing kinds of time. For instance, the intensity with which I experience time as I am running to make an appointment is not the same as that with which I experience the time of an unhurried stroll down the beach.

Various kinds of experienced time thus influence the ways in which we perceive our life situation. And, since we act on the basis of our perceptions, time variously influences our emotional, cognitive, and bodily activity. In the history of the early church and in early Marxism a kind of eschatological time formed the basis for projected and actual activity. The imminent second coming of Christ and the soon-expected "withering away" of the State reflected an experience of time that was strikingly at odds with the time of the wall clock or of other time-consciousness. To understand the behavior in either case is to come to grips with the time dimensions from which it springs.

The ethical province of meaning also includes the variational experience of time. It provides reasons for human thought, contemplated action, and actual behavior. Moral evaluation, which is the central feature in the ethical province, may, we think should, take time-consciousness seriously. It can do this at several different levels, that of my time-consciousness, the other's, or some more public time. If I am evaluating my own contemplated action, I generally do it, to the extent that I am conscious of this dimension, under the influence of but also in the awareness of my subjective experience of time.[136] I judge the merit of its pressure, but also I compare it to those times experienced by others or thought appropriate in a society. In evaluating the expressions of another, however, I am removed from the data of his immediate inner life and must rely upon what he tells me in words and actions. For this reason I judge his experience of time to varying degrees, because his experience is not completely open to me, on the basis of my own time-awareness. As is evident from judicial proceedings, however, evaluations can also be made on the basis of public or social time, a temporality which is thought common to all. There is a tendency, nonetheless, to increasingly make moral evaluations in relation to the subjective experience of the person being judged. For this reason the "mentally ill" person with his time-experience is considered morally irresponsible or not responsible for his action.

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[136] It may be argued, and we think correctly, that time-experience is itself amoral and that "moral goodness" is a phrase we link with the volitional-behavioral in man. Nevertheless, time-consciousness forms an important, influencing foundation for ethical evaluation.

Chapter Three

THE SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE DIMENSION

Introduction

In this chapter we are going to add another element to the original six that Schutz says form the cognitive style. Schutz himself leaves space for such innovation when he indicates that his six elements are only "some of the features of the cognitive style."[137] We call this seventh feature the subjective and objective dimension. In a sense it could be included in chapter one since it deals with meaning constitution, a process that is dependent upon the attention of consciousness. However, if we were to follow that line of reasoning, all the other elements would be included in the first chapter since they, too, involve meaning construction and rely upon the attention of consciousness. It is better to view subjective and objective meaning as particular kinds of meaning with their own focuses and contributing perspectives. As we will see, their construction treats personal experience and subjective, intended meaning in different ways. For this reason various, even antithetical, meanings can emerge and, since reality as Schutz views it is a meaning-product, this dimension with its possible pluralism provides an important clue to what he calls "multiple realities."

The interjection of this subject at this point is done for a specific reason. Chapter two began to indirectly raise the issues that become thematic for us here. Inner and outer time may be thought, in the terms of this chapter, subjective and objective time respectively; the former is related to the internal experience or "intended meaning" of the actor while the latter is not. This puts it rather baldly and uses terms that will be clarified subsequently, but the connection between the chapters is a real one. A subsidiary reason for placing this discussion here is that our fourth chapter will deal with the "experience of one's self," an experience which can be seen subjectively from within or objectively from without. Again, the subjective-objective dimension is interpretationally germane.

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[137] I, p. 231. Emphasis ours.

We speak of this as being a "dimension" rather than "dimensions." It is our conclusion, which is summarized in the final pages of this chapter, that subjective and objective meaning are rooted in or originally flow from human consciousness or experiencing. Subjective and objective meaning are not, therefore, two different ways of experiencing; they are experiencing under two forms, experiencing ordered in two different ways. The use of the word "dimension" underscores their unification in the flow of experience. The form that is taken depends upon the manner in which personal experiencing is voluntarily and involuntarily treated. Briefly put, subjective meaning is that which is closest to the personal, unique intentions and experience of the conscious subject; it is created relative to personal interests and perceptions. Objective meaning, in various ways, is constituted without regard for and through conscious modification of this level of experiencing; it is created relative to impersonal or "metapersonal" interests and correspondingly modified perceptions. At certain points, i.e. after the meaning is established and expressed, subjective and objective meaning may appear dichotomous. Our use of the words "the subjective level" and "the objective level" may also be misleading. However, relative to the constituting process and to the experiencing self they are two manifestations of one dimension and this we wish to emphasize.

The chapter is divided into five segments: (1) the meaning of "subjective meaning;" (2) the meaning of "objective meaning;" (3) the movement between subjective and objective meaning; (4) subjective meaning, objective meaning, and cognitive style; and (5) toward an understanding of the ethical province.

The Meaning of "Subjective Meaning"

In our Introduction we mentioned the Continental battle waged in sociology over Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften. The basic question at issue was, "To what degree are the social phenomena investigated by the sociologist similar to the "natural" or physical objects studied by the natural scientist?" In trying to answer such questions, men on both sides of the issue were often pushed to undesirable extremes, either toward claiming that there is little scientific difference between a rock and a person or toward fashioning sociology into a "science" of mind in which the conclusions reached were little more than supports for the investigator's own value judgments. We may wonder to what extent that skirmish of the last century has been resolved,[128] but it certainly did provide the background for the original edition of

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[128] Maurice Natanson's Philosophy of the Social Sciences, published in 1963, covers similar terrain, and the printing of Schutz's Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt in a second, unrevised edition (1960) underscores current interest in these issues.

Schutz's Phenomenology with its focus upon Max Weber.[139] In the midst of the argument, Weber stood on the side of the Geisteswissenschaften to the extent that he saw the importance of the subjective, intended meaning of the individual for understanding social relationships and social action. He stood against those applauding the cultural sciences in that he abhorred their evaluational excesses and their unwarranted concern for metaphysical speculation.[140] He wished to abstain from value judgments but also to render the subjective dimension observable in a rigorous, precise, and scientific manner. In order to do this, he employed his famous ideal type analysis which was based, following much that Simmel had suggested earlier,[141] upon what he considered the most elementary form of individual behavior.[142] Social relationships, structure, and so forth are the result, Weber contended, of the corporate interaction of individual, intending persons. The goal of his interpretative or verstehende sociology was to understand the subjective meaning that intending individuals give to social phenomena and the meaning that was, at another level, the creation of these phenomena.

Schutz's basic criticism of Weber enters here and serves as the starting point for his definition of subjective meaning. He writes:

> As significant as were Weber's contributions to methodology, as incorruptible as was his vision of the task of concept formation in the social sciences, as admirable as was his philosophical instinct for the correct critical position on epistemological questions - just as little did the thorough

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[139] Cf. p, pp. 3-13.

[140] P, p. 5.

[141] P, p. 4.

[142] P, p. 6.

> undergirding of his results by a secure over-all philosophical point of view concern him. In fact, he had little interest at all in the clarification of the philosophical presuppositions of even his own primary concepts.[143]

In Schutz's opinion Weber "breaks off his analysis" too soon, inaccurately concluding that the meaningful act of the individual is the primitive element. However, as Schutz goes on to demonstrate, the creation of the meaningful act - although the key to Weber's sociology of interpretation - is only the result of previous, complex activities. Also,[144] Weber does not distinguish meaningful activity as completed and as ongoing, between my own self-understanding and my understanding of another, and he does not ask how meaning is constituted and modified, for instance, in the experience of the participant and of the observer.[145] Because of these things, Schutz ventures that Weber does not provide the most helpful framework for understanding subjective and objective meaning. According to Schutz, these two kinds of meaning are directly related to the distinction between participant and observer, self-understanding and other-understanding.

It is not our concern at this point to follow Schutz in his detailed criticism of Weber's notion of meaningful social action.[146] To summarize the direction of Schutz's argument is enough, and will show the manner in which he handles "subjective meaning." He first distinguishes four levels of meaningful action[147] in Weber's sociology: (1) non-social action directed toward an object (e.g. writing with a pen), (2) non-social action directed toward another person of whose existence the actor is only aware (e.g. "a mere collision of two cyclists" [Weber]), (3) social action directed toward another (possibly anonymous) person or persons,[148] and (4) social action which is "oriented"[149] to another's (presented) behavior.[150]

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[143] P, p. 7.

[144] Cf. P, pp. 8-9 for other criticisms of Weber by Schutz.

[145] Cf. P, p. 8 but also p. 10.

[146] For this, Cf. P, pp. 15-20, which provides the basis for the next several comments.

Weber's concern for the definition of social action, reflecting as it did his (and other's) desire to delimit the specific area for sociological investigation, included the repeated return to the distinction between meaningful and non-meaningful action. This distinction is germane for us because it provides the foundation for what Schutz considers the subjectively meaningful to be.

Weber's concept of action as meaningful action, according to Schutz, is vexingly vague. "Affectual behavior,"[151] which is unconscious behavior similar to the involuntary scream of a burned child, "affectual action," which is not rationally directed toward a particular ulterior goal (e.g. sensual gratification), and even "traditional behavior," which is often more an automatic reaction than a rational response, are, in different situations and to varying degrees, borderline cases of the meaningful for Weber. His conception of meaningful behavior is imprecise and inconsistent, from Schutz's standpoint, because his standard for the meaningful is rationality and even rationality of a particular kind: that directed toward a discrete system of goals (Zweckrational).[152] Meaningful action is, then, that which is self-consciously (rationally) purposive. In Schutz's words, "The meaning of an action is identical with the motive of the action," for Weber.[153] Since much that is experienced in daily life is done routinely or without conscious motivation, there are many activities covered by Weber's "affectual behavior," "affectual action," and "traditional behavior" which are, definitionally, meaningless. However, Schutz, in criticism of Weber, suggests that when so-called "meaningless" behavior of this kind is isolated "from the flux of experience" and consciously attended to, it has a meaning, even though this meaning may not be obvious during the unfolding of the activity. In order to make this point Schutz thus draws a distinction which Weber does not between completed and on-going action. Then he suggests, to mirror our discussion in the first chapter, that a shift in attentional focus brings a previously unrecognized meaning to light or, because this wording gives the false impression that meaning exists independently only waiting illumination, creates a meaning. Viewed in this broad manner, Schutz can conclude that "none of my experience is entirely devoid of meaning."[154] *Both* purposive, rational *action* and routinized *behavior* - a distinction that Weber is intent on making - are meaningful, indeed *subjectively* meaningful, *in their own way*. Questions still remain as to how action and behavior are meaningful "in their own way," i.e. are *differently* meaningful, but we can reach the tentative conclusion that subjective meaning is *personal* meaning created by attention to a particular object - in this case either action as on-going or as completed. It is intimated at the same time, as we would expect on the basis of our investigation in chapter one, that on-going, unreflected-upon experience may have low meaning.

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[147] "Action" for Weber is that which is meaningful for the actor; "behavior" is activity not personally meaningful for the actor. Cf. P, p. 15.

[148] For instance, the use of money is based upon the actor's expectations that its exchange will be accepted by others.

[149] The distinctive contribution that the word "oriented" makes is developed although not clearly by Schutz in P, pp. 86-91. The reason for Weber's distinction between levels "(3)" and "(4)" is not made clear, except that "(3)" may involve anonymity and "(4)" familiarity, i.e. an action which is "presented" (offered in the present) and directed toward a present person.

[150] The interpretation of these four levels of action, especially the last two (i.e. social action), is the task of sociology and exist upon a fifth level of meaning for Schutz. Cf. P, p. 17.

[151] This and the following terms in this sentence are Weber's.

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[152] P, pp. 18-19.

[153] P, p. 19. Emphasis ours.

With these preliminary comments about subjective meaning in mind, let us turn, for further information on this subject, to subjective meaning as it is expressed to us by another and to the way in which we perceive it. In doing this, what Schutz means by the concept will be more evident. First of all, Schutz rejects Scheler's notion that through "inner intuition" I may have direct knowledge of the Other's subjective, intended meaning.[155] He also rejects Carnap's physicalist theory that I may know only the bodily movements of the Other and that both the concept of the "other mind" or of subjective meaning are, from a scientific standpoint, epistemologically superfluous.[156] His disagreement with Scheler, based upon the impossibility of knowing the Other's bodily sensations first-hand,[157] underscores the experiential separation of one person from the other. Carnap's physicalism, as far as Schutz is concerned, forgets that my interpretation of the object before me as a body presupposes the assumed existence of an animating Ego; we do not generally speak of an animal's body for this reason, but we do of a human body with its implied psyche, a "psychophysical unity." In fashioning his own position on the knowability of the Other's subjective meaning, Schutz builds both upon the analytically separable inner dimension that Scheler is concerned about and upon the necessary, physical expression that Carnap underscores, without declaring the former epiphenomenal or the latter mundane.

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[154] P, p. 19.

[155] P, p. 20. Cf. also pp. 97-102.

[156] P, p. 21.

Schutz clarifies this relationship between intended, subjective meaning and external, bodily expression; the building up of the external expression and my apprehension of the Other's meaning; but also the difference between intended meaning, expression, and apprehended meaning by, once again, calling upon Husserl.[158] In his Logical Investigations[159] Husserl defines the external objectifications of meaning as "indications" (Anzeichen). They are "any kind of objects or states of affairs" associated[160] by someone with the existence of other objects or states of affairs.[161] Relative to our present context, the speaking of sentences indicates to the listener that there is an intended meaning. The indications in this case are given by the body - the spoken words themselves but also the bodily movements that produce and accompany them - which, unlike other objects of the external world such as a table, is, in Schutz's words, a "field of expression." Although in the sociological literature Schutz was familiar with every activity such as languaging was thought an expression of the Other's inner meaning, this concealed, as far as he was concerned, the ambiguity in the word "expression" and the difference between experience and meaning.[162] Is not the expression of subjective experience different from the expression of intended subjective meaning?[163] In other words, what does an expression indicate? The flushed face of a hard-working lumberjack may express his experience of physical exertion to an observer, but it is certainly not a voluntary or intentional expression to the observer of what this performance means to the woodsman.[164] While the lumberjack is working he does not intend to communicate his experience. His reddened face is focused communication only for the observer, although it does express part of the woodsman's subjective state. There is, in other words, no message intended, no transmission of subjective meaning. This is an important point and should be underscored. "Subjective meaning" is not a term that denotes only "the surface attitude" of bodily activity.[165] Certainly, following Scheler's suggestions, the Other's joy, pain, love, and rage are visibly reflected in his bodily activities. In many situations little inference is demanded from the observer to determine these general attitudes; although the phrase is awkward, Scheler's process of "inner perception" may legitimately be employed in these cases. But, and this is Schutz's main point, I do not perceive as easily the intention of the Other, the why behind the attitude. The bodily gestures or states present an observable condition which must be interpreted. It is only through this interpretation, involving complex patterns of meaning, that I apprehend the subjective meaning of the Other. Furthermore, it is often only through interpretational clarification that my apprehension of the Other's subjective meaning is accepted by him as his intended meaning.

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[157] Schutz would be quick to indicate also that I cannot "feel" the Other's emotional responses or the almost instantaneous passage of his mind from one idea to another.

[158] Here we are supposing languaged communication as our primary model. Subjective meaning is also conveyed by such things as an object (e.g. written words or an object of art) created by the Other and viewed by me.

[159] Logische Untersuchungen, 4th ed. (Halle, 1928), II, i, 25, as documented by Schutz.

[160] Husserl indicates that this association is non-rational, i.e. not highly cognitive or "logical." Schutz also separates this kind of "referencing" from drawing a (logical or rational) "implication," according to his translators Walsh and Lehnert. Cf. P, p. 22, ftn. 47.

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[161] P, p. 22.

[162] Cf. P, pp. 22-23.

[163] For Husserl's discussion of the complexities of the word "expression" and his reservations over speaking of the body as a "field of expression," cf. Logische Untersuchungen, II, pp. 23-105 and Marvin Farber's The Foundation of Phenomenology, chapter 8.

[164] Here we are not concerned about the disparity that often exists between the meaning that the Other wishes to communicate and the meaning that is apprehended by another nor with the possibility that this second person may misunderstand something that is accurately communicated.

"Subjective meaning," at this stage of our analysis, is, then, the Other's personal interpretation of what he has experienced and, in the communication process, becomes what he intends to express to another through bodily movements and constructed objects such as symbols and signs. Although the word "personal" seems the closest rendering of Schutz's term "subjective," he does not use this terminology. The relation of "intention" to "subjective meaning" in this instance, however, is left at the fetal stage and raises significant problems. Is subjective meaning only that which is intended or may be intended "in the communication process," as our summary implies? Let us assume that the answer is affirmative. Subjective meaning is "something" I *intend* to communicate. Whether or when I *actually* language this "something" is not at issue. What *is* clear is that the meaning is sufficiently coagulated - I am *conscious* of it - so that it is an "entity" which I can *intend* to language.[166] Our question, and one which Schutz does not face, is: what degree of (focused) consciousness is necessary to create a meaning sufficiently concrete to be intended as a message for another? To put the question another way, "May there be subjective *meaning* created by an *un*focused consciousness which is meaning but in a *non*-conceptual, *in*articulate, or "*un*intendable" sense? We mentioned in chapter one that meaning is created, according to Schutz, by turning back against the flow of experience. Our question, in relation to the contents of the first chapter, is: "To what degree and in what manner must consciousness turn back upon or remove itself from the flow in order to create *minimal* meaning?"[167]

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[165] P, p. 23.

These questions and formulations are somewhat disjointed. Several of the questions will be answered later. We would like to suggest, however, that Schutz has not plotted the course from meaninglessness to subjective meaning, nor has he dealt with those subjectively meaningful elements which arise outside voluntary, intentional attention. If he were to do this the issues surrounding Gendlin's "felt-meaning" would undoubtedly arise. For instance, the affection that young parents give their baby is subjectively meaningful to the baby. The child enjoys the parent's love, indeed needs it, and with open arms asks for more. But he does not know the *word* "love," neither does he *rationally intend* to express his enjoyment of it. He just does. At this level the personal or subjective meaning is pre-cognitive and pre-verbal, but it is meaningful, nonetheless, as the laughing responses of the baby indicate.[168]

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[166] Even intention to communicate *nothing*, i.e. not to say anything, is the intention to communicate subjective meaning.

[167] This is certainly related to the question: To what degree is meaning only created by a cognitive, volitional, and focused objectifying of one's past experience? Is there not a felt-meaning possible, in other words, while one is experiencing? It is created by "instantaneous" associations of present experience with a meaning system through retention and protention. At the conscious, experiential level it *may* manifest itself in nothing more than in my feeling that I am in a (meaningful) *context*. Granted, greater reflection may make this meaning more cognitively concrete.

Before we began to raise these issues we were considering the distinction between the bodily state which reflects subjective *experience* and the expression of subjective, *intended meaning* in an attempt to formulate what the latter is for Schutz. Weber speaks about the intentional dimension to meaning from a slightly different standpoint when he suggests two kinds of understanding, "observational" and "motivational."[169] The first is based upon observation of involuntary bodily states such as blushing and of the voluntary body movements and verbal utterances which express a person's subjective meaning such as shaking one's fist and cursing. The second is based upon an understanding of the actor's motives or intentions.[170] This summary passes over the detail in Weber's argument because we are primarily interested in what Schutz means by "subjective meaning." For these reasons we will concentrate upon the results of his analysis of Weber. As could be expected - because at this stage of The Phenomenology Schutz is limiting the field - he says more about misunderstanding subjective meaning than about grasping its central features.

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[168] To try to say *how* meaningful or *why* meaningful would be to flirt with the imposition of *our* adult meanings upon the baby. The baby's *response* is sufficient indication of its (some-kind-of) meaning. At another level the *parents'* response to the child is an indication to him of *how* their affection *should* be meaningful.

[169] Cf. P, pp. 24-25.

[170] In a certain sense this involves observation as well. The person is asked *why* he is acting in a particular manner or some other less direct (and possibly less accurate) method is employed for ascertaining this. But in both cases the inquiring person is observing (listening to) the motives for the action. Regardless of terminology or methodology, however, these are two distinct strata.

For Schutz there is something inaccurate in suggesting, as he thinks Weber does, that subjective meaning may be "observed." Mere observation of affectual action, written thoughts, or acts may provide an objective or observable context for meaning but not the actor's subjective context of meaning.[171] For instance, the observation of affectual activity such as a supposed outburst of anger - once it is determined that the actor is not (meaninglessly) reacting to an exceptional stimulus - cannot determine what the activity means to the actor. Is it simply the release of pent-up emotions and directed toward "the world in general" or does it mean anger at himself? These important interpretative issues are left unsettled by mere observation.[172]

Although it would seem that Weber's "motivational understanding" penetrates subjective meaning more effectively, Schutz is dissatisfied. He is this for three major reasons. First, even though Weber's concept is an attempt to establish the "meaning context" of action, it seeks to understand motivation from an observational point of view. The motives of the actor are interpreted as appropriate to the action but appropriate from the observer's standpoint. But strict observation can no more determine the motives of an actor than it can illumine accurately the general, intended meaning of his action. This is related to Schutz's second point: motives have their source outside the actual, present context. In order to understand motivation, consideration must be given to the actor's past and self-conceived future.[173] Furthermore, in understanding the past and future direction of motives, the actor's point of view is determinative. Third, contrary to Weber, mere isolation of the motive in order to attain "motivational understanding," even if it is accomplished from the actor's point of view, does not exhaust the depths of subjective, intended meaning. If the actor could express his motive, it is only the visible glacier peak indicating a submerged field of subjective meaning. Articulated motives reflect the previously established presence of a meaning-context in relationship to which they become motives. Schutz writes:

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[171] Cf. P, pp. 26-27.

[172] Schutz uses Husserl's distinction between the content of a judgment and the epistemic (subjective) attitude toward that content to say the same thing about written thoughts like "2x2=4." With regard to acts such as aiming a gun, does observation make it certain, so Schutz argues, that the hunter is aiming the gun to fire at an animal or merely looking at the animal through his telescopic sight? Alfred Hitchcock's thrillers are based upon this frequent disparity between observational activity and the meaning of the activity for the observed person.

> The actor takes for granted the meaning of his action: it is self-evident to him in the proper sense of that term. If he asks himself what his motives were, he takes this self-evident meaning as his point of departure and then looks for past experiences which were relevant to his action or for future events toward which his action is conducive. It can,

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[173] Schutz, following Weber, defines "motive" as "the meaning-complex which he takes to be the meaningful ground of his behavior." P, p. 28. We will not develop Schutz's highly significant distinction between the "because" and the "in-order-to" motive here since it is our primary concern to relate the motive to subjective meaning. Nonetheless, these two motive types are important for the construction of a "project" which is then morally evaluated in the ethical province.

> therefore, be said that the actor must already know the intended meaning of his action before he can inquire about its motive.[174]

Thus, from the actor's point of view, motives are abbreviations, not synonymns, for the subjective context of meaning. But they are known as abbreviations in relation to the meaning-context which is self-evident to the actor only. The observer, in contrast, who lacks this self-evident starting point, has only the observable or objective expression and as he views it with which to work. It may be quite far removed from the actual intended meaning of the actor. Schutz concludes, then, that both Weber's "observational understanding" and "motivational understanding" begin with an objective meaning-context and cannot, therefore, accurately penetrate the subjective meaning of the actor.[175] This indicates that there is an inescapably individual, personal, and unique dimension to subjective meaning which frustrates observation by another even quite sensitive person. Yet, although the insufficiency of observation presents obstacles to social science method, subjective meaning can be and is communicated; there are objective *indications* of intended meaning.[176]

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[174] P, p. 29.

[175] Even though Schutz rejects Weber's distinction between observational and motivational understanding as "arbitrary and without any logical basis in his own theory," (P, p. 29) he does think it makes a significant and accurate epistemological point.

When we view another's action in everyday life we interpret external, observable events as indications of an underlying stream of consciousness. (Schutz does not add "with subjectively meaningful context." Why?) As we do this we know or observationally "understand" the activity, directly witnessing the action as it unfolds. Motivational understanding, in contrast, is not linked to the direct experience of an on-going action. It focuses upon the completed act with an objective meaning but a meaning which indicates a subjective (meaning) substrata. Because observational understanding is the understanding of the everyday, motivational understanding is more helpful for scientific, sociological analysis, according to Schutz.

We have spoken of subjective meaning as "*personal interpretation*," of the difference between subjective *meaning* and subjective *experience*, of the difficulties inherent in the *observation* of subjective meaning, of the relation of *intention* or motive to subjective meaning, and of the manner in which subjective meaning is only *indicated* in the public sphere. Now let us turn to *The Phenomenology* in order to continue our analysis of the relation between subjective meaning and action. We began to deal with this topic earlier by distinguishing between on-going action and completed act and by relating subjective meaning to verbal expression. But further treatment will clarify important details.

What is meant when we say that we attach subjective meaning to an act?[177] First of all, as is characteristic of Schutz, he separates "action" into two distinct categories. "Action" may be either in process (*actio*) or completed (*actum*). Every action, whether it is my personal action or another's, may be seen under these two rubrics. There is a marked difference, however, in the features of each kind of action as experienced and as observed. On-going action is experienced by the actor as *fluid*, seriated coming-to-be and passing-away. It is also experienced as *present tense involvement* in the processive event with an horizon of intended (future) actions and an horizon of remembered, terminated (past) actions.[178] Whether it is my action or another's, there is a necessary and intimate relation between the acting subject with his subjective, intended, and conscious meaning and the activity produced in the external world. This actio, in the terms of our first and second chapters, is a combination of activity in the external world with the subjective, internal meaning of the stream of consciousness, although the actor does not experience his external movements as external.[179] To the actor - and this is assumed by an observer because he has experienced similarly - on-going action with its external activity has intentional, subjective meaning which is evident to him. It may not be as evident to the observer.

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[176] It would be inaccurate to *overplay* the unique features of subjective meaning. Certainly they exist and must be acknowledged, but the existence of *society* with its shared meaning systems and social relationships demonstrates that communication of and agreement concerning meaning is possible, even though at a more specific level there are obvious divergences and impediments to the communication of meaning.

[177] Cf. P, pp. 38-43.

Completed action, on the other hand, possesses different features. Every actum presupposes an acting, but it may be separated from the subjective, constituting process as a subject-free object. Viewed in this manner what was once on-going action is now treated anonymously, i.e. reference to the personal intentions of the actor need not enter the discussion of the finished act. An actum is thus, in Schutz's words, "duration-transcendent enactedness." The crucial point is, however, that, with focus upon the completed act, the intended meaning of the original actor - indeed, intentionality itself - drifts from view, and the act, if it has meaning at all, is given meaning by the observer. The meaning is disembodied from its original meaning-context and reconstituted within the meaning-context of the observer.

An original actio may have various meanings, both subjective and objective and with even great discrepancies among them, depending upon the persons and time period involved. Let us stylize. There is (1) the subjective meaning which an on-going action has for the original actor in the process of acting, (2) the subjective meaning he gives to it as actum two years after its completion, (3) the subjective meaning the act-in-process has for an interested observer during its original constitution, (4) the meaning this same act (actum) may have for this observer two years hence, (5) the objective meaning the original actio may have for a disinterested observer, (6) and as completed action years later, and (7) there is the collage of subjective-objective meanings which others not present during the on-going process might be aware of hours or days or years after its completion.

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[178] In Schutz's words, action in progress is "subject-bound." (P, p. 39)

[179] This is the evaluation of the observer.

Now that we have suggested Schutz's separation of act (Handlung) from action (Handeln), we turn, in our continued investigation of subjective meaning, to the explicit relation between subjective meaning and action.[180] What does it say about subjective meaning to indicate, as Schutz does, that it can be "attached" to on-going action? A full answer to this question includes an elucidation of the meaning-constitution process, which we treated initially in chapter one under the caption "Consciousness, the Creation of Meaning, and Its Modification". First of all, the use of the word "attach" is certainly metaphorical. Meaning is not attached to bodily movements so that it is sent "along a parallel track in a kind of pre-established harmony"[181] or so that it resembles a note attached to a side of beef.[182] For Schutz, the meaning of an action[183] involves a particular (interpretative) way of ordering experience. In other words, meaning is given to an action through the "formation and structure" of lived experiences. But "action," it will be remembered, is only one definitionally separable kind of activity - at least as developed by Schutz and Weber - an activity which has a particular direction, let us say (at the social level) interaction with fellow human beings. Subjective meaning may be given to other kinds of activity, e.g. the mental solving of a mathematical puzzle. To digress somewhat, in the wide-awake attitude a person is conscious of his emotional and bodily state, his sensations, perceptions, and attitudes. If he calls any one of these experiences "meaningful," it is only because, "in taking heed of it I have 'selected it out' of and distinguished it from the abundance of experiences coexisting with it, preceding it, and following it."[184] The person has isolated a "discrete" experience and through this process has given it meaning, "attached meaning to" it. Meaning, however, is not added to experience nor is it a conclusion from experience. Meaning is a way of experiencing or, in Schutz's words, "a certain way of directing one's gaze at an item of one's experience."[185] It is not experienced as prickly sensations in the brain, but it is experienced as thoughts and ideas. It is reflective[186] experiencing, a "peculiar attitude on the part of the Ego toward the flow of its own duration."[187] It is also a mental activity or "experience," although certainly of a non-sensual variety. Meaning-creation, viewed as a particular kind of attending to one's experience, is the product, no matter at what level, of this reflective, mental, and selective process which turns against the flow of on-going experience in order to render a specific item or associative pattern discrete. This discrete item, then, becomes meaningful in relation, in relation to other discrete items or in relation to a particular field of experience. In other words, subjective meaning is not "attached" to something, be it an "action" or activity; it arises in and is a creation of our attention to experience.[188] But it is itself an experiencing.

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[180] In The Phenomenology this is part of a wider set of problems involving the Schutz-Weber attempt to distinguish meaningful action from meaningless behavior. The difference between "action" and "behavior" is, at this level, the presence or absence of expressible subjective meaning.

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[181] P, p. 40.

[182] Neither does the word "attach" mean that meaning is a "new, additional and secondary experience which is somehow 'attached'" to an action, nor is it "a predicate of an individual experience - a conclusion." P, p. 42.

[183] Here we have in mind the meaning for the actor. The meaning that an observer "attaches" to the action of the actor is constructed in a similar manner, although the meaning content may be quite different.

[184] P, p. 41.

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[185] P, p. 42. The phrase "directing one's gaze," although an accurate rendition of Blickrichtung, could also have been "directing one's attention." The use of the word "attention" instead of "gaze" would have made the connection with our phrase "the attention of consciousness" more obvious and rendered the meaning less physical - but the usual sense of "Blick" may have been sacrificed. Secondly, the phrase "an item of one's own experience" is significant. Even if one does not experience something at first hand, one does experience the communication of it at first-hand. When all is said and done, bedrock is the experience of the individual, regardless of how it may be (necessarily) socially given.

[186] This does not necessarily mean "highly rationalized," but it is cognitive.

[187] P, p. 42.

At this juncture, let us summarize. We have investigated the meaning of "subjective meaning" in Schutz and have begun to sketch the placement of this dimension, its general features, the manner in which it is constituted, and those elements to which it is related although from which it must be separated. As far as placement is concerned, it is experienced by the individual person. Regardless of the social and extrapersonal factors that influence subjective meaning, it is at the personal level that it is held and created. For various reasons and to differing degrees, it is impervious to the prying eyes of others;[189] it is "subject-bound" or "subjective" in the sense that it is created by a conscious subject. For want of better words, it is considered an "inner" or "mental" phenomenon.[190] Yet "inner" and "mental" refer more to the fact that subjective meaning is an experienced activity which need not be expressed, i.e. externalized to others, but which is thoughtful activity than that it "exists" inside the skull at a particular place in the brain.[191] It is also subjective or personal in that it need not, although it may, be related to objects observable by others.

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[188] Schutz writes in Der sinnhafte Aufbau, p. 40, "Sinn...ist nichts anderes als das besondere Wie dieser Zuwendung zum eigenen Erlebnis..." Emphasis in the original. The word "Zuwendung" - translated in The Phenomenology as "heeding" - with the dative means "to turn toward," strikingly similar to our verb phrase "to attend to." In chapter one it was mentioned that "attention" is the basis for the creation of meaning by the human consciousness.

[189] To a certain degree, personal, subjective meaning evades the individual himself, in his thought and in his expression. It shades off into meaninglessness or it becomes less vivid over time or it shifts meaning entirely. The fact that it is variously articulate or articulatable, i.e. is often loosely tied to words and concepts usable by the individual, may, at its fringes, give it almost ghostly, translucent, or gossamer qualities. This provides an obvious opening for "felt-meaning."

[190] Note again, however, the cognitive overtones.

Second, subjective meaning is characterized by categorization and relationality and is dependent upon the attention of consciousness. It involves relatively definite, discrete items which are related to each other and to a wider field, although they may change over time. The specific ideas, words, and relational patterns[192] that are used create a particular content, but this content is separable from these general features. Categorization and relation enable the individual to order his experienced world and to, on the basis of this ranking, make evaluations and decisions.

Third, subjective meaning is different from subjective experience and involves what may be called a message potential. It is conscious or experienced meaning which the person may intend to communicate or at least is sufficiently focused or focusable so that communication is possible.

Fourth, even though there are barriers to observation, subjective meaning certainly can be expressed. This expression is, however, simply an indication, an observable sign, of a more extensive and unexpressed meaning field.

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[191] The phenomenological explication of subjective meaning short-circuits much of the (positivistic) controversy over the relation of brain to mind and such related matters. Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind illustrates a different philosophical tradition. For a most informative comparison of Ryle's tradition with the phenomenological (Husserl), cf. Frederick J. Crosson, "The Concept of Mind and the Concept of Consciousness," James M. Edie, ed., Phenomenology in America (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), pp. 186-196.

[192] For instance, there is double, triple, or multiple association, chronological sequence, spatial relationship, and so forth.

Fifth, subjective meaning is created through a discernable process. It is fashioned by an experienced attention[193] to what one has experienced, i.e. by a reflexive act. This attention renders an item or items from a larger field of experience discrete. Through "secondary remembrance" (Husserl) the item is related to other similar or different items and to the range of (past) subjective meaning at hand. This is all accomplished as an experienced activity of the mind, an active series of changes in the individual's mental states or foci. To say that something is subjectively meaningful is to indicate that an item attended to has been placed in relation to one's past experience, experience which is coalesced as retained meaning, and that, from the person's standpoint, it "fits." If there is no relationship, there is no meaning. But this is not to suggest that the pieces fit snugly or that they remain in the same configuration indefinitely.

There are kinds and degrees of meaningfulness, in other words. For instance, different kinds of subjective meaning may exist in the relation among or between separate emotional states, attitudes, ideas, sentences, sub-cultures, and societies or, as is usually the case, in the relation among all or some of these individual categories. There are also degrees of meaning, relative to varying standards and different time periods. Let us illustrate by mentioning emotional states. The experienced fear of water and the experienced fear of height may appear[194] highly similar, and because of this they fit together snugly. If similarity is meaningful to the experiencing person, this comparison will be *highly meaningful* since the two fears are highly similar. Relative to similarity as the standard for meaning, the relation of fear of water and "love" of sunshine may have "*low*" meaning or even *no* meaning because they are *dis*similar.[195] On the other hand, if *dis*-similarity becomes the standard for the fit of meaning, these two experiences may be *highly* meaningful. There are, therefore, various kinds of subjective meaning such as emotional meaning, attitudinal meaning, ideational meaning, and so forth. And there are degrees of meaningfulness, relative to a particular standard for this meaning, which descends into meaning*less*ness. There is also a flexibility in subjective meaning, changes of various kinds and to varying degrees over time. We can even say that meaning increases as something highly meaningful in one area is related to or integrated with other areas of meaning.

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[193] This "experienced attention" may be of varying intensity and moves, in the conceptualization process, through at least three phases: (1) "passive awareness," (2) "predicative spontaneity," and (3) "conceptual thinking." Cf. Maurice Natanson, "The Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz," Inquiry, IX (1966), p. 151.

In conclusion to this section and in anticipation of our treatment of objective meaning, let us underscore several important elements that stand in relation to subjective meaning. First, the most faithful reflection of inner, subjective meaning is the actor's voluntary *expression* of his intended or thought meaning with its meaning-context.

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[194] And this involves such previous things as sufficient frequency, both to perceive them as discrete experiences and to apprehend them as "of water" and "of height."

[195] As *separate* entities and in relation to *other* past experiences each of these emotional states *may* be meaningful. Also, below the surface someone may *find* a similarity and make fear of water and love of sunshine "meaningful" in relationship.

Second, this expression may include the motives or reasons behind an action he might perform or have performed. Both are, however, coagulated or coalesced meaning, i.e. they encapsulate a subjective, interpretative substrata which is not fully articulated. Third, the bodily expression of thought-meaning and motivational meaning is distinguished from involuntary bodily states, such as blushing, which are not designed to communicate anything, although they indicate to observers the subjective experience of a person. Fourth, and we are increasingly moving away from subjective meaning itself to the perceivable and now observed manifestations of it, the observation of one person's meaningful expression by another as it is taking place ties into the original subjective meaning in a particular manner, but now there is the possible disparity between the expression of intended meaning and its apprehension. In face-to-face communication, therefore, there is the intermingling of at least two different meaning-contexts, the expressor's and the observer's. It is here that plurality may emerge. Finally, subjective meaning is ossified in the completed act and is there only through interpretation. The accomplished act may thus be interpreted as an object created at some point with subjective meaning or as an object severed from the original meaning-context of the creator.[196]

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[196] These expressional "objects" may be of different kinds. Schutz calls them, generally, "indications," "signs," and "symbols." There are other objectivities which are simple "evidences," evidence of construction by a rational, intending being, although they may not be designed to express anything (e.g. a hammer). Cf. P, pp. 132-133. These products may be viewed in two different ways, as we suggested above. Schutz treats this two-fold interpretation of objects in The Phenomenology, pp. 133-136, as "subjective meaning of the product" and "objective meaning of the product." He writes, "We speak, then, of the subjective meaning of the product if we have in view the meaning-context within which the product stands or stood in the mind of the producer. To

The Meaning of "Objective Meaning"

Although in developing Schutz's position on subjective meaning we have written of objectification and of objective meaning, it has been primarily to place subjective meaning in relief. Now we will deal with objective meaning directly in an attempt to state its positive significance and to suggest an illuminating relationship that it has to subjective meaning.[197]

Let M^1 represent the intended meaning which an actor X has for his action A. Let A be expressed by a bodily movement of X which is observed at the same time by his friend F and by a sociologist S. In making sense of A, F and S will connect A, which they assume to be

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know the subjective meaning of the product means that we are able to run over in our own minds in simultaneity or quasi-simultaneity the polythetic Acts which constituted the experience of the producer... Objective meaning, on the contrary, we can predicate only of the product as such, that is, of the already constituted meaning-context of the thing produced, whose actual production we meanwhile disregard." P, pp. 133-134. These reflect two interpretations of the same completed act, which focus upon two different levels. To employ either one does not necessarily deny the legitimacy of the other.

On pp. 136-138 the distinction is made relevant to the "cultural sciences" and on pp. 241-249 to the "social sciences." In the latter instance, Schutz's analysis of subjective and objective meaning leads him to conclude that "all social sciences are objective meaning-contexts of subjective meaning-contexts." P, p. 241. This is accomplished through the use of "personal ideal types" (and "course-of-action types") in which, "in the process of ideal-typical construction, subjective meaning-contexts that can be directly experienced are successively replaced by a series of objective meaning contexts. These are constructed gradually, each one upon its predecessor, and they interpenetrate one another in Chinese-box fashion, so that it is difficult to say where one leaves off and the other begins. However, it is precisely this process of construction which makes it possible for the social scientist, or indeed for any observer, to understand what the actor means; for it is this process alone which gives a dimension of objectivity to his meaning." P, pp. 241-242.

[197] The following exposition takes its direction from The Phenomenology, pp. 31-38.

an indication of X's subjective experiences and meaning, with a meaning. But it will be a meaning they have constructed on the basis of their observation and their own personal (subjective), interpretative framework. As we have said, observation is not sufficient to perceive X's intended meaning. This means that F will, on the basis of his friendship with X, interpret the external action A and create let us say M^2, a particular meaning for it. In the same manner, but on the basis of his sociological frame of reference, S will also construct a meaning M^3. We have, then, three meanings for the action A, the intended meaning of X and two observationally informed meanings M^2 and M^3. "Even under optimum conditions of interpretation," however, M^1 will never coincide with M^2 and M^3,[198] and M^2 and M^3 will never be synonymous.

Each person - X, F, and S - builds his respective meaning upon various interpretative skeletons which are significant in their own right but which extend far beyond the establishment of M^1, M^2, and M^3. Personality, position within a social structure, individual capabilities, educational and occupational development, the historical setting - all of these and other factors contribute in various ways to the emergence of a composit, personal, and informing Weltanschauung. Our purpose here does not include the examination of these important and interwoven phenomena. We simply underscore the fact that M^1, M^2, and M^3 are constructed on the basis of factors which transcend them.

In what sense does Schutz call M^2 and M^3 "objective?" First, they are created by rendering A an object for observation, an object which exists in the external, public world and is equally open to the view of F and S. M^2 and M^3 are created through the objectification of A.

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[198] P, p. 32.

Second, they are objective or external relative to M^1. According to both Schutz and Weber A may have only one subjective, i.e. originally intended, meaning, and the meaning (M^1) "attached" to it by X. All others are, relative to it and to it alone, "objective." He makes this quite clear when he writes:

> We have to distinguish between the subjective meaning a situation has for the person involved (or the one a particular action has for the actor himself), and the objective meaning, that is, the interpretation of the same situation or the same action by anybody else.[199]

But it certainly is not assumed by Schutz that the "objective" meaning created by F is the same as that created by S. M^2 is an "objective" meaning which grows out of F's friendship with X. For this reason, the words and concepts employed stem from the personal relationship that the two enjoy. M^3 is an "objective" meaning which is based on a scientific frame of reference. The interpretive concepts used are part of a sociological meaning system. They are not, as in the case of M^2, only the personal creation of a single person (S). They are undoubtedly more precise, stylized, highly formal, and scientifically rational than the concepts reflected in M^2. The difficulty in understanding what Schutz means by "objective meaning" is tied to the fact that we generally equate "objective" with the meaning constituted by the scientist, calling M^2 "subjective." This is not Schutz's definition. For him objective meaning is that constituted by anyone who views an act as a non-intentional object, an object unrelated to the subjective, intended meaning with which the actor originally endowed it.

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[199] II, p. 227. Emphasis in the original. Schutz is writing in this context about the objective meaning of an action, a meaning that is constructed without reference to the original, indended meaning of the actor. But objective meaning may also be constituted in relation to anything viewed as a non-intentional object. Thus, the meaning that a rock or a chemical reaction may have is objective meaning; in this sense the physical scientist deals with this kind of meaning.

Third, even though objective meaning focuses upon the non-intentional object and this focus helps create a particular kind of meaning, its construction follows the general process we outlined in chapter one. At this level it is similar to all meaning, subjective meaning for that matter.

Fourth, objective meaning, from Schutz's standpoint, can also be separated from F and S, its original creators. It can possess, in other words, a certain anonymity, independence, or impersonalism. Objective meaning is in this sense an "ideal objectivity" (Husserl). Schutz puts it in these terms:

> We mean to say that these ideal objectivities are meaningful and intelligible in their own right - in their, so to speak, anonymous nature - regardless of whether anyone is using them. For instance, the expression 2 x 2 = 4 has an objective meaning regardless of what is in the minds of any or all of its users.[200]

Here "objective meaning" signifies a "unit of meaning" treated as a separable object. As Husserl suggested in his Logical Investigations,[201] this unit is severed from the intended meaning that the original, constituting author may have had and considered for the meaning it has itself or, better from our standpoint, for the meaning it is given by a subsequent observer.[202] Schutz thus employs "objective meaning" to refer to M^2 and M^3 as constituted by F and S and as independent of their creation.

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[200] P, p. 33.

[201] Cf. Marvin Farber, The Foundations of Phenomenology, pp. 237ff and 231-232.

On the basis of our discussion of objective meaning, we can now ask Schutz several questions. Is "objective meaning" the meaning which an observed action, let us say, has in itself, divorced from the intention of the original actor and of the observer or is objective meaning that which the conscious observer bestows upon a completed act or an action in process? The manner in which Schutz uses Husserl's "ideal objectivities,"[203] which are "meaningful and intelligible in their own right," indicates that for him an idea once expressed has an inherent meaning, an objective meaning, all its own. This is highly dubious. Schutz would have to qualify himself by saying that the completed idea (act) may have an unchanging meaning but only for those within a given culture or subculture who come to that idea with an interpretative scheme into which the idea "fits." This is consonant with what Schutz has said about interpretation of objects in the external world. But it indicates that an object does not have objective or any other kind of meaning in itself. It may be related to a meaning that is shared by several or even many, a meaning that they have either created or inherited. Nonetheless, the answer to our original question is that objective meaning is bestowed not inherent. Our discussion of meaning construction in chapter one and much that Schutz himself indicates at other points suggests that he would qualify his comments in The Phenomenology to which we have taken exception here.

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[202] A special case of this distinction is the possible separation of "objective expressions" from "essentially subjective and occasional" expressions. In the latter the expression must be related to the original speaker and his condition; in the former this dimension is overlooked. Cf. P, p. 33.

[203] For example, 2 x 2 = 4. Cf. P, p. 33.

The Movement from Subjective to Objective Meaning

In this section we are going to be more concrete about the change that takes place when something is defined subjectively and then objectively. This will give additional depth to our investigation of subjective and objective meaning but will also begin to indicate that meaning-plurality which is the foundation for "multiple realities."

It is in his "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World"[204] that Schutz shows how the movement from the subjective to the objective level creates attendent shifts in the meaning of "equality."[205] His analysis, which is based upon an understanding of the Lebenswelt, begins by underscoring the taken-for-granted folkways that each social individual inherits. These folkways are combinations of what Schutz calls "typifications" or generalizations which assist in ordering experience. For instance, the words "mountain," "dog," and "car" represent the typing done at this level, a typifying which "consists in passing by what makes the individual unique and irreplaceable." It is an "equalization of traits."[206] The types are not highly rationalized or conceptualized and are thus "prepredicative," to use a phenomenological term. These typifications, furthermore, are "taken-for-granted" because, being both adequate thus far and socially approved, they require neither explanation nor justification for a society or, at a more personal level, an "in-group." Acceptance of these folkways reflects the general belief that things will go on substantially as they have been, and rejection of them comes only after a "crisis" (Schutz) proves them inadequate in meeting the pragmatic requirements of the *Lebenswelt*.[207]

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[204] II, pp. 226-273.

[205] II, pp. 250-257. He also deals in this manner with such things as "social" group (Cf. II, pp. 250-257). But we will concentrate upon "equality" and, at a more specific level, "equal opportunity."

[206] II, p. 234.

Typifications, however, can be variously inclusive as different features, with varying specificity and generality, or combinations of these features are focused upon and used as ordering principles.[208] To illustrate, the type "white, 1965, VW, sedan" includes few automobiles when it is compared to the inclusiveness of the type "foreign car," "economy car," or "car."

What determines the typifications that are used to order daily life? Schutz's answer is "the particular purpose at hand." In other words, there is no pure, generally applicable type; all types are relational and thus are created only relevant to a given problem, purpose, or "project." When several types are used in the solution of a particular problem they belong, according to Schutz, to the same

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[207] Typifications have other features that we are not mentioning here. They also *function* in a social system in various quite influential ways. Schutz lists five of these functions for the in-group on pp. 237-238 of II.

[208] This is true at the level of daily life, Schutz's concern, or at other levels such as the scientific or the sociological even though in the last two instances the types are quite different from "common-sense" types.

"domain of relevance."[209] This means, in terms of our previous analysis, that, if it is our purpose to investigate the intended meaning behind an action, we will construct a domain in which subjective meaning is of central relevance. And this domain by its very construction will include and exclude data as "significant" and as "insignificant" respectively. It follows that another purpose will call for another domain of relevance.[210]

Against this background discussion Schutz begins to sketch the meaning and use of the word "equality."[211] First of all, it is evident from our analysis of typification as an "equalization of traits" that there exists an equality or a seeming equality between the objects (events, facts) in each type.[212] For instance, we think of men as male and assume that relative to this general characterization there is an equality or interchangeability; all men are "male." In an attempt to be semantically precise, however, Schutz prefers to call this "homogeneity." Elements related to divergent types are termed "heterogeneous."

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[209] In his essay under consideration here Schutz is writing of what he calls "problem-relevance," the relevance that certain types have for a given problem. There are other forms of relevance, e.g. "motivational," "thematic," and "interpretational" relevance. Cf. III, pp. 123-132.

[210] These may be overlapping so that a single element is included both in the first and in the second domain. Secondly, in the common-sense, pragmatic world domain-establishment is largely based upon social approval, something the individual usually leaves unchallenged. Cf. II, p. 236. If C. Wright Mills is "right" in his The Sociological Imagination, this unquestioning attitude often is evidenced in the social scientific community as well.

[211] Cf. II, p. 239ff.

[212] The word "seeming" is used to indicate the fluidity in typification. Under closer analysis an object may be rejected as not "typical."

The basic reason for this clarification is that Schutz wishes to reserve "equality" and "inequality" for use within one domain of relevance. Following Aristotle's lead in his Politics, Schutz writes:

> Equality and inequality are relational notions and have to be defined in terms of the domain of relevance to which they pertain. Only within each of these domains of relevances can degrees of merit and excellence be distinguished. Moreover, that which is comparable in terms of the system of one domain is not comparable in terms of other systems, and for this reason the application of yardsticks not pertaining to the same domain of relevances leads to logical or axiological (moral) inconsistencies.[213]

It appears that Schutz is attempting to guard against what Gilbert Ryle calls in another context and at the predicative level the "category mistake."[214] Even though there may be a general ranking (differentiation) among the domains of relevance, differing from subculture to subculture, degrees of equality and inequality or divergence make sense only within one domain. For instance, in one domain the standard or distinguishing trait may be "observability." Within this domain with its typifications there are varying degrees from high to low observability. On this continuum two objects may be equally visible or unequally visible. Simple enough. It would be relatively uninteresting and misleading to compare even an object with low observability to something that is "invisible" such as the sensations I feel when I am sick. Furthermore, to demand that these feelings of sickness be observable is banal. Yet the results of similar category mistakes are legion. In the field of cultural anthropology it took some time before the word "primitive" was recognized as an evaluative word relative to our own civilization with its various characteristics such as technological expertise. Given another standard, which was endemic to the culture being studied itself, it was often found "advanced" or "highly developed." Theologians in their discipline are familiar with the abortive attempts to capture what is meant by the word "God" in the nets of existence categories.[215]

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[213] II, p. 240.

[214] Cf. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, University Paperbacks (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1949), chapter one.

It is the use of interpretations based upon different domains of relevance that leads to divergent perspectives upon and conclusions regarding the taken-for-granted or any other "world." Schutz documents this, finding himself within the tradition of W. I. Thomas ("the definition of the situation"), W. G. Sumner (the "in-group" and the "out-group"), and Weber ("subjective" and "objective meaning"), by showing the difference between the interpretation that one group gives to its activity and that of another group. Committed members of the New Left (Marxist-Leninist), for instance, look upon their activity as the most moral, creative, and necessary movement toward social and political reform. They appeal to various authorities and to a particular rationale which justifies their action. Adherents of the New Right (John Birch), responding to another style of relevances, view their own activity in a similar positive light. But how does each group perceive the other? For the Bircher, Leftists are immoral anarchists. For the Marxist-Leninist, Birchers are immoral fascists. This is an extreme and even simple illustration of the interaction or, better, antithesis of disparate domains of relevance.[216] The interesting thing is that, given the intertwining ideas, beliefs, and values in each group, its rejection of the other is consistent and, in a certain sense, inevitable. This does not mean that all domains conflict as blatantly. It does suggest a phenomenon that, even though more subtle, exists in the relation of all in-groups and out-groups. The in-group views itself and others in relation to its subjective interpretation of the everyday world; it is aware, to varying degrees, of its intentions and related values. The in-group is usually not aware of the subjective intentions of another group.[217] In fact, it may not care to be. At any rate, it generally views the other group not from within but from without, something that encourages the projection of the in-group fears, misunderstandings, and hatred upon the objective, completed acts of members of the out-group. This implies that there is conflict between particular domains of relevance both because of the actual and because of the imagined factors involved.

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[215] Cf. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 235-241. The theological problem, however, is based upon the necessity of using these categories. In this context the "mistake" is not the use of symbolism - the words or signs of one domain used to point to another - but the denial that this involves a (creative but purposive) category "fault" or slippage.

Let us now see how the movement between subjective and objective interpretation influences the meaning of "equality."[218] It was stated that equality prevails only within the same domain of relevance. This is one reason for separating such things as equality of wealth, political equality, religious equality, equality before the law, and so forth. But our concern here is with the effect of subjective and objective meaning upon the understanding of equality, whatever kind it may be. To put our present discussion in perspective, let us return to our alphabetized illustration. M^2 and M^3 were the meanings given respectively by a friend (F) and a sociologist (S) to the action (A) of an intending agent (X). They were objective meanings of A because they treated it as an object divorced from the intention of X. M^1, the only subjective meaning for A, was the one given by X to his action. It might be added that if M^2 and M^3 were consciously constructed by F and S to coincide (as much as this is possible) with M^1, they, too, would be "subjective meaning" for Schutz.[219] When we deal here with the subjective meaning that equality has, we are considering meaning at the level of M^1, that given by the actor himself to the word on the basis of his subjective or personal definition of his contextual situation.[220] The objective meaning of equality is that meaning which is given to it without reference to this personal, subjective dimension.[221]

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[216] Schutz treates these matters at greater length. Cf. II, pp. 243-248.

[217] We are drawing black and white lines here. The membership of these groups may overlap, causing more subtle issues for analysis.

[218] Here we move beyond the notion of equality treated impersonally to a consideration of discrimination, human attitudes and practices based upon the personal appropriation and interpretation of equality and inequality.

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[219] Cf. P, p. 133.

[220] This is obviously related to Thomas' "definition of the situation," to the notion of the "self-fulfilling prophecy" ("If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." - Thomas), but also to what Schutz calls "self-typification," our subjective interpretation of ourselves, our position in the world, and the manner in which we wish to or actually fulfill social roles. Cf. II, pp. 233, 237, and 254. In the conceptualization running prescribed, accepted, and actual role, it coincides most with "accepted role."

[221] It should be noted here, however, that the kind of objective meaning that Schutz is talking about here is closer to that of the sociologist or scientist (S) than it is to the friend (F).

What, now, is the difference that the subjective and objective dimensions bring to the interpretation of "equality?" To be more concrete and in so doing to deal with one domain, how do these interpretative schemata effect the meaning of "equal opportunity?"[222] Let us answer this question first from an objective point of view.[223] Sociologically, opportunity is related - let us say in the Parsonian or Mertonian schema[224] - to the structure and function of the social system. This system is conceptualized or typified in terms of interactive social roles with their related elements.[225] Although it refers to the everyday world, the world of concrete individuals, it nonetheless presents a stylized approximation. What any particular, living individual subjectively intends is not thematically relevant. Opportunity is viewed as the ability of an (stylized) individual to strive to perform or to perform in a particular role. This would demand that the individual possess or develop certain role-related talents and skills. In the objective sense equal opportunity is stated in the slogan, "The career open to the talents" and in the assumption, in Schutz's words, that

> not only competent persons should be eligible, but all competent persons, regardless of any other criteria, should be equally eligible, it being understood that among all the eligible persons the best qualified should obtain the position.[226]

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[222] Cf. II, pp. 269-273 for the basis of this analysis.

[223] There are many "objective" points of view. Here we take the one commonly used in sociological literature, especially the work of Parsons.

[224] The study by Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin entitled Delinquency and Opportunity (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961) speaks directly to these issues.

[225] This does not imply that the role analysis is the only concern of Parsons or Merton; it obviously is not.

[226] II, p. 270. Emphasis in the original.

The "actual" possibility for this is, theoretically, a matter ascertainable through empirical investigation. When that is undertaken it becomes evident, if it was not before, that equal opportunity in the objective sense, i.e. "the exact correspondence of highest qualifications for any given position,"[227] is impossible. Simmel has suggested that the inherent stratification of society and limitation of superior positions means that there are always more qualified persons for these superior positions than there are positions available.[228] However, equal opportunity,[229] from an objective standpoint, refers to the absence of barriers rather than to the number of positions actually open.

Now, when a subjective stance is taken toward "equal opportunity," the meaning of the phrase shifts significantly. This transformation takes place for several reasons. The person who is constructing meaning, although using his own typifications,[230] defines opportunity personally. In Schutz's words, it is "a possibility for self-realization that stands to his choice,"[231] and, because of that, such things as his personal background, his feelings of insecurity and fear, and his personal aspirations color the definition. Opportunity may objectively be equal. Such personal factors as awareness of the opportunity, perceived attainability of the opportunity which may be equally open to him, its positive compatability with his private (general) system of relevances including his moral system, the congruity between what he conceives his role to be and the role opportunity offered, and the relative consonance of the new role with others he personally plays also enter. In fact, because of these personal differentiating factors, Schutz writes,

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[227] II, p. 270.

[228] Cf. Schutz's allusion to Simmel, II, pp. 270-271.

[229] Here we have been discussing equal opportunity for a career. There is also, writes Schutz, "equality of opportunity for education or the development of ability and talent; equality of opportunity for sharing the benefits of culture; MacIver's concept of equal access to public opportunities, and finally, Tawney's highly interesting statement that equality means not the absence of violent contrasts of income and condition, but equal opportunities for becoming unequal." II, p. 271. Schutz's analysis of "equal opportunity" applies to all of these other possibilities. He concludes, "In all these cases objective opportunity is determined by socially approved typifications of social roles, role expectations, and positions." *Ibid.*

[230] This includes reference to that dimension studied by the social scientist, although the conceptualization may be different.

> Strictly speaking, therefore, equal opportunity exists merely from the objective point of view. The subjective chances are unequal and as we learned from Plato (section II supra), to unequals equals become unequal.[232]

The divergence between subjective and objective meaning stems in part from the manner in which each is constructed. The objective meaning of equal opportunity is constituted through a process of de-personalization and stylization which de-emphasizes individual differences for the sake of standardization. On the other hand, subjective meaning is established on the basis of these personal variations, upon the personal definition of the situation. The possible clash of these divergent meanings is noteworthy. Objectively, a career may be open to an individual who, because of his personal definitions, perceives no opening; for him there is not equality but inequality. What does this say about the perception of reality? For one person, who believes the description of opportunity given objectively, the "real" situation may be one thing, for another, who does not appropriate the objective definition, "reality" may be quite different.

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[231] II, p. 271.

[232] II, p. 273.

Subjective Meaning, Objective Meaning, and Cognitive Style

This brings us to the point in our discussion where we both summarize our findings concerning subjective and objective meaning and relate them to cognitive style. As we have seen, when Schutz writes of subjective meaning, he is talking of intended meaning, an intended meaning which is "indicated" in what we have called M^1. Although this subjective meaning is expressible, intended meaning as such always remains behind the expression, is thus only variously approximated in M^1, and is never completely transparent to the observer. In Schutz's opinion, the human person, although dependent upon the socalled external, social world, experiences dimensions that are outside both complete expression and the Other's understanding. He thinks his own thoughts, experiences his own sensations, and feels his own emotional responses. In this sense and in this sense only he is inherently an isolate. Certainly there is communication between persons, even what we call "intimate" or person-giving expression. Through this communication the experiences at the individual, personal level are exchanged and appropriated. But throughout this process he remains an object, an individual experiencing unity who is other-than-I. I am not conscious of his thoughts, physical sensations, or emotions at first-hand and perceive them only through observation of him. This does not necessarily mean, although it may, that he is meaningful to me as an object to be manipulated, a condition that is currently frowned upon by those fascinated with Buber's personalism.

I certainly may attend, with even a great deal of sensitivity, to his expressed, intended meaning, and we together may even agree that my apprehension of his meaning is highly consistent with his intended meaning. But there remains a distinct, non-reducible difference between us based upon the fact that I do not live inside him. For this reason I must objectify in some way. Indeed, as we have seen, the very establishment of meaning itself is founded upon the process of objectification or, to use a word which is less tinged with negative associations, reflection. This indicates to us that there is an inherent, experienced subject-object differentiation which has epistemological ramifications of high significance.

Whenever a person expresses his intended, subjective meaning, I may either treat it in relation to his original intentions or as a non-intentional object.[233] If I deal with his expression in the latter fashion, I construct, according to Schutz, "objective meaning;" we called this M^2 and M^3. This objective meaning may be constituted in varied ways, using different interpretational schemes, but it is objective relative to the original, subjective, and intended meaning of the expressor. Viewed in this way an expression - an action in the Schutz-Weber tradition is a kind of expression - has only one subjective meaning, that of the author. To the extent that M^2 and M^3 coincide with M^1, i.e. if I treat the expression in the former way, they are "subjective meaning," but again, the criterion for this is faithfulness to or inclusion of the original, intended meaning. What happens in this process is that the secondary subjective meaning is a constellation of "constituted objectivities" created by the observer which are referred to the consciousness of the original expressor.[234] At best, this secondary subjective meaning is directed toward and only approximates the original intended meaning, a meaning which is always a "limiting concept even under optimum conditions of interpretation."[235]

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[233] The categorization is rather stark here. In actual experience shadings are in evidence.

Now let us discuss what we have called M^2 and M^3, the "objective meaning" of the original expression. As we have said, this is the interpretation of the expression by anyone other than the original author. Yet this meaning is in a sense subjective, the creation of intending persons F and S. Schutz recognizes the terminological fuzziness here. In referring to M^2 and M^3 "the term 'objective meaning' is obviously a misnomer, in so far as the socalled 'objective' interpretations are, in turn, relative to the particular attitudes of the interpreters and, therefore, in a certain sense, 'subjective'".[236] Whether we term M^2 and M^3 "objective" or "subjective" is dependent upon our focus, a point that we and Schutz never tire making. The crucial issue is: relative to the original, intended, and subjective meaning of M^1 and to its constituting process, M^2 and M^3 are objective; relative to the original, intended, and subjective meaning of M^2 and M^3 and to their constituting process they are subjective. Whether they are deemed "objective" or "subjective" depends upon what they are relative to, upon what is attended to as relevant.

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[234] Cf. P, p. 38.

[235] Ibid.

[236] II, p. 275. Cf. also p. 227.

For clarification, let us dwell a moment upon the subjective and objective overtones to M^2 and M^3. First, the creation of *all* meaning, be it M^1 or M^{1000}, is *subjective*. Schutz makes this quite clear when he writes in a section primarily influenced by William James, "The origin and fountainhead of all reality, whether from the absolute or practical point of view is thus subjective, is ourselves."[237] The meaning-reality of M^2 and M^3 is at base, then, subjective. However, in the second place, M^2 and M^3 are constructed without reference to that subjectivity which originated M^1. In this sense, M^2 and M^3 are *objective*. But what about the subjective *origin* of M^2 and M^3? To what degree - and we are going to suggest that it *is* to a degree - are the two meanings colored by the personal, subjective interpretations of their authors? It will be remembered that M^2 was constructed by a friend and M^3 by a sociologist. We may conclude rather quickly that M^2 is tied closely to the friendship with X and that F's meaning for X's expression will be highly textured by his own subjective attitudes and insights. To say this is not to disparage the content or the usefulness of M^2. It is to suggest, however, that (1) personal friendship colors M^2, (2) the content of M^2 is probably not related to a standardized vocabulary other than that of the vernacular, and (3) the frame of reference which F uses is primarily of his own creation and influenced by his friendship with X. In short, the degree of personal, subjective involvement and the degree of personal, subjective languaging is high in M^2. The degree of objectivity relative not to the intentions of X but to the intentions of F in the creation of M^2 is low. Now, when we turn to M^3 the situation changes. The sociologist does not have a personal friendship with X. Furthermore, the frame of reference that he is using - including concepts and language - is not simply of his own manufacture. His intended meaning expressed in M^3 is related to the generalizations of "the discipline." For these reasons the degree of objectivity in M^3 is, relative to the subjective, personal intention of S, high, and the degree of subjectivity is low. In saying this we have added another dimension to what Schutz means by objective meaning: it is that meaning which is relatively independent of personal interpretation and exists at a level of generality that is removed from the level of personal, subjective uniqueness. The "personal" interpretation that exists is done on the basis of the demands of the wider academic community. Objective meaning, seen in this light, is standardized or typified meaning and is based not upon what the unique individual experiences but upon what "everyone" experiences or "everyone" can see.

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[237] II, p. 135. Cf. also I, p. 207.

[238] Because of the friendship between F and X, F may know much about X's intended meaning, and his M^2 may be, in terms of Schutz's formulation, a "subjective meaning," i.e. fashioned with an eye to the intended meaning of the original actor.

But let us be clear about the "objectivity" of objectivity. Even though the subjective is reined in and checks are thus put upon its eccentricity, meaning is still created by the subjective person. Original meaning constitution and the meaning-interpretation by one scientist of another's formulations are personally accomplished. Individual perception and interpretation - which are influenced by such "non-objective" things as attitudes, feelings, preconceptions, and human limitations - are the basis of meaning-construction regardless of how many persons agree upon meaning-constitution procedures or upon public verification.[239] As Michael Polanyi has said so eloquently in his Personal Knowledge, a book which we think is one of the most philosophically significant since Kant, all human knowledge - we would say meaning - is personal.

We have suggested that the attention of consciousness with its correlated epoché and the experience of time contribute to a particular cognitive style. Whether and to what degree a person turns toward his experience with a subjective or objective stance also influences the manner in which he "sees" reality. We have demonstrated the difference in the definitions for "equal opportunity." But this is only one of innumerable areas. The subjective and objective meaning of marriage, of music, of the theatre, of the joke, of mystical consciousness, of a presidential funeral, of a James Bond film, of a dream, and so forth directly influences the manner in which experience is interpreted, reality constructed. The subjective-objective dimension has been added to Schutz's original six elements of cognitive style because of its demonstrated contribution to reality-awareness.

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[239] The notion of "objectivity" is always relative to one's definitions. The Pentecostal sects, interestingly enough, have a corporate language which transcends the subjective experience of any one member. Individual interpretations are checked or verified by each other. As far as the members are concerned, the revelatory "objects" are "observable" for "all" to see, and so forth. In brief, what the Pentecostals experience is "objective" reality for them based upon their concrete experience. It is certainly not the scientist's "objectivity," however. But then scientists have often disagreed about "objective" meaning. One thousand years ago the world was "objectively" flat, but it is "objectively" spherical today. Today it is "objectively" impossible to travel faster than the speed of light, but tomorrow....

Toward an Understanding of the Ethical Province

As we have mentioned, the ethical province of meaning is related at the cognitive level to ethical evaluation. On the basis of the material in this chapter, it is obvious that my stance toward my own intentions, actions, or accomplishments and to those of another can be to different degrees and in different ways subjective and objective.

Let us focus upon the socalled definition of the situation. In the case of my own actions, are they morally good if they rely upon a subjective or upon an objective definition of the situation? Are the actions of another morally bad if he operates out of his subjective definition? At another level, what determines the ethically good? Is it the subjective actuality of "conscience" or the objective actuality or legislated "law." At still another level, is moral goodness based upon intended meaning or upon completed act? How can I, in evaluating another's action, penetrate to his subjective intentions? These are all questions that are raised within the ethical province of meaning, and they are directly related to what Schutz suggests about subjective and objective meaning. On the subjective plane he not only acknowledges the consciousness of intended meaning but also recognizes the difficulty both in expressing it and in observing it from the outside. On the objective plane he underscores the constructed character of its meaning and the manner in which the objective stance deals with objects of experience. All of these things are highly relevant for sketching the contours of the ethical province, a province which is based upon meaning establishment.

Chapter Four

THE EXPERIENCE OF ONE'S SELF, SPONTANEITY, AND SOCIALITY

Introduction

This chapter is rather heterogeneous. It contains the three remaining factors in cognitive style: (1) "the experience of one's self," (2) "spontaneity," and (3) "sociality." Of the three, sociality is examined by Schutz at the greatest length. In fact, outside of his rather cryptic comments about the experience of one's self and about spontaneity in his essay "On Multiple Realities," he does little direct or sustained analysis of the other two concepts. Of these two, Schutz provides the fewest clues concerning the meaning of "spontaneity." Indeed, the concept appears rather out of context in this chapter, sandwiched in between the treatment of self-experience and sociality. These last two concepts seem more at home with each other than with the rather ill-defined notion of spontaneity. However, as we will be showing, the concept of the experiencing self is different from that of the self experiencing *itself* or self-experience. The first notion forms the hub for Schutz's system; the second is a much more narrow conception, involving only one *kind* of experience that a person may have, and is not linked explicitly with the notion of sociality. The *experiencing self*, however, is assumed whenever Schutz deals with sociality, and the self as *social* is assumed whenever he treats the experiencing self.

The Experience of One's Self

Because this is not a concept that Schutz deals with at any great length, we are going to arrive at an understanding through a process of elimination. We begin by suggesting that there are four different meanings for the phrase "the experience of one's self." These meanings we will construct ourselves, and then narrow the field to the one we think is closest to Schutz's own. The first meaning may be rendered "That full range of experience(s) which belongs to me, the multifarious experience that I have had." It is that experience, both prephenomenal and phenomenal and, therefore, holding varying degrees of meaning for me, which is past, experienced. As I reflect upon it as a sedimented collection, I find that it contains a continuum moving from what was simply presented as a field of undifferentiated things (pre-event, pre-object), through my selective attention to specific items (event, object), to experience that I have highly, personally ordered. The second meaning of "the experience of one's self" is "that general range of my experiencing." Here we refer to on-going experience which I am moving through. In both the first and second meaning of the phrase, "experience" is my "experience in general." What differentiates the two is the fact that in the first instance the experience is past, in the second it is lived in - a distinction that Schutz makes throughout his work. The third sense of the phrase is "that specific experience of my person or self[240] which I have had." It is my past experience of my self as a *person* distinct from my environment, the experience of my bodily sensations, mental states, perceptions, and emotions. With reflective attention I can concentrate upon, separate, and analyze these items, i.e. objectify them or grasp them by other acts (which I am in turn now experienc*ing*). It is through reflective attention to these experiences of my self as a separate entity, through attention to them as past, that I arrive at what is called "self-consciousness." Schutz elaborates,

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[240] It is our decided impression that Schutz does not present an explicit topological map of the self at any point in his work. We use the words "self" and "person" synonomously because Schutz does. To our knowledge he never advances a solid definition for that crucial

> We cannot approach the realm of our Self without an act of reflective turning. But what we grasp by the *reflective* act is never the present of our stream of thought and also not its specious present; it is always its past. Just now the grasped experience pertained to my present, but in

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word "self." In the majority of instances where the word "Self" is employed it is equated with the word "person," "individual," or "human being." At one point the suggestion is made that the "self" is a particular dimension of the person, but here the slippery connection with "individual" is retained. Schutz writes, "Our analysis has shown that the synthesis of the interpretations by which I know my contemporaries as ideal types does not apprehend *the unique Self of a human being* in his vivid present." II, p. 44. Emphasis ours. Although we do not expect from him a Freudian categorization of "id," "ego," and "superego" - as we have suggested before his phenomenological perspective rules out this kind of secondary interpretation to a large degree - yet the distinction between Ego and Self or the I and the me is not thoroughly developed. We say not "thoroughly" because he *does* write of the reflection process which presents the "me" for the attention of the experiencing person and of the emergence of self-awareness through intersubjective encounter. However, it would seem that a phenomenological analysis of both the experiencing self and the self as reflected upon leads in the direction of a concept of "*multiple selves*." This certainly would correlate favorably with Schutz's "multiple realities." Regardless of the subsequent balance of the system, Herbert Fingarette in his *The Self in Transformation*, Harper Torchbooks (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 184-212, speaks directly to the point with his "many selves." The only major difference between Fingarette and Schutz at this point is Schutz's quite cognitive conception of the Ego. It is strange, however, that Schutz both recognizes and gives positive place to the non-cognitive in dreams, music, and aesthetic experience but then talks of the *cognitive* style as an overarching concept and gives so much space to the rationality of "projecting." Our opinion is that the multiple realities point is in tension with the cognitive style point. If "multiple realities" is taken seriously and consistently applied the *non*-cognitive must be too.

> grasping it I know it is not the present anymore. And, even if it continues, I am aware only by an after-thought that my reflective turning towards its starting phases has been simultaneous with its continuation. The whole present, therefore, and also the vivid present of our Self, is inaccessible for the reflective attitude. We can only turn to the stream of our thought as if it had stopped with the last grasped experience. In other words, self-consciousness can only be experienced modo praeterito, in the past tense.[241]

Finally, the fourth meaning of "the experience of one's self" is "that specific, on-going experience which I have of myself or person as I live in my activity." This experience is an unreflected-upon sense that I am a living, aware entity, distinguished from others and from my environment. I am conscious of personal, on-going perceptions, sensations, emotions, mental states, ideas, and so forth. This experience may be in relation to the relatively passive, recuperative activity of sleep or to the more aggressive activity of manual labor. When Schutz writes of "the experience of one's self" in relation to cognitive style, we believe he is referring to this dimension: the on-going experience of my person as a distinct, experiencing entity. A specific style, constructed of the particular manifestations of the elements we have been discussing in previous chapters, produces a certain on-going experience of one's self. However, the formal isolation of this experience, such as Schutz attempts in order to relate it to cognitive style, is accomplished in the reflective attitude. The task of this reflection is to faithfully approximate the original experience.[242]

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[241] I, pp. 172-173. Emphasis in the original.

[242] This task is undertaken by the theorizing self who, if he is to illumine the experience of one's self during this theorizing operation, has the difficult mandate to describe the experience of the self of him who is thinking about the experience of the self of the theorizer.

Let us now begin to spell out the various dimensions to the experience of one's self in this fourth sense.[243] These dimensions fall together into a particular, unified experience which is in turn characteristic of a cognitive style. First of all, self-experience in the sense that we are using it here is related to processive bodily movements and functions. Secondly, it is dependent upon personal present awareness or consciousness. This awareness may be unfocused, experienced as a hazy sense of my being or doing something. Third, self-experience also includes the consciousness of my thinking or, more generally, of what we can call for want of better terminology mental states. Finally, although this is related to the other elements, I experience my self as a flow of emotional attitudes. These are four discernible items included in self-experience. Yet this is not meant to imply a fragmentation of the self, nor to suggest that the elements are experienced as entirely discrete. All the separable items are grounded in the unity of experience; they are manifestations of this primordial experiencing.

In order to make the phrase "the experience of one's self" more specific, let us compare the self-experience of the "theorizer" and the "worker"[244] as Schutz views the matter. As the theoretician goes about his task, he experiences his self primarily as a thinking self. To a degree that is not present in other activities, he puts, in Schutz's words, "his body in brackets."[245] What he is accomplishing in pure theorizing does not necessitate a world "within his immediate reach." His purpose focuses his activity upon ideas and their mental manipulation.[246] In what Schutz terms "the everyday world of working," however, the situation is changed.[247] "Work" in his sense of the word includes a gearing into the external world. In the pragmatic mode the self is experienced as an active, shaping force. Right ~~and~~ left, forward and back, grasping and release - these body-oriented factors take on primary significance. The self is now experienced as a thoughtfull body with sensations in a resisting but manipulatable environment.

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[243] The following comments are not taken directly from Schutz but do reflect, we think, what he might have said.

[244] "Worker" for Schutz has a specific meaning. It is a definitional matter, then, as to what kind of "work" the theorizer does.

The comparison and elaboration of the different self-experiences possible could be continued.[248] But it is enough here to mention three important, general characteristics of self-experience which we think Schutz might have suggested. First, although it may be formally conceptualized afterwards as we are doing here, the experiencing of one's self is generally unfocused. I take my self for granted as I live in my acts unless special attention is called to it by another or by an extraordinary self-experience such as extreme elation or physical pain. Second, self-experience is pluralistic. Although in the statistically normal person there is both a sense of unity provided in part by my remembrance of past self-experiences and a gradual continuity between self-experiences, recognizably different selves are experienced. This leads to everyday statements such as, "I feel like a different person." Third, the self under another rubric is experienced in relation to other persons and objects. For instance, I experience my body as a discrete entity in relation to other relatively stable objects of my environment. The resistance that the external world gives to me, the mobility that I experience in relation to fixed objects and other moving entities, and the space that I personally as a discernable object occupy - these give me a feeling of autonomous, bodily selfhood. Furthermore, in communication with the Other I not only experience my self as physically differentiated. Through cross-referencing with the Other, I recognize that I think different thoughts and experience different emotional states; I am a separable self at these levels, too.[249] In a real sense I come to self-experience only through this kind of social interaction. The meaning that my self has for me, i.e. in reflective self-consciousness, is also created, as is all meaning, in relation.

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[245] I, p. 253.

[246] Certainly, as he writes his thoughts down, i.e. moves from theorizing to expression, the paper and pen within his immediate reach become important. Also, he is aware of hot and cold drafts upon him, but these are not his central focus while in the theoretical posture.

[247] I, p. 222f.

[248] For instance, what differences in self-experience exist between those involved in sexual intercourse and the scientists observing or between an enraged killer and an unsuspecting victim. The concept of "many selves" mentioned in footnote 240 is obviously helpful here.

What does the experience of one's self mean for cognitive style? The answer to this question is made more difficult because Schutz does not draw the explicit connection. As far as we can tell, "self-experience" is the awareness that a person has of himself as a distinct entity while he is engaging in an activity. We have suggested, on the basis of what Schutz says at unrelated points, that this experience may be of various individual or combined aspects of the person. For want of a more precise conceptual scheme, we have implied that these facets may be called body-experience, thought-experience, and emotion-experience.[250] We have also proposed that these various self-experiences are founded upon awareness of the self as a distinct entity. This awareness or consciousness emerges through a sense of relation, a (variously articulated or even articulatable) feeling that I am over against other distinguishible things or persons.[251] In the first three chapters we dealt with the attentions of consciousness, the consciousness of time, and subjective-objective frames of reference. These are personally constructed by the individual, even though within a social context. The experience of one's self emerges in correlation with these elements; distinguishible experiences arise in relation to a particular nexus of these factors.

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[249] The person only gradually comes to the awareness of himself as a discernable self, to the consciousness of self-experience. Babies, for instance, treat the external world as an extension of themselves. The maturation process includes the baby's exploration of his body and the subsequent differentiation of it from other things. Later this process includes, at a more abstract level, experience of the self as a separable emoting and thinking entity. Schutz does not speak to these issues because he is dealing with the adult.

But this is more suggestive than conclusive. One of the major problems is with Schutz himself. He never offers his own detailed analysis of "the experience of one's self." His essay "On Multiple Realities" offers the most obvious clue. It is there, while writing of "the everyday world of working," the pragmatic world of the natural attitude, that he makes a rather cryptic suggestion. In the everyday world self-experience is of "the working self as the total self."[252] "Working" is defined by Schutz as gearing into the outer world of objects. This is done with bodily movements and manipulation of things within reach.[253] In contrast to thinking, the effects of working in the physical world are "irrevocable;" they cannot be wiped clean in the way that thoughts can be.[254] Self-experience at the level of working evidences a two-fold simultaneity. It includes experience of my bodily movements in the outer world and awareness of my stream of consciousness.[255] But this is all that Schutz says.

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[250] Others may wish to include experience of the self as a volitional and valuing entity.

[251] When we say "over against" we do not necessarily mean in an antithetical or antagonistic manner.

There are several ways that we can view Schutz's lack of development and definition. We can account it a disastrous omission, the proper inattention to a small point, an unfortunate but unimportant hiatus, or, as we do, the sadly stunted indication of a highly significant concept. The omission is not crippling to the basic thrust of Schutz's notion of cognitive style. How I experience my self during an activity does not negate the primary fact that I operate out of variously shaped meaning-contexts. But how I experience my self can have an even striking impact upon the kind of meaning-context that is formed. If, for various reasons, I experience my self as primarily physical, the reality, meaning-context, or Weltanschauung that I manufacture will certainly reflect this. Dissatisfaction, neutrality, or satisfaction regarding the present experience of my self will influence the meanings that I both will and wish to create in the future. Self-experience is not simply the end product of the five or six elements in cognitive style. It is a constituting factor in its own right. This Schutz would not deny, but, nonetheless, he does not expand the topic. He treats some of the issues by implication when he writes about "the definition of the situation," "the biographical situation," and "the (personal) stock of knowledge," but the experience of one's self does not enter as a distinguishible item. Furthermore, we are taught to experience ourselves in certain ways. Schutz's focus upon the wide-awake, mature adult in the everyday world brackets consideration of this important, socialization process. Yet, even though he does not make the contours of self-experience definite or the relationship that it has to the other elements clear, the point is correctly made that it must be related to the general notion of cognitive style. We have tried to indicate with our description and with our evaluation both the importance of self-experience and the direction that its expanded explication may take.

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[252] I, p. 230.

[253] Cf. I, p. 222f. "Theorizing," then, which is done mentally, is not "working" in Schutz's sense but "performance." Cf. I, pp. 215-217.

[254] Cf. I, p. 217.

[255] Cf. I, p. 215.

Spontaneity

Even fewer indications are given by Schutz to the meaning of the next element of cognitive style which he terms "spontaneity." At this point we know only one place in his four volumes where he makes his own statement on the issue. In his essay "On Multiple Realities" he suggests it as a part of the working world's cognitive style,

> a prevalent form of spontaneity, namely working (a meaningful spontaneity based upon a project and characterized by the intention of bringing about the projected state of affairs by bodily movements gearing into the outer world)[256]

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[256] I, p. 230.

The specific relation it has to the everyday world of "working" provides some form to the concept but not a great deal. We can only turn to other contexts for hints as to the relevance it has for cognitive style.

Ilsa Schutz in her indexing of the third volume of the Collected Papers suggests that "spontaneity" is synonomous with "activity." This "activity" is discussed by Schutz only in connection with his treatment of Husserl in an essay entitled "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy."[257] Here it is his intent to plot the movement from what Husserl calls "receptive experience," i.e. prepredicative, passive consciousness of an object which simply "awakens" an (involuntary) association with previously experienced objects, to "predicative spontaneity," i.e. a form of consciousness which focuses upon the object and actively (voluntarily) relates it to a conceptual schema. "Spontaneity" refers here, then, to an active functioning of the consciousness. Yet Schutz concludes the essay by suggesting that Husserl's distinction between the passive and active consciousness is "highly unclarified" and asks if it is "indeed valid."[258] The implication is that the socalled "receptive experience" is not passive but active, involving a spontaneous (in this sense involuntary) association. Consciousness in all of its forms, then, is somehow active or "spontaneous."[259]

Schutz's use of the phrase "prevalent form of spontaneity" in the excerpt quoted above gives us an indication, in light of his Husserlian investigations, of his meaning in relation to cognitive style. First, it is obvious that spontaneity is part of every specific style. It is a generic feature in this sense, although it emerges in some particular way in a specific cognitive style. Second, it describes a general feature of consciousness,[260] the dynamic character of consciousness. This dynamism, furthermore, is inherently a feature of consciousness; the question is, "What kind of spontaneity exists, not whether spontaneity exists?" Schutz's criticism of Husserl indicates that non-spontaneous or passive consciousness does not exist. It can even be suggested that the spontaneity of consciousness is more primitive or primordial than either the "intention" or "attention of consciousness." Intention and attention to something demand initiating and sustaining "power." Consciousness of...from moment to moment requires sustenance, experienced as out-going openness to or on-going embracing of the ever-new or ever-presented (objects, events, persons).[261] Third, Schutz's use of the word "prevalent" implies, at least to us, that there may be several forms of spontaneity co-existing in a particular cognitive style but that there is one overriding, distinguishible form. Fourth, the form of spontaneity may be differentiated by its voluntary or involuntary nature, by its willful "intention" in the cognitive or rationalistic sense of that word. For instance, theorizing and working call for an active, voluntary, and creative response, a constructing spontaneity (with various shadings). Dreaming is characterized by an active, involuntary spontaneity, one which is taken (or received) as it is (or is transpiring), a receptive spontaneity. Phantasizing mixes the voluntary and involuntary elements, evidencing both an unbridled stream of consciousness and a directed spontaneity.[262]

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[257] III,pp. 92-115, esp. 102 and 113-114.

[258] III, pp. 113-114.

[259] It is impossible for us to know what relationship actually existed between what he said in this essay, published in 1959, and his notion of spontaneity as presented in "On Multiple Realities" (1945). What follows is primarily our own (quite general) tentative evaluation.

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[260] For instance, in the everyday world the form spontaneity takes is called "working" and is "based upon" a conscious project and includes an (consciousness-related) intention of a particular kind which employs bodily movement to gear into the outer world. It is a spontaneity which effects external action.

[261] Regardless of the origin of this spontaneity in the evolution of men - even though this might be highly instructive - the fact that it exists (is functionally prerequisite) can provide a focal point for a contemporary, processive "natural theology". The "We-relation" band wagon that men like Gibson Winter have climbed aboard is but a cart behind the team of horses which pull it ("powerfully") ahead. To put it another way, why can we turn toward the future (currently a popular theological category)? We can attend to the future because of the primordial spontaneity of human consciousness.

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[262] This is a tentative codification of Schutz. He may mean by "spontaneity" simply the degree to which and the manner in which the external world is "geared" into. At this level he may be referring to the degree and kind of physical animation in each cognitive style. If spontaneity were to be interpreted in this way, it would at least provide a reason for Schutz's treatment of it as a separate element in the style and not as a facet of consciousness. But this is not decisive since the experience of time could also be treated as a subheading under consciousness. Furthermore, if spontaneity were "physical animation" then the dream world or the world of the meditating mystic would have no form of spontaneity, a conclusion that the generic nature of the elements in cognitive style denies. Our interpretation of spontaneity focuses upon the activity of consciousness, the manner in which it is variously, let us say, alert, attentive, or actively motile in a particular cognitive style. That this may not be too far removed from what Schutz had in mind is indicated even though indirectly by his assessment of Leibniz's conception of spontaneity. He writes, "Leibniz has rightly defined spontaneity as the capacity to proceed from apperception to ever new apperceptions." III, p. 121.

Sociality

In his essay "Mozart and the Philosophers"[263] Schutz suggests a definition for "sociality": the "encounter of man with man within the human world." This encounter includes both the meeting of men and the attendant acquisition of knowledge concerning the Other. Based upon experience, it may be conceptualized in terms of its "manifold forms." The element of cognitive style that we are now considering is designed to deal with those specific forms that are part of a particular style. Schutz does this explicitly in his essay "On Multiple Realities" relative to the everyday world of working. Here the specific form of sociality is "the common intersubjective world of communication and social action."[264] Although our concentration upon the individual thus far may have given another impression, sociality and its ordering in the Lebenswelt was Schutz's main concern throughout his life.

In attempting to conceptually deal with sociality, he distinguishes between the direct and indirect experience of social reality. The social world of direct experience (Umwelt) consists of what Schutz calls immediate "consociates," those persons with whom I presently associate. This experience involves spacial proximity and a temporal co-present. The sphere of indirect experience has three dimensions: (1) the world of my contemporaries (Mitwelt), which includes spatial distance but a temporal co-present; (2) the world of my predecessors (Vorwelt) in which there is both a spatial and a temporal distance; and (3) the world of my successors (Folgewelt) where there is, also, neither spatial relationship nor a co-present.[265] Contemporaries may become consociates, a potentiality which is not possible, obviously, for predecessors and successors.[266]

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[263] Cf. II, pp. 179-200, esp. 199.

[264] I, p. 230.

We will sketch the contours and internal texture of these social worlds, beginning with what for Schutz is the primordial strata: directly experienced social reality. He conceives of this level as "primordial," for one reason, because of the specific task he has given himself. His is a phenomenological investigation of everyday experience, and, at this level, social reality is based upon, although it is not restricted to, what the social individual directly experiences. For the purposes of ordering this direct experience the experiencing person establishes[267] himself as the coordinates of the social matrix. It would be even more precise to say that it is the experience of my body at a particular time and place which is used to map out my person in relation to others, my sense of sociality. Schutz writes,

> The place which my body occupies within the world, my actual Here, is the starting point from which I take my bearing in space. It is, so to speak, the center O of my system of coordinates. Relatively to my body I group the elements of my surroundings under the categories of right and left, before and behind, above and below, near and far, and so on. And in a similar way my actual Now is the origin of all the

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[265] Cf. P, pp. 142-143.

[266] Here Schutz means by "predecessor" a person who has died previous to my birth and by "successor" one who is born after my death.

[267] This "establishing" is more a function of what a human being is (in everyday life) than of what he consciously wills to do. Early in a person's life when the everyday is unreflected upon the involuntary nature of this establishment is more clearly discernible.

> time perspectives under which I organize the events within the world such as the categories of fore and aft, past and future, simultaneity and succession, etc.[268]

Sociality is thus ordered by using these "co-ordinates of immediate personal experience," to use Natanson's phrase.[269]

Direct Social Experience

The World of Consociates: the We-relation

Directly experienced sociality, the sphere of consociates, is founded upon what Schutz calls the "face-to-face situation."[270] This situation, which will be contrasted below with "the face-to-face relationship," exists when two or more people share a spatial and temporal community. Let us say I am sitting in a plane with fifty other persons; we share this kind of communal space and time. Within this spatiotemporal community of the face-to-face situation there are, however, varying degrees of awareness of and intimacy with the Other. At the barest minimum two people simply exist together at the same time and in the same place. From this there can emerge various kinds and degrees of Other awareness and interactive intimacy.[271] There may be a shared space and time in which I am aware of the Other and in which

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[268] I, pp. 222-223.

[269] I, p. xxx.

[270] P, p. 163.

[271] Schutz does not always make this differentiation evident. For instance, in P, p. 163, paragraph one, he speaks of spatiotemporal simultaneity and awareness of the Other in this community as if they were the same thing. Then, on the next page, he makes it clear that to be aware of the Other (to be Thou-oriented) may be different from simply sharing the same space and time without this awareness. We interpret his first comments in light of his second.

I may communicate with the Other. This is the way Schutz describes it:

> He shares a community of space with me when he is present in person and I am aware of him as such, and moreover, when I am aware of him as this person himself, this particular individual, and of his body as the field upon which play the symptoms of his inner consciousness. He shares a community of time with me when his experience is flowing side by side with mine, when I can at any moment look over and grasp his thoughts as they come into being, in other words, when we are growing older together.[272]

For Schutz all the shadings of sociality are related to the face-to-face situation, a situation which to varying degrees can be modified. The They-relationship, for instance, is constructed, according to him, on the basis of gradated removal from the face-to-face situation.

However, this situation allows for various kinds of social experience. Let us illustrate this texturing by taking the standpoint of a participant in a community of space and time with another or others. First, co-presence and a co-present are assumed. But, for various reasons, I may not be aware of the Other. In the second place, when I do become intentionally conscious of him, when I attend to the Other, I am, in Schutz's terms, Thou-oriented. This constitutes a face-to-face Other-orientation" or a "Thou-orientation."[273] It involves "a certain attitude of the ego toward the other person's duration,"[274] in which I am conscious of the Other before me as a human person. Experientially I recognize an entity that I directly experience as a fellow man with life and consciousness. This is not, however, a conscious judgment of the Other's particular characteristics (Soseinssetzung). The Thou-orientation is a prepredicative experience which is simply based upon a positing of the Other's existence (Daseinssetzung) as a person.[275] In its "pure" form this orientation consists merely of my consciousness of the Other's "pure being-there." But this is, to use Husserl's phrase, an "ideal limit," a formal, intellectual concept which is not experienced in real life; we experience the mediated or "humanified" existence of the Other, not his "pure existence." In other words, the experiential Thou-orientation is toward the actualized, determinate existence of the Other as he is presented before me. The Thou-orientation has no external effect in the sense that "effect" is commonly meant, effect in the external world. It may exist without overt expression in communicative acts. At base it is, according to Schutz, the matrix of attitudinal "acts of the Ego" directed toward a particular Thou, including "feeling-activities" such as love, anxiety, anger, and hate.[276] It reflects what we have called sociality in that it is directed toward or stimulated by the presence of the Other and, also, to expand the scope of the analysis, is the outgrowth of previous, personal, and social experiences.

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[272] P, p. 163. Emphasis in the original.

[273] P, p. 163. Although we are not concerned directly with Weber and Husserl here, these two phrases emerge from Schutz's use of these two men. Cf. P, pp. 144-159 and 164.

[274] P, p. 146.

This Thou-orientation may be either one-sided or reciprocated. The Other may or may not be paying attention to my presence. If there is a mutual Thou-orientation, however, a "face-to-face relationship" is created within the presupposed face-to-face situation. This relationship "in which the partners are aware of each other and sympathetically participate in each other's lives for however short a time" Schutz terms the "pure We-relationship." But, as in the case of the pure Thou-orientation, this is a limiting concept. In real or experienced life the direct experience is of the variously actualized or concretized We-relation.[277] As Schutz informs us, "The directly experienced social relationship of real life is the pure We-relationship concretized and actualized to a greater or lesser degree and filled with content."[278] It is this concretized We-relation which is the paradigm for what he calls intersubjectivity[279] and is the model in terms of which other social relationships are modifications. As would be expected, however, intersubjectivity is intense to varying degrees. Furthermore, when talking of the We-relation, Schutz thinks in terms of a relationship between two persons. When I am faced with several people at the same time, he calls this a direct They-relationship. But "this 'They' can always be broken down into a Thou and Thou and Thou, with each of whom I can enter into a We-relationship."[280]

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[275] Schutz formally defines the Thou-orientation as "the intentionality of those Acts whereby the Ego grasps the existence of the other person in the mode of the original self." P, p. 164. In a footnote to this definition he adds, "This originality is, of course, not 'primary,' since the conscious life of the other person is in principle inaccessible to me in direct perception. It is in Husserl's terminology a 'secondary' originality (Husserl, Logik, p. 206)."

[276] P, p. 147.

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[277] At certain points Schutz claims that the pure We-relationship is a theoretical, limiting concept. It is not consciously experienced. Consciousness that I was experiencing a present person comes through reflection. Cf. P, pp. 168 and 170.

[278] P, p. 164. In this sense the "pure We-relation" is similar to the "pure Thou-orientation." Both are limiting concepts which are non-experiential. But Schutz is not always rigorous on this point. In P, pp. 176-177, he indicates that there may be some kind of experiential content at the level of the "pure." He writes, "When we speak of 'pure' Thou-orientation or 'pure' We-relationship, we are ordinarily using these as limiting concepts referring to the simple givenness of the Other in abstraction from any specification of the degree of concreteness involved. But we can also use these terms for the lower limits of experience obtainable in the face-to-face relationship, in other words, for the most peripheral and fleeting kind of awareness of the other person." Cf. also II, p. 110. He underscores the non-experiential quality of the "pure" again in II, pp. 23-27; Cf. also p. 28ff.

[279] Cf. P, p. 97ff. In contrast with others (e.g. R. M. Zaner) we do not deal with the intersubjective dimension at great length since this concept is subservient to our concern for Schutz's conception of reality. This does not deny its centrality in the Schutzian scheme.

To recapitulate, the encounter between men is experienced at one level as Thou-orientation, a turning toward the Other in which I am aware of his presence and experience certain attitudes toward him, and which, potentially, may be reciprocated. A reciprocal We-relation reflects a level of sociality that demands further attention. We will do this by using a detailed illustration of this relation given by Schutz.

> Suppose that you and I are watching a bird in flight. The thought 'bird-in-flight' is in each of our minds and is the means by which each of us interprets his own observations. Neither of us, however, could say whether our lived experiences on that occasion were identical. In fact neither of us would even try to answer that question, since one's own subjective meaning can never be laid side by side with another's and compared.
>
> Nevertheless, during the flight of the bird you and I have 'grown older together'; our experiences have been simultaneous. Perhaps while I was following the bird's flight I noticed out of the corner of my eye that your head was moving in the same direction as mine. I could then say that the two of us, that we, had watched the bird's flight. What I have done in this case is to coordinate temporally a series of my own experiences with a series of yours. But in so doing I do not go beyond the assertion of a mere general correspondence between my perceived 'bird in flight' and your experiences. I make no pretense to any knowledge of the content of your subjective experiences or of the particular way in which they were structured.

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[280] P, p. 185.

> It is enough for me to know that you are a fellow human being who was watching the same thing that I was and if you have in a similar way co-ordinated my experiences with yours, then we can both say that *we* have seen a bird in flight.[281]

At this point it is clear that the most definitive element in the We-relation is the mutual Thou-orientation. To read a bit into the illustration, let us say explicitly that the Other was aware of my presence as I was aware of his. But it is also evident that this, as of yet, is *only* internal *orientation*. There is no communication between the persons involved, or, to use Schutz's terms, there is no "affecting-the-Other."[282]

However, the We-relation *may* include more than just mutual orientation. Through this reciprocity may emerge social *action* in which I purposively affect the Other. This "affecting-the-Other" (*Fremdwirken*) involves "intentional Acts"(*Akte*) directed to an Other, insofar as they are projected acts (*Handlung*), that is, spontaneous behavior according to an antecedent "project" which "have as their in-order-to motive the bringing-about of a certain conscious experience in the other person."[283] This definition includes many loaded and, up until this point, undiscussed concepts. The experience of intersubjective sociality at its "affecting-the-Other" level is so closely tied to what Schutz calls "the project" with its "in-order-to motive" that we will explore these matters before moving on. This important digression is lengthy enough to be treated in a separate section.

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[281] P, p. 165. Emphasis in original.

[282] The illustration also makes it clear that a face-to-face relation is not *literally* (*umwelt* does not imply this either) that. I do not stare the Other in the face as we watch the bird - an impossibility.

[283] P, p. 147.

Excursus: "Projecting" and "The Project"

In the first chapter we spoke of that element in the reflective, phenomenal consciousness which Husserl called "anticipation." When the conscious person anticipates, he phantasizes an object - let us say an action - and projects it into the future as a completed act. He anticipates what will-have-been. A "project" is "anticipation of future conduct by way of phantasying,"[284] a conduct which, in this case, is to be directed toward the Other. Secondly, according to Schutz, projects are constructed on the basis of two analytically separable motives: (1) the "in-order-to motive" and (2) the "because-motive."[285] The in-order-to motive is "the state of affairs to be brought about by the future action, prephantasized in its project."[286] The because-motive refers, from the point of view of the actor, to the actor's "past experiences which have determined him to act as he did."[287] In our present context, the in-order-to motive is the effect upon the Other that the actor intends to affect. But this only introduces the basic themes. Let us treat the subject in more detail.

"Action" is defined by Schutz as "human conduct devised by the actor in advance, that is, conduct based upon a preconceived project."[288] It may be covert, e.g. the mental attempt to solve a philosophical riddle, or overt, gearing into the outer world; it may also be accomplished - and this is significant for the ethical province - by commission or omission. The *purposive* abstention from action is as much an action in Schutz's terms (although not a *social* action necessarily) as a physical act which gears into the outer world.[289] The "act" is the outcome of the ongoing action process, an accomplished action. When Schutz writes of the project he is referring to the preconception of the action. This purposive activity is a phantasized projection into the future of a proposed action as accomplished act. Dewey called this "a dramatic rehearsal in imagination." According to Schutz, the starting point of all projecting is this phantasized, accomplished act. He writes,

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[284] I, p. 20. Cf. also P, pp. 59-63.

[285] Cf. I, pp. 21-22 and P, pp. 86-96.

[286] I, p. 22.

[287] I, p. 22.

[288] I, p. 19.

> I have to visualize the state of affairs to be brought about by my future action before I can draft the single steps of such future acting from which this state of affairs will result. Metaphorically speaking, I must have some idea of the structure to be erected before I can draft the blueprints. Thus I have to place myself in my phantasy at a future time, when this action *will* already *have been* accomplished. Only then may I reconstruct in phantasy the single steps which *will have* brought forth this future act.[290]

The project is thus built upon the future perfect tense, as Schutz so often says, "*modo futuri exacti*."

There are other significant dimensions to the project. First, all projecting is based upon the present knowledge at hand. This stock of knowledge contains my experience of acts similar to the projected one that I have accomplished before. Here the similarity is focused upon, and I project that "I-can-do-it-again," to use Husserl's terms.[291] What I will do and what I did will necessarily be different in fine detail, but relating the project to a particular type is manditory for giving the project some sense of direction and some meaning. It will be remembered that an object, here the project, is meaningless out of relation.[292]

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[289] It is covert to the extent that it goes no further than thought; it is covert to the extent that the body is purposively held in check. The visibility of action by omission is low, but it may be seen in the person who is shaking with rage yet refuses to strike with his hand.

[290] I, p. 20. Emphasis in original. We can raise questions as to the *clarity* of this projected, accomplished act. Does the act become clear *only in* the building up step by step and are *many* accomplished, projected acts experienced merely as vague, felt goals toward which one gropingly moves in projecting as well as in acting?

Second, projecting is more than phantasizing. It is motivated phantasizing, in the case of projected action motivated by the intention to carry out the project.[293] Here we come upon the double motive structure which we treated cursorily in a previous chapter. There are two distinguishable motives: (1) the genuine because motive and (2) the in-order-to motive. Already in The Phenomenology Schutz had talked about these two motives in relation to Weber's alledged confusion of them.[294] Out of that discussion the in-order-to motive is defined more carefully. It is that motive which the actor gives as his reason for acting out the accomplished act of his project. I pick up the phone in-order-to call my friend; I go out the door in-order-to visit a relative. When I give as the motive for my action that it is in-order-to-such-and-such what I mean is, to quote Schutz:

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[291] Cf. I, pp. 20 and 20-21 for a more detailed treatment of this matter.

[292] At certain places (e.g. I, p. 72) Schutz distinguishes projecting from fancying by saying that the former is related to a "stock of knowledge" whereas the latter is dependent only on one's wishes. "If I fancy to be superman or to be endowed with magic powers and dream what I will then perform, this is not projecting. In pure phantasy I am not hampered by any limits imposed by reality." This puts Schutz on shaky ground from our standpoint and, we think, from his own viewpoint expressed at other junctures. We believe the phantasizer has a stock of knowledge to which he refers although "knowledge" within his reality may be different from ours in the common-sense world. "Within my reach" and "within my power" - two phrases Schutz also uses in this context - are defined by the phantasizer in relation both to this stockpile and to his interest at hand just as the common-sense man defines these two concepts relative to his current knowledge and interest. The major problem here is that Schutz defines reality by implication in this context as common-sense reality and projecting as that which takes place in the common-sense (or "rational") world. Because phantasying does not use the stock of knowledge and the reality-pattern of the common-sense world, it is supposedly not projecting. But this is to negate Schutz's own multiple realities point. In positive relation to it, fancying is projecting, i.e. it may be purposive and future directed, but projecting relative to the world of phantasy with its own purposes, knowledge, interests, and so forth. It is the content not the process of projecting which differs from reality to reality. But this is our opinion based upon other things Schutz says, not upon his expressed opinion on this topic here. For him fancying and projecting are distinct, and we develop this excursus in that light. It is probably because in the world of fancy there is no projecting in Schutz's terms that this process is not introduced as a generic element of cognitive style, something that we could do more easily based upon our definition of projecting.

> The action itself is only a means within the meaning-context of a project, within which the completed act is pictured as something to be brought to fulfillment by my action. Therefore, when asked about my motive, I always answer in terms of 'in-order-to' if the completed act is still in the future. What is presupposed in such a case is that the act is only being phantasied (or fancied) in the mode of anticipation.[295]

After the projected action becomes a finished act, the same question can be raised: "Why did you go out?" Its answer, however, can take two linguistic forms. I can say, "I went out in order to visit a relative" or "I went out because I wanted to visit a relative." The second statement is what Schutz calls a "pseudo because-statement,"[296] and can lead to the confusion between in-order-to and because motives.

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[293] In the case of action, which may be covert (e.g. the solving of a mental problem) or overt (e.g. gearing into the external world), this projecting is purposive. Projecting is converted into a purpose by the intention to carry out the project. However, even though all projecting is motivated, it need not be purposive in this sense. I may project an end state of affairs that I have no intention to carry out.

[294] Cf. P, pp. 3-15, 86-96, and 159-163. Cf. also in Schutz's later work I, pp. 69-72; II, pp. 11-14.

[295] P, p. 89.

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Let us clarify the distinction between the motives by first comparing this pseudo because-statement with a "genuine" because statement.[297] In doing this we take up the second of the two motives, the because motive. If I say that a juvenile stole hubcaps for money, this is an in-order-to statement; he steals in order to get money. But if I suggest that the young man became a thief because of the influence of friends, I am making a genuine because statement. This second statement is quite different from the first; it has nothing to do with the project for the action constructed by the youth. The second statement takes a past event such as a theft and connects it with a meaning context quite different from the one which motivated the actor. Yet this second kind of statement is usually thought an "explanation of the deed" when from another perspective it merely points to those past experiences of the juvenile which have created a "disposition" (Schutz) which prompts stealing. In summary,

> the difference, then, between the two kinds of motive as expressed in our two statements is that the in-order-to motive explains the act in terms of the project, while the genuine because-motive explains the project in terms of the actor's past experiences.[298]

For comparison let us now construct a pseudo because-statement: "The juvenile stole the hubcaps because he has no money." A genuine because statement in this case would be: "The juvenile stole the hubcaps because poverty was distasteful to him." Notice the important difference. A person does not steal simply because he has no money, simply because of a present (by itself meaningless) situation. Quite possibly, as in the case of monastics, poverty is valued positively. The present condition is related to past experience of some kind and the judgment is made, in this instance, that being without money is undesirable. Again, I do not fry an egg simply because it is seven thirty in the morning. I fry an egg because seven thirty is placed within a past-related meaning context in which words like "breakfast" and "hungry" are endemic. The difference between pseudo because statements, i.e. those which seduce attention away from their heritage in the past and confuse themselves with the future-directed project and its in-order-to statement, and genuine because statements "lies in the fact that the latter cannot be translated into in-order-to statements."[299] In terms of our illustration, the statement "The juvenile stole the hubcaps because poverty was distasteful to him" cannot be translated "The juvenile stole the hubcaps in-order-to poverty was distasteful to him," and make sense. In other words, because and in-order-to categories cannot be meaningfully mixed. They represent two divergent perspectives upon the process of human motivation and action. The former represents a context of meaning imbedded in the past,[300] which indeed may be observed and commented upon by others, while the latter reflects a future-directed and intentional meaning context, which resides in the mind of the actor.[301] The first stems from evaluation of lived experience prior to the project; the second emerges from the project;[302] the first is an objective, the second a subjective context of meaning.

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[296] Cf. P, p. 89.

[297] Cf. P, p. 91f.

[298] P, p. 91.

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[299] P, p. 91.

[300] Cf. P, p. 93.

Schutz's distinction between because and in-order-to motives, although expanded by men such as L. W. Beck,[303] offers a basically solid foundation for solving certain traditional problems in ethics. According to Schutz,[304] and emerging from his appreciation for Bergson's Time and Free Will (1888), the arguments in the free will-determinism controversy are based upon a confusion of two categories. Freedom is evidenced in action as process, as future or project-directed, whereas determinism is found only when the completed, past act is attended to. It is the confusion of the because motive sphere with the in-order-to motive realm that has elicited so much heat. Each side, in other words, has reduced the phenomena involved to the terms of its own interpretative schemata and in the process has bracketed the legitimate perspective of the other. The fault exists in believing that that which is bracketed is either non-existent or illegitimate and that the incommensurability of two categories is somehow a mirage to be corrected through some overarching category.

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[301] Cf. P, p. 92. Ideal type analysis is Schutz's (and Weber's) way of getting to this level sociologically. Much current - and, indeed, legitimate - social research, however, takes the because stance and is thus meshed with a different meaning context and behavioral level.

[302] Cf. P, p. 93f for a summary statement by Schutz, the relation between the motive and subjective meaning of the project, and a definition of in-order-to and because interest.

[303] Cf. L. W. Beck, "Agent, Actor, Spectator, and Critic," The Monist, XLIX (1965), pp. 167-182.

[304] Cf. on this issue P, pp. 66-69 and I, pp. xxxviii-xxxix.

Now that we have considered the motives of the project, we turn to another area that is also important in relation to the project. Up to this point, we have dealt with projects as relatively completed entities without going into the process which creates them or into the choice among them. At both levels evaluation and weighting takes place. Let us first sketch the emergence of a projected action.[305] It is the result, in Husserl's terms a "polythetic" unity, of various posited "theses" which are synthesized. For instance, when I project chopping wood, this synthesizes the concepts "wood," "axe," "bodily exertion," the "will to chop wood," and so forth into a particular action-meaning context, a particular action-project. When we reflect upon this complete synthesis - something that is not done in the natural attitude - we find that it contains these isolatable parts in a particular kind of (weighted) configuration. How and why this constellation is arranged in this manner and the degree to which its creation is volitional or understood by modern psychology takes us into water too deep for plumbing at this point.[306] There are certainly both conscious and and unconscious, volitional and non-volitional, factors involved. Schutz even suggests that the Ego's creation of the project at this level is more by "impulse" than by choice.[307] To move on, another project constituted in the same way may be set beside this one as a synthetic unity. Now it is possible at this level also to speak of choice, choice between or, as the number of projects is extended, among projects. We would propose that as the conscious construction of a project (the choice among the synthesized elements in the individual project) or the choice among projects, with the accompanying evaluations (weighting) necessary, is made in relation to the good, ethical reflection is being engaged in. Schutz writes of the choice among projects of action as a rational activity,[308] although choices may also be made on the basis of personal habit or social tradition. And, surely, rationality is part of ethical reflection stretched to include not only projects of action but other kinds of projects as well. Within that framework the suggestions that Schutz has made following Husserl may prove helpful in understanding ethical evaluation, although it seems that the rational model with its emphasis upon articulate ends and means is only a part both of the choice among projects of action and in reaching ethical decisions. As he correctly asserts, however, rationality must be the backbone to scientific investigations, even when irrationality or emotion are dealt with. In any case, "the problem of weight"[309] of evaluation is central to both meaning construction and, more specifically, to ethics, but, in Schutz's words, "transcends the actual situation of a concrete choice and decision."[310] It is imbedded in those polytextured value systems that are so drastically important for the constitution of reality and for the making of (ethical) evaluations. But as Schutz indicates,

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[305] A project it should be noted is always of a particular kind (here action-oriented). Although there are different dimensions to each kind of project, (e.g. an action-oriented project does not necessarily take people into account; a social action project does), the act of projecting is basically intentional, mental, or ideational (although it may be influenced by other elements such as feelings and attitudes) and the general process of construction is similar even though it may be action-oriented, attitude-oriented, aesthetically-oriented, and so forth.

[306] Cf. P, p. 68.

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[307] Cf. P, p. 68, ftn. 50.

[308] Cf. "Choosing Among Projects of Action" in I, pp. 67-96 but also cf. I, pp. 27-34, "The Problem of Rationality in the Social World" in II, pp. 64-88, and P, pp. 61 and 239-240.

[309] Cf. I, pp. 93-94.

> for the purpose of this purely formal description, no assumption whatsoever is needed either as to the specific content of the higher system involved or as to the existence of so-called 'absolute values,' nor is any assumption needed as to the structure of our pre-knowledge, that is, as to its degree of clarity, explicitness, vagueness, etc.[311]

With these brief comments about the ethical realm of the project we conclude this excursus.

The We-relation Continued

To return to our discussion of the We-relation and affecting-the-Other, sociality can be expressed and experienced through preprojected activity directed toward the Other in order to act upon his consciousness. This is what Schutz calls genuine social action.[312] The significant point is that social action of this kind emerges at a certain level of the We-relation, the level at which the internal Thou-orientation breaks out into external, intentional, and Other-directed activity.[313] It is also Schutz's contention that the mutual Thou-orientation and affecting-the-Other are differently textured in the We-relation than they are in what he calls the They-relation, the relation with one's (socially removed) contemporaries. To put it into the terms of our present chapter, sociality is experienced and thus shaped in the We-relation differently than it is in the They-relation.

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[310] I, p. 93

[311] I, p. 94.

[312] Cf. P, pp. 147-148. It is contrasted with social behavior which is activity lacking a self-conceived project and is thus, in Schutz's terms, not definitionally, a case of "affecting-the-Other." From our perspective it seems that Schutz would have been terminologically on better ground if he had distinguished between purposive and non-purposive affecting. Many social activities, i.e. activities emerging in the encounter between or among men, are, from the actor's point of view, "unintentional" or non-projected. These non-purposive activities nonetheless "affect" the Other in the usual sense of the phrase. To use Schutz's terms but our own meaning, social behavior does affect the Other.

Before moving to the comparison between the We and They-relation, additional, clarifying comments must be made about the We-relation, its components, and its observability. In describing the shape of we-sociality above we mentioned that it included a certain kind of Thou-orientation, a mutual or reciprocated Thou-orientation, in which two persons were each aware of the other's existence. If the Thou-orientation is only one sided, a We-relation does not exist in Schutz's terms. There does not need to be a reciprocal affecting, however, for the We-relation to exist. This is so because, since affecting-the-Other definitionally involves affecting the Other's consciousness, there is already established a mutual orientation, the minimal requirement for a We-relation, even though there is no mutual affecting.

But, regardless of whether there is mutual affecting or not, it has not been made explicit yet as to how the existence of a We-relation is to be verified. Schutz contends that this question is not adequately answered by Weber.[314] The issue is larger, however, than the Schutz-Weber debate. One's experience of sociality, the shape that it takes in a person's experience, is determined by the manner in which he becomes aware of this sociality. To begin an answer to the question in Schutz's terms, the existence of the We-relationship at its three major levels (mutual Thou-orientation, affecting-the-Other, and mutual affecting) can be determined by the participants in that relation or by an observer(s). The "actuality" of the social relationship may be different in each case. As Schutz puts it,

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[313] Schutz makes it clear that this social action is directed toward the Other's future subjective experience, i.e. the purpose is to affect his consciousness. "What makes my behavior social is the fact that its intentional object is the expected behavior of another person." P, p. 149. In making this point at some length (cf. P, pp. 148-150) Schutz wishes to contrast himself with Weber who claims that social action, according to Schutz, can be oriented to the past behavior of others. Because the definitional problems involved are not the focus of this chapter, we simply note the context out of which Schutz's statements about the We-relation come.

> It can hardly be said that, just because an observer can see a social relationship existing, therefore the participant in the same relationship will also be aware of it. Nor is the opposite the case: what the participant sees, or thinks he sees, may be quite hidden from the observer.[315]

Part of the difficulty stems from the varying externality of the three elements in the We-relation. Mutual affecting, which involves outward expression, is easier for both the participants and the observer to discern than is the internal, reciprocal Thou-orientation. But the central issue revolves around the manner in which participants and observer are related to each other. The specific shape and experience of we-sociality emerge from the multiple relations possible. Schutz implies that there are two basic relationships, the subjective and the objective;[316] we expand the discussion here.

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[314] Cf. P, pp. 151-159.

[315] P, p. 152.

Let us assume that a social relationship exists between two participants (P^1 and P^2) and an observer (O). We mean by "social relationship" that all three are mutually oriented to the other's existence; minimal requirements are present for a social, We-relation. Let us assume furthermore, however, that P^1 and P^2 are affecting each Other. They are communicating with words and gestures laden with subjective, intended meaning, a meaning which is to varying degrees clear and clarified between them. O is simply watching and listening to what is taking place and putting the social relationship and its contents into his own meaning-frame. All concerned recognize the existence of the social relationship, and its contents, although P^1 and P^2 sense that O is in some way removed from their dialogue, and O feels that he is not participating with P^1 and P^2 as they are with each other. To be more concrete, let us assume that P^1 and P^2 are members of the same family engaged in playful argument; O is outside the family, possibly a neighbor or a social scientist. In other words, there is a certain psychic and social distance between O and the two participants. There is also, by virtue of the fact that they are two distinct persons, psycho-social distance between P^1 and P^2, but it is not as discernible as it is in the relationship with O. At this level they may be loosely called "participants," persons in a spatial-temporal community who are involved _in a certain manner_ with each other. But the observer is also "involved" with P^1 and P^2 "_in a certain manner_." As we will suggest, it is _the_ certain manner which distinguishes what we will term "participation" in a narrower, more precise sense, from observation. Participation, in our sense of the word, increases both as the number of levels shared increases and as the levels themselves change, extending to an outside, only _theoretical_ limit in which there is complete consonance between P^1 and P^2.[317] In terms both of our illustration and of our narrower definition the "participants" (P^1 and P^2) share, among other things, the interpersonal dimension, family background, and the activity of communication as well as of listening and watching.

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[316] Cf. P, p. 152. He writes explicitly about the "subjective probability" and the "objective probability," experienced by the participants and the observer respectively, that a social relationship exists or is verifiable. What follows is our own attempt to deal with these issues in relation to Schutz. There is an obvious correlation with our discussion in chapter three of the subjective-objective dimension. Cf. also P, p. 204ff, I, pp. 24f, and 202-207.

There are also different kinds or degrees of _observation_. At its outside limit it is, let us say at the level of the macro-human, a non-interpretational recording of those occurrences normally visible to the human eye. The operation of a stationary T.V. camera illustrates this kind of observation, but it is a non-human, non-experiental activity, what we call an "outer limit," since _human_ observation of any kind is inherently interpretational. Human observation may only involve visual activity, but usually it includes auditory activity, if not the sense of touch, taste, and smell.[318] It may be of chemical experiments, as in the physical sciences, or of human activity in the social sciences. This is not to imply, however, that what is being observed is the same in each case. According to Schutz at least, they are not. The physical sciences observe non-intentional phenomena whereas the social sciences should deal with human phenomena charged with subjective intentionality. O, as a social scientist, however, may observe the external behavior of P^1 and P^2 or he may observe this behavior as a concomitant to subjective meaning and experience. Regardless of the commitment that Schutz may have to the latter, in both instances there is observation.[319]

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[317] This limit may better be called "absorption," not "participation."

[318] The social observation of O that we are discussing here would be highly unorthodox if it employed these last three faculties.

How does this differ from participation? The matter is to a large degree definitional. For us, observation at its most simple level involves what might be called "watching and listening." It is, thus, a relatively passive activity; the observer does not actively engage P^1 and P^2 in conversation, for instance. Observation also reflects personal aloofness or distance on the part of the observer. This aloofness may be expressed in various ways: (1) there is no extensive communication between O and the participants; (2) O does not become personally immersed in the participant's frame of reference or meaning-contexts; (3) O does not interject his personal values into the situation; (4) O views P^1 and P^2 primarily as types, not as unique persons; (5) the participants are living in their experience together, whereas O is living in his (removed) experience of observing them experience together; (6) there is a difference between the emotional-attitudinal levels experienced by O and by the participants.

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[319] "Observation" must be distinguished from "objectivity." The former is performed by P^1 or P^2, by a friend, or by a sociologist (scientist). The latter reflects a kind of interpretational framework within which observation is placed. In other words, there may be "objective" observation and "subjective" observation with varieties of each.

Observation and participation are not, however, clear-cut categories. The observation we have described in detail is modeled after "scientific" observation. How does a neighbor observe P^1 and P^2?[320] The fact that we talk about "participant observation" also indicates the slippage between the two categories in some contexts. Let us suggest a continuum running from observation to participation, including these particular reference points: (1) observation, (2) participant observation, (3) observational participation, and (4) participation. To put it another way, there are various kinds of observation, and O, by degrees, can move toward participation, toward becoming P^3.[321] In the social observation of two participants, O may variously express passive, personal detachment from the action between P^1 and P^2. Strict observation decreases and participation increases as O becomes an active, personally involved factor in the action. For instance, as O begins to consciously communicate with P^1 and P^2,[322] as this meaning increasingly reflects his own personal values in relation to the personal values of P^1 and P^2 as they emerge in the social action among them, and as outside (in relation to this relationship), impersonal purposes and typifications give way both to the purpose and to the (unique) persons of this context, O becomes P^3. But this is too simple; one more important factor must be added: intention. This is the clue to the difference in the continuum between participant observer and observing participant. O may expressively involve himself personally with P^1 and P^2 in the ways just mentioned, but he may do so because he intends to observe their interaction in relation to him and to each other. Thus O's social behavior may reflect participation but his intention is observation. In the actual situation, then, even though observation and participation can be defined relative to what is termed, for want of better words, "active personal involvement" and tied to the factors we have suggested, whether or not a person is observing or participating is also relative to his purpose or project. On top of this, the judgment can never be decisive in certain grey areas because it will depend upon who is doing the evaluation. Finally, the areas become grey because in a social (We-relation) situation there are elements of participation in observation and elements of observation in participation.[323]

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[320] Other questions could be raised: (1) does not the simple presence of an observer, not to mention the subtle bodily indications which reflect O's subjective states and interpretation (e.g. a raised eyebrow, a frown) "communicate" to P^1 and P^2? (2) does not even the passive following of the participants' expressions indicate that O is to some degree immersed in their frame of reference? (3) how does a person guarantee the separation of his value judgments from the manner in which he orders his observation? (4) does not extensive observation increasingly reveal to O that P^1 and P^2 are unique, non-typifiable individuals?

[321] We do not wish to imply that a person can or must hold to one of these positions. Especially in social observation, there is a tendency for both the participant and the observer to slide along the continuum. Thus P^1 might say to P^2, "You're treating me like an object!" This means that, for P^1, P^2 has become an "observer" of sorts in the act of participating with him.

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[322] Schutz claims that when questions are asked, O is no longer a "mere observer." P, p. 174. O is now a "participant." We think that our continuum does greater justice to the gradations involved and does not imply, as we think Schutz does, that there are only two categories, "observer" and "participant," and that the boundaries can be crossed so abruptly.

[323] It is also instructive to compare various "observers," e.g. in the illustration we have suggested the social scientist with a neighbor or even two methodologically different sociologists.

To put this within the framework of our discussion of sociality, the texture of _experienced_ sociality is different in the We-relation for the observer and the participant. The motive overtones with their affect upon experience and meaning, the signs available to each, and the meaning-establishment vary. Schutz underscores this difference in perspective by comparing the criteria used and available for use by the observer and by the participant for determining the existence of a social relationship.[324] The observer relies upon bodily movements, cultural products, and what he perceives as the relationship between P^1 and P^2 or any social actors. _Certainty_ as to the existence of the relationship - not to mention specific subjective components - often demands that the observer ask the actors questions. He must become a _participant_ observer and engage in the (to this point uncertain) social relationship. Unless he knows the actors well, he will not understand the subjective meaning-framework in which the perceived relationship is taking place. Generally, for persons whom we usually class as observers, this subjective dimension is initially opaque. On the other hand, the participant's criteria are based upon his _personal experience_ of the Other _orienting_ himself to him and _affecting_ him. Certainty of this is gained through together living _in_ mutually related, conscious experiences and _in_ reciprocal action. It is also gained through conscious _reflection upon_ the intersubjective process, through viewing the process as completed. The observer reflects too, but the participant has _experientially_ been related to the Other in orientation and in affecting, and thus, the content of the reflection is different. In other words, participants experience an intimacy with each other that the observer does not. For this reason the observer may miss, indeed may be closed off from, subtle signs of communication, innuendos and nuances of meaning, which are important to the understanding of the manner in which the social relationship is being carried on.

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[324] Cf. P, pp. 152-159.

Before moving to a summary of the dimensions to sociality in the We-relation, several more comments should be made about its general characteristics. Concrete We-relationships are of various kinds. In Schutz's words,

> The partner...may be experienced with different degrees of immediacy, different degrees of intensity, or different degrees of intimacy. Or he may be experienced from different points of view. He may appear within the center of attention or at its periphery.[325]

Conversation, for instance, can be "animated or offhand, eager or casual, serious or light, superficial or quite personal".[326] The fact that we experience Others and relate to others with varying degrees of directness is crucial for understanding the transition from the directly experienced world of the We-relation to the indirectly experienced world of the They-relation. However, the We-relation evidences characteristics that the They-relation does not.[327] It is here that the other is literally seen and is lived with as he communicates in words, glances, gestures, and tonal inflections. Here I am better attuned to him than I am to myself. Indeed, although I have greater knowledge of my reconstructed past than of the Other's, I have never been outside my body to capture myself in the face-to-face, immediate manner in which I can perceive him. Here there is a series of possible reciprocal acts through which my knowledge of my partner increases and is continually revised. I may also attend to the Other's subjective, intended meaning and not merely to my own lived experiences of him. The potential reciprocity in the We-relation means that the Other can be oriented to me in a similar manner and that we can take account of this responsiveness in our relation with each other, mutually anticipating and responding to each other's activity. There is also a common environment in the We-relation, a common external world which we can directly apprehend. It is assumed, to an extent not possible in the They-relation or in the world of predecessors, that the Other sees the same thing I see. There may be varying interpretations, which we can cross-reference with each other, but it is assumed that when I point and say the word "tree" that - barring physical difficulties - you hear the word "tree" and see the designated object before us.[328] The we-ness necessary for this kind of intercommunication in the We-relation provides the fundament for sociality itself, for the emergence of communicative signs and mutually agreed upon social rubrics that melt individual experiences into social existence with its - at this point in human history - highly textured expressions. This communality in the We-relation also means that there is a common - although not necessarily highly specific - attentional focus or attentional modification between us. Schutz puts it this way: "The way we attend to our conscious experiences is actually modified by our relationship to each other. This holds for both of us."[329] This focus is manifested in person-to-person communication by the common topic discussed and, at another corporate level, by the music played at a concert and attended to by those present. One of the peculiar features of the We-relation is that, in relation to this mutual focusing, I participate in the disclosure not only of my own motives but in the disclosure of the Other's motives in his relationship to me; "I can actually live through and participate in the constitution of his motivational context."[330]

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[325] P, p. 168.

[326] P, p. 169.

[327] Cf. P, pp. 169-172.

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[328] Husserl suggests that the "commoness [sic] of Nature" is the clue to intersubjectivity. Cf. Cartesian Meditations, trans. by Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 120-128.

We have sketched various characteristic features observable in the We-relation. Let us now give an overview of the terrain. Sociality in the We-relation presupposes a face-to-face _situation_ in which two or more persons share a community of space and time. This specific kind of social relationship also presupposes the using of my body as the matrix for my sense of _relation_ to others. The face-to-face situation may include potential awareness of the Other as an existing person (the awareness of a one-sided Thou-orientation) and the possibility of a mutual or reciprocated Thou-orientation. When this possibility of reciprocating is actualized, a _We-relation_ (or face-to-face _relationship_) exists.[331] It may have three basic dimensions which do not necessarily obtain at the same time: (1) the simple (internal) mutual orientation, (2) one-sided (external) affecting-the-Other, and (3) mutual affecting. But this is only to establish a conceptual beachhead. We-relations are of almost infinite variety, depending both upon the manner in which the "affecting" is shaded with degrees of immediacy, intensity, and intimacy and upon the equally complex texturing of the attitudes toward the Other reflected in the kinds of Thou-orientation. And this is even yet to treat the We-relation as a frozen slide, a sliver from an on-going process of social encounter. In actual experiential life this relation ebbs and flows, gaining ever-new specific characteristics, ammending others, and leaving others behind as the two persons respond to each other, learn, and re-respond. With these changes come attendant, fluctuating feelings and ideas about the social relationship with related shifts in meaning-context.[332]

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[329] P, p. 171.

[330] P, p. 172.

[331] In this sense, i.e. at the level of a mutual Thou-orientation, the relation of O to P^1 or P^2 and the relation of P^1 and P^2 is a _We_-relation.

Indirect Social Experience

A. The World of Contemporaries: the They-relation

The transition from the direct social experience of the We-relation to the indirect experience of the They-relation involves decreasing degrees of vividness. Certainly, in the We-relation there are *degrees* of directness, intimacy, and intensity. But even in the mutual Thou-orientation of two strangers rubbing shoulders at a football game, a case in which both apprehension of the Other is peripheral and knowledge of the Other is almost lacking, some degree of *directness* is essential. As one moves into what Schutz calls the They-relation, the relation with what he terms "contemporaries," this directness decreases. This excerpt from The Phenomenology describes the process concisely.

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[332] This is not to imply chaos; there is a *pattern* too. But this *pattern* is *fluid*.

> The first steps beyond the realm of immediacy are marked by a decrease in the number of perceptions I have of the other person and a narrowing of the perspectives within which I view him. At one moment I am exchanging smiles with my friend, shaking hands with him, and bidding him farewell. At the next moment he is walking away. Then from the far distance I hear a faint good-by, a moment later I see a vanishing figure give a last wave, and then he is gone... As another example, imagine a face-to-face conversation, followed by a telephone call, followed by an exchange of letters, and finally messages exchanged through a third party. Here too we have a gradual progression from the world of immediately experienced social reality to the world of contemporaries. In both examples the total number of the other person's reactions open to my observation is progressively diminished until it reaches a minimum point.[333]

Three important comments can be added to this discussion. First, as the friend moves away, "it is quite impossible to fix the exact instant," according to Schutz, when this friend of the We-relation enters that "shadowy realm" of one's contemporaries. Second, it is certain that we are faced with a series of experiences, a continuum, which progressively retreats from the face-to-face situation of which it is a "variant function." The fact that we remember our friends as they were in the We-relation after they have entered the world of contemporaries and the fact that our wider frames of reference make the shift unproblematic should not blind us either to the change that does take place or to the seriated nature of our relationship. The word "seriated" is important. Actual life is made up of a multiple number of separate although related events taking place over time. For instance, when a good friend leaves, I remember him as he was in the face-to-face relationship, but the relationship and the remembering are two different events. Furthermore, in his absence ever new things happen to me and to him. The original face-to-face relationship shifts through the natural modulations of memory and through the influence of subsequent events. Indeed, because of this serial progression, the friend in his absence may take upon a "new self" as far as I am concerned as I may take upon a new self for him.[334] There may be, in other words, a continuous relationship between us, involving processive events for us both, but not a continuous series of contacts between us; we each relate to other people and are often not together.[335] Finally, the procession from the We-relation to the They-relation can continue past the They-relation to ever-more-general levels. Schutz illustrates and explains this best when he writes:

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[333] P, p. 177. Cf. also II, p. 37-38, indeed the whole section, pp. 37-56.

> As we approach the outlying world of contemporaries, our experience of others becomes more and more remote and anonymous. Entering the world of contemporaries itself, we pass through one region after another: (1) the region of those whom I once encountered face to face and could encounter again (for instance, my absent friend); then (2) comes the region of those once encountered by the person I am now talking to (for instance, your friend, whom you are promising to introduce to me); next (3) the region of those who are as yet pure contemporaries but whom I will soon meet (such as the colleague whose books I have read and whom I am now on my way to visit); then (4) those contemporaries of whose existence I know, not as concrete individuals, but as points in social space as defined by a certain function (for instance, the postal employee who will process my letter); then (5) those collective entities whose function and organization I know while not being able to name any of their members, such as the Canadian Parlaiment; then (6) collective entities which are by their

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[334] This is not to mention the new selves that we become from our own perspectives while we are apart. The exclamation, "My how you've changed!" reflects this personal "re-selving."

[335] For a more detailed exposition, cf. P, pp. 177-180.

> very nature anonymous and of which I could never in principle have direct experience, such as 'state' and 'nation'; then (7) objective configurations of meaning which have been instituted in the world of my contemporaries and which live a kind of anonymous life of their own, such as the interstate commerce clause and the rules of French grammar; and finally (8) artifacts of any kind which bear witness to the subjective meaning-context of some unknown person. The farther out we get into the world of contemporaries, the more anonymous its inhabitants become, starting with the innermost region, where they can almost be seen, and ending with the region where they are by definition forever inaccessible to experience.[336]

From our discussion thus far, it is clear that the They-relation exists between two or more persons who live in the same present but who do not experience each other immediately. Knowledge of the Other, then, is always indirect and impersonal.[337] But this is only to begin the analysis of a highly complex issue. Let us continue by investigating the modifications that take place in the Other-orientation and social relationship that we have come to know in the We-relation.

In contrast to my understanding of the Other in the We-relation in which each of us is open, accessible, and immediate to the other in a prepredicative[338] manner, the Other in the They-relation is given to me only through inference or predication. To clarify this, there are two basic ways in which I can know the Other as my contemporary. First, this knowledge may be derived from a previous We-relation with the person in question. Inferences as to his present condition are thus made on the basis of what he was to me in direct social experience. My knowledge of any change that has taken place in him is for me, because he is now removed, either indirect or non-existent. Knowledge of the Other in a They-relation can be constructed, secondly, on the basis of my acquaintance with someone who, through personal conversation or through other communicative acts such as the written word or cultural artifacts, "tells" me about this Other. This knowledge, however, is gained as all knowledge must be, from someone's direct experience, no matter how far removed I may personally be from this source in personal experience.[339] In Schutz's words, "indirect social experiences" - and we could add the words "all knowledge" - "derive their original validity from the [someone's] direct mode of apprehension."[340] It may be obvious, but it is also true, that knowledge of removed others, of ideas not original with me, and of experiences which are not my own is based upon someone's original experience which, in comprehending, I mingle with my own interpretational framework. With regard to knowledge of contemporaries specifically, "all experience...is predicative in nature. It is formed by means of interpretive judgments involving all my knowledge of the social world, although with varying degrees of explicitness."[341]

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[336] P, pp. 180-181. Emphasis in original.

[337] This is not to deny that a contemporary may have *once* been a consociate, that a contemporary may *become* a consociate in the future, or that knowledge of the Other in a They-relation may be tinged with knowledge gained of him *through a We-relation*. In the *They-relation*, however, this description holds.

[338] There is *also* predication in the We-relation, although the process of predication (categorization) is always tempered both by the prepredicative and the unpredictable (unique).

Even though this knowledge of the Other is indirect, it is based upon Other-orientation, although of a distinct variety. Schutz calls this "They-orientation" (Ihreinstellung).[342] Since there is no possibility in the They-relation for simple (immediate) orientation to the presence of the Other - what in the We-relation is called Thou-orientation - or direct affecting-the-Other with their personal implications, They-orientation includes all the variously configurated ways in which I typify or conceptualize what I think are the conscious experiences and meaning-contexts of my contemporaries. These conceptualizations are constituted anonymously, without reference to concrete, unique individuals with their subjective, intended meanings. They are originally and primarily based upon my own experience of social reality, my understanding of others whom I have directly experienced, and my inferential projections. Furthermore, these are generalized or homogeneous projections, applicable to several or even many removed others.[343] It is on the basis of the types constituted through a They-orientation that what Schutz calls "personal ideal types" are formed.[344] These typifications do not "apprehend the unique person as he exists within his living present" but conceive of him "as always the same and homogeneous." As Schutz goes on to remark, this leaves out of account "all the changes and rough edges that go along with individuality. Therefore, no matter how many people are subsumed under the ideal type, it corresponds to no one in particular."[345]

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[339] Cf. P, p. 182.

[340] P, p. 182.

[341] P, p. 183.

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[342] P, p. 183.

[343] To make reference to an issue discussed in chapter three, these conceptualizations stand in an "objective context of meaning" (cf. P, p. 184) because they are (subjectively, we would claim) constructed without regard for the subjective, intended meaning of an original person.

[344] P, p. 184.

The social person lives his life on the basis of these typifications everyday. For instance, when I mail a letter or deposit a check or fly to Chicago, I do not think, nor need I think, about those many individuals whom I implicitly trust to carry out the expediting functions. I do expect them to behave in certain general ways and keep this anticipated behavior in mind when I decide to mail the letter or make the deposit or take the trip. Certainly, I may even meet and talk to those "anonymous" persons who perform the expected tasks,[346] but I relate to them (generally) as functionaries, not as unique persons who have personal feelings and subjective attitudes. For Schutz, "their behavior in the conduct of their duty is from my point of view defined purely through an objective context of meaning. In other words, when I am They-oriented, I have 'types' for partners."[347]

The ideal types of the They-orientation are not, however, appropriate simply to the They-relation. We draw upon these types in our face-to-face relationships, in the world of direct social experience. But the unique persons in the We-relation constantly force modifications of these general types - even against our resistance - forcing them into amalgamation with the individuated reality of the everyday. Yet this amalgamation is not easy to maintain. In fact, in the Lebenswelt there is a continual shifting between the typical and the concrete and between unsolidified types and vague specifics. The conscious person can take modifiable stances toward the persons within his direct social experience. For instance, there are occasions when I am face-to-face with several persons simultaneously. According to Schutz, this can be called a "*direct* They-relationship,"[348] but I may break down the group into separate Thous with whom I may have a We-relation. Let us say that I am watching a group of men play cards. I may take up a stance toward each one of these men in which he is a "Thou," a man who makes individual moves at particular times, and guess what is going on in his mind at each play. But I may also suspend this participation in the We-relation.[349] shift my "mode of observation," and transport the players into my world of *contemporaries*. I now see them under the type "men playing cards," and in this categorization each man is of the type "card player." The activity of each man, furthermore, is related to an action-model symbolized by "the rules of the game." To the extent that I take this typifying posture, the men, who were individuated in the We-relation, are treated now as *homogeneous*. As Schutz writes:

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[345] P, p. 184.

[346] This illustrates the close (potential) connection between consociates and contemporaries, the We-relation and the They-relation. My relating to these people may be better thought a modification of the They-relation.

[347] P, p. 185. The use of ideal types is also employed in the world of predecessors.

> *The typical and only the typical is homogeneous*, and it is always so. In the typifying synthesis of recognition I perform an act of anonymization in which I abstract the lived experience from its setting within the stream of consciousness and thereby render it impersonal.[350]

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[348] P, p. 185. Emphasis in original.

[349] It will be noted that the We-relation does not necessarily include *mutual orienting* as Schutz uses the concept here - a noticeable divergence from the way he has previously defined the We-relation.

[350] P, p. 186. Emphasis in original.

To render it impersonal is, in Schutz's terms, to objectivy it, to create an objective meaning-context. As typification subsides and as these men, with their unique stream of subjective consciousness, are treated personally, subjective meaning-contexts may be created. The degree of typification reflects the stance taken toward the Other, the kind of meaning that the Other has for me, and the kind of sociality that I experience in relation to that Other as well as in relation to those with whom I may be living currently.

With these suggestions Schutz presents a most interesting conceptual dilemma and offers an indication of the crucial difference between the We and They-relation. Using the card game illustration for reference, what is the turning point which changes the We-relation into a They-relation or vice versa? It is the shift in my interpretational stance,[351] a transformation in my "mode of observation." There is no shift in the shared community of space and time; we are all in the same room at the same time regardless of whether I view the Other as a Thou or as a type. This calls into question the centrality of spatiotemporal categories for differentiating the two relations, even though it does not deny the contributing importance of space and time distinctions. The face-to-faceness or spatiality of the relation is the same whether or not I interpret the Other as a "They" or as a "Thou." The notion of "directness" or its corollary "indirectness" which Schutz relies upon to distinguish the consociate sphere from the contemporary sphere is misleading if it refers to spatial directness. The important issue is whether or not I interpret the Other as a Thou (or to what degree). When Schutz illustrates the transition from the We to the They-relation with the friend's walking away, he underscores the spatial or objective, not the interpretative, dimension that we see as the crucial one. What he should have emphasized - and we do not deny that he speaks to this issue - is directness relative to the inner time dimension. The We-relation is one in which my interpretation of the Other is sensitive to his inner time experience or, more broadly, his inner stream of consciousness. The They-relation is indirectly related to this. In fact, in a "typical" They-relation I may presuppose that the Other is an animated person who has inner, subjective experience, but I treat this indirectly to the point of even overlooking it. In short, the fundamental distinction between the We and They-relation is whether or not I interpret the Other in relation to his (unique) subjective meanings and experiences or without reference to these. In the latter case, the Other is dealt with as a type, a "They." The central issue, in Schutz's terms, is subjective or objective interpretation.

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[351] This implies a shift in attentional focus with correlated changes in meaning, a process that we have discussed before.

All this does not negate the importance of space and time. But it sees their significance in relation to the kind of interpretation of the Other that is being done, not as definitive categories in their own right. Let us explain. Shared space and time provide an opportunity that other less vivid dimensions do not for (potentially) interpreting the Other as a Thou. Even though typifications are used in the We-relation[352] the pressure of the Other before me and the communication with him may shatter my stereotypes and generalizations, may transform a They-relation into a Thou-relation. Of course, since there are other factors involved, it may not too. But the opportunity for the We-relation to develop is generally less when there is spatial distance.[353]

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[352] Cf. II, p. 46.

There is also the matter of degrees. Typification and response to the uniqueness of the Other interpenetrate regardless of whether the relation is of the We or They variety. There is always the fact that I put my experience of the Other into my categories not his and thus treat him objectively relative to his subjective stream of consciousness. There is also the complex matter of deciding what is a fair interpretation of the Other's subjective experience and expression which involves the matter of the Other's knowing who he is subjectively - no small issue. The question may also be asked, Who determines what those types are which serve as the basis for whether we are treating the Other as a They or as a We? One of the core issues is that no one may know (have the standard for evaluating) who is typing and to what degree. But at base we would suggest that the difference between the We and They relation is an interpretational difference, a difference that we have related to subjective and objective meaning construction.

The process of typing is a complex one, and Schutz treats it at some length.[354] Since we do not, as adults, simply experience social reality but come to it with interpretative schemata (types), our social experience is poured into these interpretative forms; our experience of sociality is influenced both by the process of meaning construction and by sedimented meaning (our personal stock of knowledge). In the concrete situation the specific types we construct play a large role, and we will be returning to this subject in the next chapter. However, at this point, we will not deal further with the kinds of types[355] employed but with a summary of the general texture of the social relationships that exist between contemporaries. These relationships are based both upon, as we have seen, "distance" between me and others[356] and thus upon a typing of the Other. When contemporaries relate to each other, their behavior is based upon a mutual typing. In riding a plane, for instance, I become for the pilot a "passenger," and he becomes for me a functioning person I call a "pilot." Schutz compares this social relationship to that experienced in the face-to-face relationship.

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[353] However, there are gradations here. A phone conversation with spatial distance implied may be more intimate than a relation in which space and time are shared. Again, the kind of meaning created is the significant issue.

[354] Cf. P, pp. 186-202.

> A social relationship between contemporaries, therefore, consists in this: Each of the partners apprehends the other by means of an ideal type; each of the partners is aware of this mutual apprehension; and each expects that the other's interpretive scheme will be congruent with his own. The They-relationship here stands in sharp contrast to the face-to-face situation. In the face-to-face situation my partner and I are sensitively aware of the nuances of each other's subjective experiences. But in the They-relationship this is replaced by the assumption of a shared interpretive scheme. Now, even though I, on my side, make this assumption, I cannot verify it. I do, however, have more reason to expect an adequate response

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[355] For example, there are "course-of-action types" and "personal types." Cf. P, p. 187.

[356] This is not necessarily physical or spatial distance, as we have noted, even though Schutz has a fondness for this variety.

> from my partner, the more standardized is the scheme which I impute to him. This is the case with schemes derived from law, state, tradition, and systems of order of all kinds, and especially with schemes based on the means-end relation, in short, with what Weber calls 'rational' interpretive schemes.[357]

Social relationships with contemporaries also include an element of doubt that is not existent in the We-relation, according to Schutz.[358] There is always doubt that the contemporary I am relating to will respond according to the typification I have of him. We disagree with this, however, and with Schutz's implication that doubt does not exist in the We-relation. In fact it can be argued that I may have fewer doubts that the pilot will get me to Chicago than that my friend in a We-relation will respond in a certain manner. In any case, the social relationship between contemporaries includes these three basic elements: (1) removal from personal, immediate confrontation with the Other,[359] (2) general typifications which treat the Other as an "anyman" of the type used, and (3) behavior founded upon this removal and typification.

B. The World of Predecessors

Because the world of predecessors does not present serious complications, we can deal with it quickly.[360] To use Schutz's words,

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[357] P, pp. 202-203.

[358] Cf. P, pp. 202-204.

[359] This reflects Schutz's formulation, of course, and not our reservations over the centrality of the spatial referent. Also, these three elements are of the "typical" typification in the "typical" They-relation with contemporaries such as the bus driver.

[360] For more detail cf. P, pp. 207-214.

> I can define a predecessor as a person in the past not one of whose experiences overlaps in time with one of mine. The pure world of predecessors I can then define as entirely made up of such persons. The world of predecessors is what existed before I was born. It is this which determines its very nature. The world of predecessors is by definition over and done with. It has no open horizon toward the future.[361]

The behavior of individual predecessors and interaction among them are fixed or deterministically frozen. These things can influence me, but the influence, unlike that in the We-relation, is only one-sided; I never influence my predecessors. What we have called "orientation" in other contexts is manifested in this sphere as passive or receptive. To say that my action is oriented toward one of my predecessors is to suggest that my action is influenced by his. Or, to put it in terms of the project, "his action conceived in the pluperfect tense is the genuine because-motive of my own."[362]

The "experience" of predecessors is always, at best, second-hand. I learn about them from someone else, from something he has written, or from records and monuments. The vividness that the predecessor has for me is related to factors such as the intensity of the narrator's original experience and the intensity with which I am oriented to the narrator as he describes. Whatever subjective, intended meaning the predecessor may have had is played through the interpretational matrix of the narrator. In contrast, historical research, which is directly concerned with the world of predecessors, does not take the illumination of this subjective meaning as its primary task. It focuses upon what, in Schutz's terms, is objective meaning.

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[361] P, p. 208. Emphasis in original

[362] P, p. 208.

Although in the world of consociates and contemporaries we can assume a relatively similar environment and "common core of knowledge,"[363] in the world of predecessors this is not the case. For this reason, my interpretation of my predecessor's experience as it comes to me in preserved signs and symbols can only be vague and tentative. Certainly, I may interpret these signs in terms of "the characteristics of human experience in general." But there will always remain a distinct difference, an unbridgeable chasm, between the experience of those in the past and my own.[364]

The whole matter of historical interpretation is problematic for other reasons. The historian's task demands that he select from the vast number of possible sources those which he then weaves into a "history." The famous discussion between Eduard Meyer and Max Weber clarified the issues involved.[365] They include the fact that not only the writing of history but also the selecting of sources is an interpretive process. "The basic methodological problem of the historian," writes Schutz, "is already set for him by that point of view which is his qua historian."[366] This point of view reflects the historian's personal interests and purposes with which he comes to his work. Schutz concludes in an extended section that is worth our consideration.

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[363] P, p. 210.

[364] This condition is reflected in various ways. The controversy over the "correct" manner in which to interpret the notations on Bach's music, the arguments over what the words used by philosophers of the past "really" meant to them, and the often chaotic clash among those who interpret the "original" meaning of the Bible all speak to this issue. A similar chasm is also evidenced, for different reasons, between disparate cultures in the world of contemporaries.

[365] Cf. P, p. 211, ftn. 73.

[366] P, p. 211.

> History is thus the same as any other field in that the angle of approach determines everything. The kind of interest the historian has depends, of course, on the time in which he himself lives and on his attitude toward his own age and toward the past age which is the object of his scrutiny. Just as the individual interprets his past experiences in different ways at different times, so the historian interprets past ages now in this way and now in that, looking at them from his own experience of the social world. This means that in the process of interpretation he will always be constructing new ideal types of both persons and actions, all in order to understand precisely the same facts. Into the historian's own picture of the social world, however, is incorporated his experience of the world of his contemporaries (or, as we say, the cultural context of his time) and also, indeed, his experience, whether prescientific or scientific, of his predecessors. Starting from this general picture as a vantage point, he focuses upon his specific problem, seeking to reconstruct what happened in the past. But he always seeks to 'make sense' out of the past, that is, to describe it consistently with his total previous knowledge of the world of predecessors and of the world generally.[367]

In the words of chapter one, history is written from a particular attention of consciousness, which is itself influenced by the historian's interests and purposes. This attentional focus as a selecting ray pinpoints items but within a field of possible items. Thus, the manner in which we deal with the world of predecessors illustrates not only the dimensions to sociality but also a wider issue: the way in which multiple meaning-contexts may be fashioned.

C. The World of Successors

In order to round out the picture of sociality that we have been drawing, we now turn to the world of successors. Schutz says so little about this sphere and says it so concisely that we will conclude simply by allowing him to speak for himself.

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[367] P, pp. 211-212.

> If the world of predecessors is completely fixed and determined, the world of consociates free, and the world of contemporaries probable, the world of successors is completely indeterminate and indeterminable. Our orientation toward our successors cannot amount to more than this: that we are going to have some. No key will open the door of this realm, not even that of ideal types. For the latter method is based on our experience of predecessors, consociates, and contemporaries, and there is no principle which permits us to extend it to the world of our successors. Of course, some of our consociates and contemporaries will outlive us, and we can assume that they will continue to act then as we know them to act now. In this way a kind of transitional zone can be set up between the two worlds. But the further removed the world of predecessors is from the Here and Now, the less reliable will such interpretations be.[368]

Sociality and Cognitive Style

Within his system Schutz proposes that each attended reality has a form of sociality as part of its cognitive style. In this sense one's attentional focus brings with it some kind of relation to other men. The "relationship" may only include the remembered association with friends as in the case of the desert hermit. It may be the anonymous relation to the mail man when my letter is dropped in the box or the less typified relation with a postal clerk while buying stamps. Finally, as the association becomes increasingly personal or intimate, it may be the relationship I have with my closest friend. At each of these levels a particular meaning-context or reality is established. It gives a particular texture or coloring to the reality.

One's social experience with its different kinds of typification is not simply a passive corollary to the attention of consciousness. It influences what is conceived of as real or what is excluded as unreal. This influence is exerted both by remembered social experience and by presently experienced sociality. For instance, the manner in which I have come to know myself as a person through "bouncing off" others, the role I feel I must play, and how I perceive and interpret other persons - in short, the way in which I perceive social reality - is weighted by sedimented social experience. At the second level, the reality I experience now is affected by present social involvement. The stageplay, personal conversation, a musical performance, a football game, a cocktail party, and so forth press reality-experiences upon me. How difficult it is, for instance, to establish the reality of meditation while in a group or in conversation with another. If I drift off into meditation while someone is talking and turn from the unique person to typification, I may be forcibly brought back to the reality of conversation by the exclamation, "Say, you aren't even listening to me!" It is easy to see how the kinds and degrees of typification, which are simply interpretational structures, order the manner in which I experience and perceive social reality and other realities as well.

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[368] P, p. 214.

Toward an Understanding of the Ethical Province

Ethical reality is shaped by the three elements in cognitive style that we have investigated in this chapter. The experience of one's self is obviously related to how I think another should experience his "self," the "self-image" that I have, the current life goals which I believe I may or may not reach with certain means that I think both appropriate and feasible. These dimensions stemming from self-experience influence the evaluation of my own or another's intentions, means, goals, and results relative to their moral goodness. In the process of evaluation and moral action I am dependent, as are others, upon the vitality or spontaneity of consciousness and may even judge myself or another in relation to the degree of ethical awareness that this helps produce or sustain. The manner in which I relate ethically to my fellow human beings is influenced also by my social experience, by sociality. The degree to which I typify or categorize others has ethical implications, tied as it is to I-It and I-Thou activity. If my action is based upon a typified view of another which misses his intentions and subjective personhood, this may have ramifications for its moral goodness. And my ethical judgment of my own and other's activity may be grounded in such considerations. The manner in which ethical traditions are passed on and appropriated within a social setting also adds weight to maintaining that sociality has high relevance for the ethical domain.

With the comments of this chapter about cognitive style and the ethical province in mind, let us now turn to consideration of the synthesizing concept: "multiple realities."

Chapter Five

MULTIPLE REALITIES

Introduction

In the preceding four chapters we have concerned ourselves with seven elements in cognitive style. We have suggested that each of these generic elements contains an inherent flexibility. At certain points this fluidity expresses itself in a conceptual continuum, at other points through an interrelation of discernible, discrete sub-elements. For instance, subjectivity and objectivity are the poles of a single continuum between them, mixing in various proportions the private and personal, the private and social, the public and personal, and the public and social. In this conceptualization there are public elements in the private, private elements in the public, social elements in the personal, and personal elements in the social; no term excommunicates but rather communicates with the others.[369] The attention of consciousness, on the other hand, blends a focus upon a particular object at a particular point upon the wide-awake to sound-asleep continuum, thus interrelating two discrete factors. Whatever fluid features each element evidences at the generic level, however, a relatively stable pattern emerges when each feature is concretely focused into a specific cognitive style. Thus Schutz can descriptively attend to the lived world's cognitive style and write of full or "wide-awakeness,"

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[369] Put another way and properly defined the continuum may reflect different postures of the "subjective."

"suspension of doubt," "working," "the working self," "the common intersubjective world," and "standard time" - all these are specific factors in a particular cognitive style.

The burden of this chapter is two-fold. First, we will discuss "multiple realities" as a general concept. This will include treatment of those men that Schutz uses in molding the notion, the general contributing elements that make up the composit concept, the relation of meaning to this pluralistic idea of reality, and some implications that can be drawn. This section will also, when necessary, indicate areas where the pluralistic interpretation of reality has impact. The second major task will be to illumine the relationship between or among different realities. This will be done at two levels. Regardless of how realities are ordered by the individual person, any constellation involves what Schutz calls "enclaves" or elements in one reality which appear, although in a different position, in another. Also, regardless of the configuration, passage between realities is accomplished by a "shock" or "leap." There is also the problem of unity within the multiplicity, another issue to be faced at this first level. The second level of analysis will answer the question, How and why are multiple realities ranked by the individual within a community? This will move us into what Schutz calls "the problem of relevance," the manner in which he as a particular philosopher of the social sciences orders the plurality, and the role that death or "the fundamental anxiety" plays in influencing a person's ordering.

Multiple Realities: Its Historical Background and Major Features

According to Schutz, there is a multiple number of worlds or realities. The world of dreams, phantasy, art, science, religion, play, insanity - all these, and many more,[370] are worlds filled with meaning of various kinds. Each is a "finite province of meaning,"[371] to use Schutz's words, and is built upon a specific cognitive style with its peculiar configuration of experienced time, sociality, spontaneity, and so forth.

The phrase "finite province of meaning" is Schutz's own, but it is consciously both contrasted to and adapted from the notion of "sub-universes" adopted by William James.[372] For James, in his two volume Principles of Psychology, there are a multiple if not an infinite number of ordered realities. He calls each a "sub-universe"[373] and lists seven such domains: the world of physical things, of science, of ideal relations, of "idols of the tribe," of the supernatural, of individual opinion, and of madness and vagary.[374] Even though this seems like a limiting list, the specific manifestations of these worlds are "as numerous as men are."

What is it to say that one of these worlds is "real?" Reality for James, as it is for Schutz, is a matter of attention. James states, for instance, that "each world whilst it is attended to is real in its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention."[375] In Schutz's words James is saying that "whatever excites and stimulates our interest is real."[376] Each world of reality continues, if not disturbed, with its own internal consistency and cohesion. The seven year old girl, while she is in her play world, is the mother with her doll-child, responding to herself and to her doll as she thinks a mother should. There is a pattern to the relationship within this reality, and other realities, such as the reality of the grown-up world in which she is the child, exist for her only in a peripheral way. Reality, for both James and Schutz, is also a relational creation: "To call a thing real means that this thing stands in a certain relation to ourselves."[377] This relationship includes the creation on our part of a cognitive style, the modus operendi with which we move through a particular reality. "The origin of all reality," furthermore - as we indicated in chapter three - "is subjective," according to Schutz.[378] The social individual, with his stock of knowledge gained from past social experience and with the experience of his on-going present and projected future, attends to certain objects with their attendant fields and in so doing gives them an "accent of reality."[379] Multiple realities -

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[370] There are other immediately distinguishible worlds such as that of the joke, the stageplay, the music hall, and so forth. But depending upon the things attended to and the manner in which this attention is focused, there are worlds within worlds, so to speak. The religious world of the mystic is different from that of the non-mystic; the scientific world of the biologist is different from that of the sociologist; the sociological world of the Parsonian equilibrium model is different from that of the C. Wright Mills conflict model. In fact, the worlds are as endless as the number of people who construct them.

[371] I, p. 230.

[372] Cf. I, pp. xli-xlii, 207-208, 229-230, 340-341, and II, pp. 135-136. In James cf. his Principles of Psychology, vol. 2 (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1950), chapter 21, pp. 283-324.

[373] William James, Principles of Psychology, vol. 2, p. 291

[374] Ibid., pp. 292-293.

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[375] Ibid., p. 293. Emphasis in original.

[376] I, p. 340.

[377] I, p. 207.

[378] I, p. 207; cf. also II, p. 135.

[379] I, p. 230.

this phrase should be distinguished from "the multiple character of (one) reality" - emerge because of what James calls "two mental facts."

> The whole distinction of real and unreal...is thus grounded on two mental facts - first, that we are liable to think differently of the same; and second, that when we have done so, we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and which to disregard.[380]

For Schutz this "thinking differently" is not simply a matter of sporadic, diverse thoughts about a single object but involves or can involve different systems of thinking about one object, a whole pattern of thought which differs from other patterns of thought about the attended object. In the strict sense of the word these patterns are, however, cognitive. It is on the basis of these divergent cognitive patterns but also in relation to variously textured emotional and social states that what Schutz terms cognitive style, the overarching pattern of one reality, emerges. Although it is not ultimately disruptive, it is linguistically unfortunate that he uses the phrase "cognitive style" to refer to a general cognitive and non-cognitive dimension. It would have been better, we think, to restrict the phrase "cognitive style" to the thought dimension to which James is obviously referring, a dimension in which there are also multiple cognitive styles, and to call the activity which is meant to encompass all the elements in one reality-style "reality patterning." Reality patterning would then include cognitive, rational, irrational, emotive, volitional, and experiential elements and be related to its particular reality or, to use Charles McCoy's phrase, "realm of actuality."[381]

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[380] James, Principles of Psychology, vol. 2, p. 290. Emphasis in original.

Although Schutz finds himself in agreement with James on the attentional, definitional, and relational or relative nature of reality, he prefers to term the multiple realities "finite provinces of meaning,"[382] rather than "sub-universes." In doing this Schutz disengages the notion from its psychological setting in James and emphasizes that "it is the meaning of our experiences, and not the ontological structure of the objects, which constitutes reality."[383] This focus upon meaning and away from ontology reflects the influence that Husserl's thought had upon Schutz. It is in the Ideas that Husserl writes in words quoted later with approval by Schutz:[384]

> In a certain sense and with proper care in the use of words we may even say that all real unities are 'unities of meaning.'[385]

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[381] We initially mentioned our reservations about Schutz's cognitive treatment of meaning in chapter one by introducing Gendlin's notion of "felt-meaning." Our interpretation of Schutz at this point betrays our own proclivity for this dimension. A second point: the relation between reality patterns will be discussed below.

[382] For an example of the manner in which such finite provinces can be independently described, cf. Maurice Natanson's "History as a Finite Province of Meaning" in his Literature, Philosophy, and the Social Sciences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 172-177.

[383] I, p. 341.

[384] I, p. 230, ftn. 18.

[385] Edmund Husserl, Ideas, p. 152. On p. 153 Husserl goes on to write in a section significant for our discussion: "Unities of meaning presuppose (let me repeat it with emphasis: not through deduction from metaphysical postulates of any description, but because we can point to it in our intuitive wholly doubt-free procedure) a sense-giving consciousness, which, on its side, is absolute and not dependent in its turn on sense bestowed on it from another source. If the concept of reality is derived from natural realities, from the unities of possible experience, then 'universe,' 'Nature as a whole,' means just so much as the totality of realities; but to identify the same with the totality of Being, and

At another point in the same section Husserl writes that "an absolute reality is just as valid as a round square."[386] Reality by definition is, in other words, relative and not absolute, just as a square by definition is rectangular and not circular. In Ryle's terms, the phrase "absolute reality" is a contradiction in terms, a "category mistake." For both Schutz and Husserl the human conception of reality is necessarily fragmented, multiple, and finite, since it is based upon what is attended to and not upon the totality of everything. In fact, the real is what is being attended to at a particular moment. For the dreamer the man coming after him with a knife is "real," and his tossing about in bed and increased heart beat reflect the effect of this reality. Each reality of this and other kinds is fashioned about an object attended to, its horizonal field, and interpretational or meaningful setting. It is true that individuals and societies rank such multiple realities in certain ways, that they interpenetrate, that the individual moves from one to another, and that the ordering betrays a general approach to reality. But the finished product, whatever its level of generality, is nonetheless a finite meaning creation, which - because it cuts into all that is at a particular point or points - does not embrace the absolute totality of everything.

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therewith to make it absolute, is simply nonsense. An absolute reality is just as valid as a round square. Reality and world, here used, are just the titles for certain valid unities of meaning, namely, unities of 'meaning' related to certain organizations of pure absolute consciousness which dispense meaning and show forth its validity in certain essentially fixed, specific ways." For Husserl's related suggestion that personal appropriation is the key and not a "world in itself," cf. III, pp. 27-28.

[386] Husserl, Ideas, p. 153.

Schutz alludes to this shifting, perspectivistic, and delimiting notion of reality when he writes about the taken for granted beliefs.

> Each element of the realm taken for granted beyond question has necessarily an equivocal character of indeterminateness...Suppose that one of the beliefs unquestionably taken for granted could be formulated by the proposition'S is p.' Now S, taken without question, as it appears to be given to us, is not only p but also q, r, and many other things. As long as this interrelationship is not put into question the expression 'S is p' is elliptical in the sense that the full statement should read: 'S is, among many other things such as q and r, also p.' In other words, within the unquestionably given world the propositions 'S is p' and 'S is q' are until counter proof both open possibilities, not contradicting each other, either having its equal right and its equal weight. If I, with respect to an element S of the world taken for granted, assert: 'S is p,' I do so because for my purpose at hand at this particular moment I am interested only in the p-being of S and am disregarding as not relevant to such purpose the fact that S is also q and r. The famous principle discovered by Spinoza "_Omnis definitio est negatio_" points, of course on another _level, in the same direction_.[387]

This brief passage gives important insight into the finite or delimiting character of reality that Schutz espouses and also reflects the operation of James' two mental facts. In the realm of the taken for granted - but in other worlds or realities as well - a statement such as 'S is p' is a statement about what is (real). It is _positive_ in that it establishes a central focus of meaning with its implications extending or fringing outward so to speak. However, it is also necessarily _negative_; it excludes from attention the fact that S is also q and r. That S is q or r may or may not contradict in a logical sense the statement 'S is p'; this issue is not important here. The significant matter is that S can be several things, can be thought of in several different ways as the author chooses. Each in turn has its particular field with others excluded. All interpretation at whatever level, more specifically the question of "real" and "unreal," is an exercise in boundary creation and maintenance, a definitional expedition whose goals are the establishment of finite domains of interconnected meaning. Meaning creation is endemic to the human being as we know him.[388] The fact that interpretation is inherently selective reflection on the flow of experience, that selection necessarily involves incision into what is at a particular point or points - with all the implications that this including and excluding process has - and that the emergent meanings are multifarious leads Schutz to the conclusion that conceptions of reality will necessarily be meaning-related and pluralistic. As Bierstedt has commented,[389] Schutz's concern for these finite meaning-contexts and his bracketing of the ontic dimension also leads him away from concern for "existentiality" and absolute Being in his system.[390] This is but another way of saying that Schutz's conception of reality reflects a stance, one among others. The recognition of this, however, simply hints at the validity of a pluralistic notion of reality.

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[387] I, pp. 75-76. Emphasis in original.

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[388] Cf. P, pp. 83-86. [The fact that interpretation is inherently selective reflection on the flow of experience, that selection necessarily involves incision into what is at a particular point or points - with all the implications that this including and excluding process has - and that the emergent meanings are multifarious leads Schutz to the conclusion that conceptions of reality will necessarily be meaning-related and pluralistic.]

[389] Robert Bierstedt, "The Common Sense World of Alfred Schutz," Social Research, XXX (Spring, 1963), p. 117.

[390] Although Schutz, in Natanson's words, "had a profound grasp of the problems of existential philosophy," he also had "equally profound reservations about its conclusions." Cf. I, p. xliv. This will become more apparent when we discuss death as "the fundamental anxiety" below. It does indicate, however, that Schutz would have difficulty with the existential philosophy of a man such as Heidegger, who, interestingly, drew upon Husserl as much as Schutz himself did.

Although the major contribution to Schutz's "multiple realities" comes from James and Husserl, his appreciation for Bergson's treatment of "order" and "disorder" in the latter's Creative Evolution, chapter three,[391] indicates that Bergson, too, may have added weight if nothing else to Schutz's conclusions. For Bergson, "disorder" is "merely the want or absence of a particular kind of order we expected and to which any other order appears just a contingent arrangement."[392] In terms of our context, a second "reality" may appear "unreal" but only in relation to the first or standard reality. Furthermore, order and disorder, reality and non-reality, are not "out there" in the external world or "inside" in the mental world. They are *created* by the human orderer whose schemes are the interpretational product of his experience.[393]

To summarize our discussion thus far, "reality" is a word used by Schutz to refer to that which is attended. In contrast to dictionary definitions, which by defining "reality" as that which has objective or physical existence[394] render ideas and such related elements *un*real,

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[391] Cf. I, pp. 300-301.

[392] I, p. 300.

[393] This argument is reminiscent of Pitirim Sorokin's discussion of the relation between order and disorder ("congeries") in his Sociological Theories of Today (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 17-21.

[394] Although existence and reality are not necessarily the same, the "existence" of something is, as in the case of "reality," a relational matter. James underscores this in a note (Principles of Psychology, vol. 2, p. 290) when he states that the existence of something is related to its existence *for me*. With this Schutz would completely agree.

Schutz's use of the word includes everything which the conscious person can attend to. In attention, dreams are reality as are the simple, felt presence of another person in a room (one-sided Thou-orientation), ideas, the rock I throw, and the paranoid state of what we usually call the mentally ill person. Attention to or consciousness of is the minimal requirement for something to be called a "reality." In the words of our first chapter, something may be real pre-phenomenally or phenomenally; attention is alone the determinate. However, for Schutz, reality is a finite province of meaning. This shift from reality as (any kind of) attention to reality as meaning is not carefully analyzed by Schutz. It involves the movement from minimal attention or from what Natanson has called "passive awareness" to highly focused, reflective ("conceptual thinking," in Natanson's words) attention.[395] When Schutz writes of "finite provinces" he gives the impression that he understands their creation in terms of conceptual thinking, although it need not be highly formalized.

We agree with Schutz's suggestion that reality and meaning should be and are tied together. But his treatment leaves the impression that that which is attended to at the passive or pre-phenomenal level is, although real, not a finite province of meaning. We think that it is. Certainly, the province may possess extremely vague contours, in a sense approach the status of a limiting concept, but it is the necessary concomitant to an equally vague reality. This difficulty here is related to a problem that we suggested in chapter one and four.[396] There it was ventured that Schutz does not deal adequately with the kind of meaning that exists at the pre-phenomenal level and even gives the impression that there is none.[397] We think that a continuum exists moving from passive awareness of reality to highly conceptualized awareness. At each stage on this continuum there is a correlated finite province of meaning which varies in sharpness and in scope as conceptualization increases. At the passive level, to be concrete, the province includes the meaning of a simple Thou-orientation. My experience of the Other as present is meaningful not because he is clothed in a certain manner or physically proportioned in a certain way but because he is there and because I have come to recognize that the attending to something has meaning as a process. And this minimal meaning is not dependent upon the phenomenal or predicative characteristics of the Other.

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[395] Maurice Natanson, "The Phenomenology of Alfred Schutz," Inquiry, IX (1966), p. 151.

To return to our summary, each reality attended to has a correlated province of meaning. There are as many realities as there are people and there are divergent interpretations within a single person's life. But these realities with their meaning provinces are finite, interpretive, and experiential slices from what "absolutely" is. They are all relative to a particular experience and interpretation of the real that is attended to. Because the mind can and is constantly shifting from reality to reality, from meaning configuration to meaning configuration, one person in a particular day passes through multiple numbers of realities. We will be writing of this passage later. However, here it is enough to say that the shift in realities does not create mental chaos but usually is smooth and unnoticed by the average person. It is only in reflection that one becomes aware of the immense complexity and diversity involved.

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[396] Cf. chapter 4, p. 124.

[397] Cf. P, p. 45f.

Each reality with its finite province of meaning has an attendant cognitive style, a style that is composed of the various elements we have treated in our first four chapters. Reality and cognitive style (reality patterning) are interactive. The manner in which a reality is attended to shapes the cognitive style. This "manner" can be influenced by various external and volitional factors so that, on the one hand, what is attended to may force or focus a cognitive style, e.g. a San Francisco earthquake shakes us into wide-awakeness, and, on the other hand, my project at hand may shape the reality to which I give attention, e.g. theoretical contemplation removes us from the everyday world. The cognitive style belonging to a particular reality is consistent with itself and the attendant experiences compatible with one another, although not necessarily with other experiences outside this reality. In fact, experiences outside the reality attended to may appear from the vantage point of this specific reality "merely fictitious, inconsistent and incompatible."[398] The inner consistency and compatibility, however, allow for slippage. "Inconsistencies and incompatibilities of some experiences, all of them partaking of the same cognitive style, do not necessarily entail the withdrawal of the accent of reality from the respective province of meaning as a whole but merely the invalidation of the particular experience or experiences within that province."[399]

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[398] I, p. 232.

To conclude, Schutz's "multiple realities" is an overarching concept which both relates and distinguishes the innumerable reality or meaning patterns in human experience and suggests that these are shaped by correlated cognitive styles (reality patterning), which themselves are also complex. "Reality" is that attended to; "meaning pattern" (finite province of meaning) is the interpretational configuration through which reality is appropriated; "meaning patterning" (cognitive style) is the activity[400] through which the meaning pattern is constructed and personally held.

The evidence for multiple realities is legion, although, since we generally are seduced by the mirage of an "absolute reality," the temptation is always to reduce the pluralism. Phenomenological analysis of the Schutzian variety holds the reins against systems which reduce the multiplicity to a "symphony" on one string. In light, however, of the lessons phenomenology teaches, it would be misleading to suggest that Schutz's concept is anything more than a perspective upon the problem of reality-establishment, even though it is a perspective which is more inclusive than most others. Its strength rests in its ability to consistently and coherently deal with plurality. The conflict between the physical and social sciences as they are conceived by various of their practitioners, the tension between science and religion, the divergences within sociology, intercultural variety in value systems, the conflict between world religions, and, in general, the wide, disparate range of reality-systems with their ethical, political, and economic implications - all of these areas appear more manageable when it is understood that they represent, at base, when viewed phenomenologically, attentional modifications with correlated shifts in both experience and meaning.

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[399] I, p. 230. Emphasis in original.

[400] In describing cognitive style the temptation has been to make it static and to squeeze out of it this activity which is endemic to it.

In approaching human experience in this manner, plurality can be appreciated for what it is rather than as a wayward child to be conformed to some expected or acceptable behavior pattern. The stance is thus an open one, based more upon our allowing a phenomenon to exist than upon our destroying it through reduction. The _danger_ in this perspective lies in its openness, in its tendency to see plurality where more rigorous conceptualization could lead to similarity, and in its disregard for the ranking of realities in a particular individual's life or in a given larger society. Schutz's phenomenology, as we will see, guards against the last danger. For instance, in his highly original essay "Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality"[401] he describes the way in which realities rub against each other or, to be more specific, the manner in which the physical, material world chastens Don Quixote's world of phantasy. It can be argued, however, as Robert Bierstedt does,[402] that Schutz does not relate his notion of the _Lebenswelt_ - in this context we add his concept of reality - to the general structure and stability of society. But this is more because Schutz did not primarily concern himself with this level[403] than that his phenomenological approach prevented him. The Berger-Luckmann volume in the sociology of knowledge, which draws upon Schutz, entitled The Social Construction of Reality[404] demonstrates that this job can be done.

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[401] II, pp. 135-158.

[402] Robert Bierstedt, "The Common Sense World of Alfred Schutz," _Social Research_, XXX (Spring, 1963), p. 120.

Multiple Realities: Their Relation

In General: the notion of "enclaves"

We now turn to the relationship that exists between realities. According to Schutz, finite provinces of meaning are not self-enclosed castles but communities spreading outward from their centers. He does not, unfortunately, deal with this at great length[405] but does suggest that "enclaves" exist between provinces, areas which may be at the center of one province but which are enclosed by the periphery of another. For instance, in the finite province of what Schutz calls "working" theoretical contemplation is done. We "draft, reject, redraft projects and plans before making up our mind" as to how we will gear into the world.[406] However, as Schutz goes on to say,

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[403] His suggestions for the sociology of knowledge (cf. esp. "The Well-informed Citizen: An Essay on the Social Distribution of Knowledge," II, pp. 120-134) provide the exception here.

[404] Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966).

[405] We are aware of only three explicit references in his four volumes: I, pp. 233, ftn. 19; 245; and 307.

[406] I, p. 245.

> all this contemplative thinking is performed for practical purposes and ends, and for this very reason it constitutes an 'enclave' of theoretical contemplation within the world of working rather than a finite province of meaning.

This is to say that relative to the central activity in the world of working, which Schutz has defined as "gearing into the world," this kind of contemplation, although it is "theoretical" in the widest sense, is a domain within the finite province of meaning called "working." On the other hand, relative to the province of theorizing, theoretical contemplation is the defining or central activity, and the writing of notions on paper (working) to be read by someone else is an enclave. Enclaves, in Schutz's words, are "regions belonging to one province of meaning enclosed by another."[407] In terms of our illustration, theoretical contemplation belongs to the province of meaning called "theorizing," but it is enclosed or included as a contributing element in the province of "working." As far as we can understand, then, enclaves are those peripheral elements in one province which are the same as those of central concern in another. Relative to one reality they show themselves at the defining center, but relative to another at the periphery or as secondary ingredients.[408] The notion underscores the interpenetration of the realities, a subject that we will now treat further in relation to the passage between the provinces.

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[407] I, p. 233, ftn. 19.

[408] It should be noted that the notion of enclaves emerges in an attempt to relate realities or to draw a topological map so to speak of the field of realities. While one is living in one reality this relational concept loses its importance; we experience one reality at a time and others are subsumed.

Multiple Realities: Their Relation

In General: the passage between realities - the notion of the "shock"

The world of working is the "natural" one, according to Schutz. Movement from this reality to others is accomplished by what he calls a "shock." It is "nothing else than a radical modification in the tension of our consciousness, founded in a different attention à la vie."[409] We treated this attentional modification in chapter one. There seem to be two reasons that Schutz suggests for the experience of this shock and its re-accenting (another attentional object) with reality. First, while living within the natural attitude in the Lebenswelt, "we are not ready to abandon our attitude toward it without having experienced a specific shock which compels us to break through the limits of this 'finite' province of meaning and to shift the accent of reality to another one."[410] The shock happens to us either through, we suggest, a (external) challenge to the reality of the Lebenswelt - indeed, a challenge to the present reality whatever it is - or through a (internal) shift in the field of experience. For instance, we become ill with microscopic organisms or we "see" an apparition. The shocks in these cases are caused from without so to speak, and a "quarrel" is established between two realities.[411] The "natural" world of the healthy and of the physical quarrels with or is made problematic by the world of sickness and of socalled spirits. The second reason is far more common: the shock is created by our own relatively volitional shift in attention to life. For instance, I turn to a painting on the wall and allow myself to give attention to the world within the picture frame.

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[409] I, p. 232.

[410] I, p. 231.

[411] Cf. II, p. 135.

The word "shock" may strike us as a bit violent or extreme since it is used to depict what we consider the most natural and unshocking experience. Everyday we pass through innumerable kinds of shock experiences which call for both mild and radical transformations in the province of meaning. Schutz's description is worth quoting at length.

> Some instances are: the shock of falling asleep as the leap into the world of dreams; the inner transformation we endure if the curtain in the theater rises as the transition into the world of the stageplay; the radical change in our attitude if, before a painting, we permit our visual field to be limited by what is within the frame as the passage into the pictorial world; our quandary, relaxing into laughter, if, in listening to a joke, we are for a short time ready to accept the fictitious world of the jest as a reality in relation to which the world of our daily life takes on the character of foolishness; the child's turning toward his toy as the transition into the play-world; and so on. But also the religious experiences in all their varieties - for instance, Kierkegaard's experience of the 'instant' as the leap into the religious sphere - are examples of such a shock, as well as the decision of the scientist to replace all passionate participation in the affairs of 'this world' by a disinterested contemplative attitude.[412]

Even if the electrical overtones in the word "shock" and its meaning in the phrase "shock therapy" make it seem to us a bit inaccurate in depicting these transitions that Schutz has just mentioned, the word does serve three purposes. It underscores the significant even radical shift that takes place between provinces, emphasizes Schutz's contention that each province is a finite or relatively autonomous entity,[413] and indicates his belief that there is no "formula of transformation" in which one reality can be referred to another.[414] To transfer one reality into another is to alter its texture, to change its components and their configuration. Schutz does not argue this highly significant point against reductionism. He has introduced the basis for such an argument, however, through his use of James and Bergson. From James, as we have mentioned, Schutz has appropriated the notion of the two mentalistic facts. From Bergson he has taken the idea of "coexisting orders."[415] Both James and Bergson present a common front here. The order that one constructs, i.e. a finite province of meaning, is based upon a particular relation of objects at a particular time. Different orders are the product of different orderings. The kind of existent order is dependent upon one's choice of an order and a rejecting, disregarding, or sublimating of others. For James the possibility of this stems from the operation of the two mental facts; for Bergson the possibility of coexisting orders is dependent upon two or more individuals creating two or more divergent orders at the same time. For Schutz there is no possibility of a formula of transformation because such a formula would reduce one order or finite province of meaning to another, simply re-arrange the province to coincide with another. Although there may be similarities between the provinces of meaning (hence, "enclaves" at one level), they may not be equated without destroying one or the other.[416] For this reason Schutz votes for real pluralism or multiple realities and against a concept that would use words like "perspectives upon a single or absolute reality." If there is a unity among the realities it is not to be found in an absolute reality to which multiple perspectives all tie in. Again, with Husserl on his side, "reality" is inherently the creation of individuals or, in so far as this is possible, a community of consenting persons and is experientially and definitionally pluralistic.

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[412] I, p. 231.

[413] Cf. I, p. 232. This does not deny Schutz's other notion that enclaves exist, but they become thematic when relating realities through reflection.

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[414] Cf. I, p. 232.

[415] Cf. I, pp. 300-301 and 344.

Multiple Realities: Their Relation

In General: the unity of the realities

In what way can Schutz speak of a unity among this multiplicity if "absolute reality" provides nothing more than a category mistake? First of all, let us outline directions that the answer to this question is not justified in following. Since reality is by definition a human perspective, a workable unity cannot be found in "absolute reality," which is a totality that human beings are constitutionally incapable of grasping and thus not a perspective at all but also a contradiction in terms. There can be only relative realities, and this in itself does not provide unification. The notion of enclaves likewise can not be parlayed into a theory of unification. The existence of enclaves, at best, indicates that similar features exist in different realities, although they may occupy different positions, but a formula of transformation only reduces; it does not unify. Furthermore, even though there may be one universe which is common to all persons and in relation to which the multiple meaning systems are created, this is only a geographical unity which begs the question concerning the unification of multiple meaning contexts.[417]

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[416] For an illustration of the manner in which the realities of one province become the fictions of another, cf. Schutz's treatment of the symbols used in science and poetry in their relation to the common-sense world in I, pp. 345-347.

In the final analysis Schutz does not attempt a unification of the realities. As far as he is concerned the plurality does and, in conceptualization, must remain plural. We spoke in chapter two about the "incommensurability" of inner and outer time. This unreconcilable differentiation along with that (potential) divergence between subjective and objective meaning underscores the barriers to unification. Schutz's denial that a transforming formula is possible, his argument that provinces of meaning are finite, his affirmation that it takes a "leap" or "shock" to move from reality to reality, his emphasis upon the infinite number of attentional modifications possible, and his understanding of "reality" as that which is attended to - all these statements point to the necessary maintenance of multiplicity. If unity emerges, it does so at two levels: (1) that of individual consciousness and (2) public consensus. However, in both instances unity is not reduction to a common denominator. In the first case, unity is created because consciousness holds discernible realities in a magnetic or meaning field. In the second instance, social agreement blends similar realities into an interwoven mat. Schutz refers to the first possibility when he writes,

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[417] Furthermore, to assume that the universe or world at any level is "common to all" is misleading. It is variously open to each person depending upon his interpretational system and related perceptions.

> The finite provinces of meaning are not separated states of mental life in the sense that passing from one to another would require a transmigration of the soul and a complete extinction of memory and consciousness by death, as the doctrine of metempsychosis assumes. They are merely names for different tensions of one and the same consciousness, and it is the same life, the mundane life, unbroken from birth to death, which is attended to in different modifications.[418]

If there is a unity of the realities it stems from their being held, juggled, and ranked by a unified consciousness, which retains their remembered vestiges. But this unity is not the product of homogeneous content; the same person can hold quite disparate realities with and without sensing incongruity. The second possibility for unity is more social in nature. It is implied by the manner in which an in-group shares common values and definitions of the situation.[419] The members' construction of reality is similar or, in our context, unified the one with the other. However, both the unity provided by individual consciousness and that gained through social consensus is far from the all-inclusive unity for which those who seek "absolute reality" hunger. The multiplicity of reality denies this.

Multiple Realities: Their Relation in a person's conceptual system - the problem of relevance

As far as Schutz is concerned Spinoza was correct when he wrote "Omnis definitio est negatio." But he is concerned to go further and ask the three-fold question: How does redefining positively reshape the structures of meaning and reality; why are there different definitions; and what are the elements which go into the finally constructed definition? Although we have not gone into extreme detail in our analysis, it should be obvious by this time that redefining does alter the texture of reality. In terms of the statement "S is p," which we have mentioned, the nature of S changes as it is related to p, q, and r. What may be unproblematic relative to the statement "S is p" may become problematic when the reality is shifted to include the statement "S is q."[420] Throughout his life, especially by comparing the theoretical or social-scientific reality and the common-sense world, Schutz attempted to spell out the specific how of the redefining.[421] Relative to scientific concept-formation - and this general process is paradigmatic for all defining - Schutz describes what takes place in this way:

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[418] I, p. 258.

[419] Cf. "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World," II, pp. 226-273, esp. pp. 243-273.

> We have now to characterize briefly the system of relevances prevailing within the province of scientific contemplation. This system originates in a voluntary act of the scientist by which he selects the object of his further inquiry, in other words, by the stating of the problem at hand. Therewith the more or less emptily anticipated solution of this problem becomes the supreme goal of the scientific activity. On the other hand, by the mere stating of the problem the sections or elements of the world which actually are or potentially may become related to it as relevant, as bearing upon the matter in hand, are at once defined. Henceforth, this circumscription of the relevant field will guide the process of inquiry. It determines, first of all, the so-called 'level' of the research. As a matter of fact, the term 'level' is just another expression for the demarcation line between all that does and does not pertain to the problem under consideration, the former being the topics to be investigated, explicated, clarified, the latter, the other elements of the scientist's knowledge which, because they are irrelevant to his problem, he decides to accept in their

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[420] Cf. III, p. 117.

[421] Cf. especially in this context I, pp. 137-138 and 249; II, pp. 18 and 83.

> givenness, without questioning, as mere 'data.' In other words, the demarcation line is the locus of the points actually interesting the scientist and at which he has decided to stop further research and analysis. Secondly, the stating of the problem at once reveals its open horizons, the outer horizon of connected problems which will have to be stated afterwards, as well as the inner horizon of all the implications hidden within the problem itself which have to be made visible and explicated in order to solve it.[422]

The redefining by the scientist is accomplished in relation to the problem he has set before himself. This determines what is relevant and irrelevant. But Schutz goes deeper: the problem is chosen, the relevances are established, in light of the scientist's professional interests. The same process takes place in the Lebenswelt on the basis of a man's "practical interest."[423] Although this is not a complete answer by far, it is the beginning to answering "Why are there different definitions?"

The shift in interest with its attendant change in the relevant data Schutz treats as "the problem of relevance." The Phenomenology bristles with related material, but it is only in the last two pages that he singles it out in a "glance at future problems."[424] There, as at other places,[425] he stresses the fundamental importance that a theory of relevance has for any theory of the social sciences. However, nowhere in his hitherto published writings[426] does he devote an entire essay to the problem. What follows is our own tentative ordering of widely scattered material.

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[422] I, pp. 249-250. Emphasis in original

[423] Cf. II, p. 83.

[424] P, pp. 249-250.

[425] III, p. 131.

[426] R. M. Zaner has recently edited Schutz's lengthy essay "Reflections on the Problem of Relevance" and it will be published in the near future. We did not receive it in typed form early enough to give it the attention it deserves here.

There are different definitions and different realities because interests change, dictating new attention and purposes. Interest determines what is relevant or, better, systems of interests determine what is relevant. In Natanson's words, "I decide upon a course of action in one direction rather than another in the light of what I deem to be relevant to my deepest convictions or interests."[427] With the interjection of the interest dimension Schutz begins to break out of an overly cognitive conception of reality-formation. If he flirts with an over-rationalized conception of man as we have intimated, he cracks the door here for the entrance of correction. Yes, interest directs our attention to "those experiences ['objects'] which for one reason or another seem to us to be relevant to the sum total of our situation as experienced by us in any given present,"[428] but "it does not necessarily involve conscious choice between alternatives which presupposes reflection, volition, and preference."[429] In other words, the "seem to us" in the first statement by Schutz does not necessarily mean "seem to us rationally," although "for one reason" it may. Schutz goes on to explain:

> When I walk through a garden discussing a problem with a friend and I turn left or right, I do not choose to do so. I have no alternative in mind. It is a question for psychology to determine the motives for such behavior, but

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[427] I, p. xli.

[428] I, p. 283.

[429] II, p. 78.

> I cannot say that I prefer one direction to another.
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> Undoubtedly here are situations in which each of us sits down and thinks over his problems. In general he will do so at critical points in his life when his chief interest is to master a situation. But even then he will accept his emotions as guides in finding the most suitable solution as well as rational deliberation, and he is right in doing so, because these emotions also have their roots in his practical interest.[430]

There may be, then, different kinds of interest. Even though Schutz does not make explicit reference to Husserl in this connection, he might well have been thinking of Husserl's distinction between what we will call receptive interest and active, participatory, or thematizing interest. In the former instance, an object is pregiven to us and "wakens in us the more or less intense tendency to follow the stimulus emanating from and imposed upon us by the object, and to advert to it."[431] Passive interest attends to the brilliant orange flower in our path or at a less directed level, the warm breeze on an (infrequent) Berkeley evening. In the latter case, interest is purposely directed toward a constellation of objects that I actively render thematic. The crash of a car accident may break into the solving of a philosophical problem, but I then return with active interest to the chosen theme at hand.

Various kinds of interest aid in selecting those factors which are relevant to a problem, the system of relevances. We suggest, on the basis of Schutz's comments, that there are two basic kinds of interest with appropriate sub-groups:

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[430] II, p. 78.

[431] III, p. 98; cf. also III, p. 101.

- (1) receptive interest (pre-phenomenal)
    - (a) receptive cognitive-interest
    - (b) receptive felt-interest
- (2) active interest (phenomenal)
    - (a) active cognitive-interest
    - (b) active felt-interest
    - (c) active willed-interest
    - (d) active valued-interest (preference)[432]

These terms deserve some illustration. To be interested in something, according to Schutz, is to give attention to it. It is not, however, the _process_ of _attending_ itself, although this is of course related, but the _attitude_ which prompts and sustains this attention. We can attend to something because we are interested in it. In the case of _receptive_ interest in general, this interest in something is evoked by that object; in the case of _active_ interest in general, it is produced by the person concerned with an object. The sentences "I am being interested in this" and "I am taking an interest in that" reflect the difference. From the person's point of view, the first is involuntary, the second voluntary. Receptive interest is the lowest form of ego-activity and fringes, in terms of activity, backward into non-activity (including _unconscious_ elements) and forward into active interest. Because it is the "lowest form," the cognitive and emotional elements in this interest are likewise minimally represented and structured. The kinds of receptive interest mentioned in our summary above indicate the _overtones_ that an evoked interest carries but also point to the _preconditions_ necessary for an interest to be evoked.[433] Receptive cognitive-interest is an interest evoked by an object which carries with it thoughts and words. For instance, my eye passes indiscriminately over the objects on my desk and is "captured" by the handle and outer surface of a green cup. Although I do not say the words or express these ideas a chain is evoked which moves through "curve," "handle," "cup," and "coffee remaining inside the cup." The object awakens my interest by its being there.[434] At this stage I do not wish to pick it up and drink the coffee or evaluate this cup as better than another of a smaller size. In addition to the cognitive overtones of this particular receptive interest, its existence presupposes certain conditions. The primary one is that I am a thinking, concept-holding being. To move to our second category, receptive felt-interest is an interest evoked by an object which contains feeling overtones. To illustrate, a mini-skirted woman wiggles provocatively down the street in front of me. Although there may be attendant thoughts - this simply underscores the interweaving of the interests we are describing - certain emotional-sensual feelings are evoked involuntarily. Feeling interest is aroused although there may be no wish to actively pursue these feelings or to evaluate them. The obvious precondition is that I be an emotional being. At the cognitive level of receptive interest there is no reflection, and at the feeling level no voluntary creation of or dwelling upon feeling. The volitional and evaluationary overtones to interest, which emerge at the active level, are vaguely apparent at the receptive level as the general "will to be alive" or the "will to be at a certain place doing certain things" and as "having values" respectively. Receptive interest of both the cognitive and emotional variety may often touch off interest based upon volition or preference, but, in our scheme at least, these are different kinds of interest called "active."

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[432] We realize that our conception of "_felt_-interest" moves beyond Schutz. Regardless of the door he leaves _open to_ this dimension, he does not exploit it at any great length in his published works. _His_ interest is primarily at the cognitive level in which "cognitive" _is_ defined broadly as "thought" and in which "rationality" is a (formalized) kind of thought. Cf. "The Problem of Rationality in the Social World," II, pp. 64-88, esp. 74-80

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[433] It almost goes without saying that the general preconditions for any interest are consciousness, previous experience, learned conceptual frameworks, and memory.

[434] Why? This is one of the most fascinating and to my knowledge "unsolved" questions that can be asked. Why should the presence of the cup in this case "pull" from me a focus upon it in contrast to the innumerable focuses possible? The easy answer is that consciousness is "made" for focusing. Likewise, to "answer" the question in terms of how we experience the object, i.e. as "cup," "handle," and "curve," or in terms of the socialization of concepts is to beg the question. For a parallel treatment cf. Husserl, Ideas, "The Physical Thing and the 'Unknown' Cause of Appearances," pp. 143-149.

This "active interest" may be of four types depending upon the related factors. We may be cognitively interested, emotionally interested, volitionally interested, and preferentially or valuationally interested. Since active interest in general is distinct from receptive interest because of its voluntary nature, there is an element of volition in all the other distinguished interests. But there is an intermingling at all levels. Active, felt-interest includes cognitive and valuational elements; active, cognitive-interest includes emotional and preferential factors, and so forth. From the person's standpoint, active interest is creative whereas receptive interest is not. Like receptive interest, active interest involves conscious elements which however dovetail into the unconscious.

To return to what Schutz suggests more explicitly, interest of whatever kind has varying degrees of "intensity" and "scope,"[435] which determine the boundaries and breadth of relevant (half-relevant and irrelevant) factors. Thus, interest may be keenly felt for a short period of time, mildly entertained for a long period of time, focused upon one element, or concerned with a wide range. Although this is operationally impossible for several reasons,[436] if the button of one interest with its intensity and scope were pushed on a computer, correlated relevances would light up on the board. But this illustration should not be "pressed."

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[435] Cf. II, p. 93.

Interests show another characteristic. Not only are they receptive and active, not only do they intermingle cognitive, emotional, volitional, and evaluational elements, they also exist as configurations or systems, not as isolates, and evidence both heterogeneity and change. In the second volume of the Collected Papers Schutz indicates this.

> There is, however, no such thing as an isolated interest at hand. The single interest at hand is just an element within a hierarchical system, or even a plurality of systems, of interests which in everyday life we call our plans - plans for work and thought, for the hour and for our life. To be sure, this system of interests is neither constant nor homogeneous. It is not constant because in changing from any Now to the succeeding Now the single interests obtain a different weight, a different predominance within the system. It is not homogeneous because even in the simultaneity of any Now we may have most disparate interests. The various social roles we assume simultaneously offer a good illustration. The interests I have in the same situation as a father, a citizen, a member of my church or of my profession, may not only be different but even incompatible with one another. I have, then, to decide which of these disparate interests I must choose in order to define the situation from which to start further inquiry. This choice will state the problem or set the goal in respect to which the world we are living in and our knowledge of it are distributed in zones of various relevance.[437]

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[436] Interests often change rapidly, are many times inarticulate, are often linked "logically" with nonetheless relevant facts, and emerge in systems, not as isolates.

[437] II, p. 125.

However, Schutz does propose that certain of these interest systems can be named. The supreme system is the "life-plan," a system of interests variously sensitive to external pressures, variously articulate or deliberately thought through, and variously flexible over time. This life-plan determines the "particular plans" which in turn influence the current plan.[438] The "interest at hand"[439] with its correlated purpose and system of relevance influences present activity. Since the systems of interest are interactive, the movement, it seems to us, is not simply in one direction from the overarching life-plan. The interest at hand may influence the particular plan and the particular plan the life-plan. Furthermore, as we will see, the origin of life-plans - indeed, all interests - is related to certain formative factors such as the awareness of impending death, what Schutz calls "the fundamental anxiety," and the inherited value system of one's society. He treats this intriguing problem of origins only in a footnote: "We venture to suggest that the various solutions offered for the explanation of the origin of the interests might be grouped into two types: one which is concerned with the because motives, the other with the in-order-to motives constituting the so called interests."[440] To order the solutions is not to present his own, however. This is unfortunate. We would suggest that a solution must combine a sensitivity to the pressure of the deterministic past (the because motives) and of the open future

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[438] Cf. III, pp. 122-123.

[439] Cf. II, p. 124.

[440] I, p. 77, ftn. 2.

(the in-order-to motives). It seems also that values, both conscious and unconscious,[441] are the clue both to the ranking of interests and to ethics. This does not, obviously, answer the important questions, "Why do we value at all?" and "What is the origin of value?" Our own answer follows this line of thought: we value because human existence forces us to value - decisions cannot be dodged - provides us the tools with which to value (memory, emotion, and comparison), and both pressures and allows various kinds and degrees of loyalty.

Before mentioning those systems of relevance that various interest systems produce, two additional comments suggested by Maurice Natanson are in order. First of all, the "taproot" of the problem of relevance, he ventures, is the "motility of consciousness."[442] "In all motivation, choice, projection, phantasying, and decision there is the force which drives the action and expresses the vitality of the actor. I suggest that the identification and comprehension of that nisus of consciousness would be the solution to the source of relevance."[443] This seems, to us, to be an important clue to the problem, although the mere presence of motile force does not account for the moment of choice, the valuing process, attention to a particular object, or the social dimension to relevance. Secondly, Natanson also believes that the problem of relevance is grounded in the phenomenology of inner-time consciousness[444] or, more specifically, in the necessity for and the fear of death. Quoting from Schutz,[445] he argues that death not only negates temporality, but fear of death menaces that intentionality which consciousness in time sustains. The idea is provocative, but it appears to us that inner-time consciousness, although highly significant for consciousness itself, is not the same thing at all as the fear of death. Inner-time consciousness may make death meaningful, but this is a far cry from making it fearful. Although this may be the minorities' experience, some people even within our Christian culture anticipate death with anything but fear. To say it in a slightly different way, inner-time consciousness offers the key to meaning-construction of various kinds, but it is stratified or ordered meaning which, we think, provides the better way into a solution to the problem of relevance. Both Natanson's suggestions, however, correctly underscore the importance of consciousness' motile force for the interpretation of relevance.

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[441] To treat values in this way makes them more than rationally or "logically" cognitive, opens them to the pressures of the unconscious, and sees them as variously articulate. It also introduces the complicating possibility of either consciously or unconsciously willing what I either consciously or unconsciously value or disvalue.

[442] Maurice Natanson, "Alfred Schutz on Social Reality," Social Research, XXXV (Summer, 1968), p. 239.

[443] Ibid., pp. 239-240.

[444] Ibid., p. 240.

Systems of interest create systems of relevance; what I am interested in at a specific time determines what is relevant. At various places Schutz distinguishes specific systems. Following his own suggestion that in-order-to and because motives are central to the problem of relevance, he separates intrinsic and imposed systems of relevance. In moving toward a definition Schutz writes, "The intrinsic relevances are the outcome of our chosen interests, established by our spontaneous decision to solve a problem by our thinking, to attain a goal by our action, to bring forth a projected state of affairs."[446]

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[445] Cf. I, p. 228.

[446] II, p. 126.

They are the product of interests tied into in-order-to motives with their projects.[447] To be sure, there is a freedom of choice involved, but the choice of a current interest once made "determines the system of relevances intrinsic to the chosen interest."[448] The significant fact is that these relevances remain, to a certain degree at least, within our control and as we have spontaneously chosen we can spontaneously re-choose. Systems of imposed relevances, in contrast, do not exhibit this personal spontaneity. To varying degrees our interests and hence the relevant data that they select are imposed upon us by "events beyond our control which occur without our interference."[449] They include, in Schutz's mind, events in an individual's personal life "such as disease, bereavement, acts of God, or the metaphysical problems of fate, destiny, providence, or the feeling of being 'thrown into the world' which Heidegger considers a fundamental condition of human existence."[450] There is also a social dimension to these imposed relevances, which include elements of social and value structure. Projects based upon such imposed interests and relevances stem from because motives. To relate the two systems of relevance in terms of their respective motives, the ghetto child is interested in stealing (and gathers the necessary things relevant to his interest) in-order-to get money but because he is poor.

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[447] Schutz generally speaks of interests in relation to a problem. This makes them relatively conscious and articulate or articulatable. Certainly, there are non-project interests and unconscious interests. For instance, to say that I am interested in my mother or father does not necessarily imply a project. The "Freudian slip" points to socalled unconscious interests. (Cf. III, p. 123.) Schutz would not deny this, but his concern for social action influences the emphases relevant to him.

[448] II, p. 126.

[449] II, p. 127.

[450] II, p. 127.

As is obvious from the fact that in daily life I appropriate imposed relevances such as social values with varying degrees of personal creativity and fashion in-order-to projects with varying degrees of reliance upon what is pregiven, imposed and intrinsic systems of relevances are interactive, although analytically discrete.[451] The shaded domain between is further illumined when it is suggested that imposed relevances can be "transformed" into intrinsic relevances,[452] that the reverse seems possible, and that the actor's or observer's point of view can alter whether or not a system is thought intrinsic or imposed.

At another point Schutz proposes, as he concentrates in characteristic fashion upon project-establishment,[453] that these intrinsic and imposed relevances may be grouped under the title "motivational relevancy."[454] In the constituting of a project, interests determine the elements from a person's stock of knowledge - with its various modifications such as "knowledge about," "knowledge of acquaintance," belief, or ignorance - that are relevant to it. "If the elements of our stock of knowledge, which are at our disposal in the mentioned gradations, suffice for the definition of the situation, as far as motivational relevancy is concerned, then the definition takes place as a matter of course in the form of the unquestionably given. Such will be the case in all affairs of routine."[455] However, it may happen that those elements selected on the basis of motivational relevance do not satisfy our interest in solving the problem or provide enough ingredients for the solution. Then it becomes relevant to move beyond these factors that motivational relevancy draws from the field and investigate further. We need to "know more about" the relevant issues.

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[451] II, p. 126.

[452] Cf. II, p. 127.

[453] Interests and their correlated relevances when they are related to problems (projects) are treated under what Schutz calls the category of "problem-relevance." Cf. II, p. 235, ftn. 3. There are other forms as well. We suggest, in light of Schutz's treatment, "dream-relevance" and "phantasy-relevance" in which there is not necessarily a project but items made relevant by the activity itself - in the context of the project this "activity" would be related to a "purpose at hand."

[454] III, p. 123.

This second kind of relevance, which is based upon the insufficiencies of motivational relevance, Schutz calls "thematic relevancy."[456] He does this because "the relevant element now becomes a theme for our knowing consciousness, a process which in traditional psychology has usually been treated under the heading of 'attention'."[457] Motivational relevancy, which remains as an "outer horizon" or as the encompassing boundary while the theme is pursued, becomes again the central system of relevance when our knowledge of the thematized topic becomes sufficient for accomplishing the original project. The process of thematization itself involves bringing the unknown or the unknown or atypical relative to our present questions into meaningful relation with our stock of knowledge. This is done either by seeing it in terms of our to-this-point-non-applicable typifications or by adjusting our preconceived types so as to enfold the now problematic elements. The process culminates with what Husserl calls "a synthesis of recognition"[458] in which, to use the words of our third chapter, the thematized element "fits" into previously held (but possibly now re-understood or re-conceived) meaning-contexts.

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[455] III, pp. 123-124

[456] III, p. 124.

[457] III, p. 124.

The process of thematization pressures the emergence of another type of relevance: "interpretational relevancy."[459] In trying to come to the synthesis of recognition the thematically relevant problem or topic is compared and contrasted with the stock of previous experiences (the stock of "knowledge"[460]) at hand. Yet, not all elements in this "recipe" (Schutz) book are equally germane or "relevant." In fact, the bulk of this knowledge may have no bearing upon the theme. Selection from or interpretation of the stock is necessary. Interpretational relevancy is that (process) which shapes what I draw from my previous stockpile of experience.

Over time motivational, thematic, and interpretational relevancies based upon original interests interweave to create and expand the stock of knowledge. What is at one time thematic or problematic finds a place through interpretational relevance in this relatively stable but sedimented, expanding, and re-integrated stockpile.[461] Those things which are problematic or unfamiliar are worked back into it until they become, at the other end of the spectrum, unproblematic, familiar, and "acquired" knowledge. They remain unquestioned until thematization and interpretation force them, in relation to a new set of problems, into the realm of the questioned again.

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[458] Cf. III, pp. 123-126.

[459] III, p. 127.

[460] Schutz uses the word "knowledge" rather broadly since the stock includes elements that are believed as well as those which are "known." But, to defend him, what is "known" is definitional; the mystic claims he "knows" but the scientist whose standards for "knowledge" differ from his, may assert that he does not. It may be better to say that there are varieties of knowledge with their particular practical, theoretical, and emotional consequences.

What is relevant to a particular situation determines the categories (from and within the stock of knowledge) that are used and developed. In Schutz's terms, relevance determines typification. A type may be defined, in fact, as a standardized concept whose internal elements are all related or relevant to a particular criterion or criteria. As Schutz puts it,

> All typification consists in the equalization of traits relevant to the particular purpose at hand for the sake of which the type has been formed, and in disregarding those individual differences of the typified objects that are irrelevant to such purpose. There is no such thing as a type pure and simple. All types are relational terms carrying, to borrow from mathematics, a subscript referring to the purpose for the sake of which the type has been formed. And this purpose is nothing but the theoretical or practical problem which, as a consequence of our situationally determined interest, has emerged as questionable from the unquestioned background of the world just taken for granted.[462]

As types become increasingly familiar and useful they generally become increasingly unquestioned. They remain "valid until counter-evidence appears"[463] and my use of them as such presupposes both that similar circumstances in my future may be handled typically and that I believe the world as I know it will remain unchanged until further notice.[464] Types are individually appropriated, ranked, and constructed on the basis of relevance systems,[465] but they are also social in nature.[466] Within a particular society or sub-society typifications take on specific shapes and orders. The investigation of these phenomena provide the major task for the sociology of knowledge. It includes attention not only to the texture of the types but also to the continuum between socially approved typing and socially disapproved typing with the gradations in between and to the distribution of knowledge within a society. Although Schutz did not develop a complete sociology of knowledge, he did suggest a basis both for a definition of such a discipline and for the work of men like Berger and Luckmann.[467] His contribution in this area stems from his provocative correlation of relevance systems, typification, and the stock of variously sedimented knowledge.

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[461] Cf. III, pp. 127-128.

[462] II, p. 234.

[463] II, p. 286.

We have mentioned the systems of relevance that Schutz proposes:

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[464] The notion of "atypicality" is ambiguous. Cf. III, p. 128. It may mean that presently the element does not fit into previous typifications, that it may be fitted if the types are narrowed, or that the element at hand is completely novel and cannot be brought into line with any type. That something cannot be typed at all is highly dubious; the types "existent" and "non-existent," although definitional, would appear to include all elements. Atypicality is best handled as a non-typical element relative to the typifications presently used but which may be typical if a different scheme is employed.

[465] Cf. P, pp. 186-202 for Schutz's type-constitution.

[466] Cf. I, pp. 13-14.

[467] Cf. in Schutz I, pp. 13-14, 39n, and 149; II, pp. 120-134, 238, and 249; III, pp. 121 and 142f (Scheler). Cf. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966), pp. 14-15.

imposed, intrinsic, motivational, thematic, and interpretational. There are also imposed and intrinsic elements in motivational relevance. At a particular moment in relation to a particular problem they are interrelated in a specific manner but interrelated. However, these are not the only systems of relevance possible. All of them have been developed by Schutz with his project in mind, the illumination of the Lebenswelt. Within this context motivation and projects (more narrowly "problems") gain prominence. The defining factor in this social life-world is working or "gearing into the world." The actual gearing in process renders things other than motivational, thematic, and interpretational relevance germane either in contemplation or in action. At this level what is within personal reach is relevant. Schutz stratifies this "world within reach" into three zones: (1) actual, (2) restorable, and (3) obtainable.[468] To round out the model, we add as a fourth zone, the unobtainable, which may be as influential in a negative sense upon action as are the other three in a positive sense. But all of these relevancies are project-relevancies. There are others which Schutz does not feel it his task to explore. What of that constellation of relevance-systems created by the dream or meditation, to mention only two other possibilities? Although there may be motives of sorts involved, meditation is not primarily designed in-order-to do something, to accomplish some specific project anticipated in the future. Intrinsic-imposed, thematic, and interpretational relevancies also emerge in meditation, although with a lighter accent on rationality. But they intermingle with factors like receptive interest so as to form a configuration different from that encountered while actively pursuing a project. An inclusive, systematic treatment of the various systems of relevance must be left for another time. It is, however, adumbrated in Schutz.

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[468] Cf. esp. III, p. 118 but also II, pp. 124-125 and 127.

Each person experiences, with varying degrees of consciousness, his over-all system of relevance based upon his ultimate, presently configurated, and specific interest. But the possibility for and living out of this system is created and actualized within a society of Others.

We will now consider interest and relevance explicitly in relation to this social seed-bed. Because the Other's system of relevances is founded in his unique "biographical situation," a phrase in Schutz that includes organismic, psychological, social, accidental, experiential, and contextual factors which shape the person, it cannot be congruent with mine even though I may come to understand it. But uniqueness is only one side. For various obvious and not so obvious reasons, there _is_ mutual understanding. The existence, stability, and even evolution of society stems from the potential and actual congruence of relevancy-systems, of typifications, and of meaning-structures. Successful communication whether spoken, written, or non-verbal depends upon this convergence.[469] Yet, in the _Lebenswelt_ there is generally neither pure congruence nor complete disparity. The highly textured nature of personal relevance-systems produces sometimes abrasive but often profitable if not pleasurable contact between persons. This social rubbing of shoulders is illustrated by Schutz in his sensitive essay on "The Stranger" and "The Homecomer."[470] The manner in which words and concepts are defined differently on the basis of divergent systems of relevance is also documented in his "Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World."[471] Finally, as we will develop in chapter six, the interlocking, diversity, and conflict among ethical systems is founded upon this interplay among systems of relevance as distributed in a society or societies.

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[469] Cf. I, pp. 321-323.

In conclusion, let us sketch the dimensions to interest and relevance that we have explicitly uncovered or found implied in Schutz. Based upon such foundational elements as the motility and attentionality of consciousness and the sedimented knowledge of past social experience, interest in a particular object is either evoked with cognition and/or emotional overtones (receptive interest) or voluntarily[472] focused upon an object. This latter, active interest is shaded with cognitive, emotional, volitional, and evaluational elements in various combinations and degrees. All interest exists with varying intensity and scope. A particular interest determines what is relevant; to the degree that the interest is unclarified the system of relevance is also. As current interests change, so do those things that are thought relevant. Present activity of whatever kind reflects the interests at work and their correlated systems of relevance. Each world or reality has its own interest-relevance system with its combination of intrinsic and imposed relevances. In the world of working this system can be called the system of project-relevance. Schutz has investigated this sphere and proposed a constellation of interrelated relevance subsystems: (1) motivational, (2) thematic, (3) interpretational, and (4) reach or manipulatory relevance. At a particular moment a system of interest calls into play a system of relevances which rules in and rules out elements from the person's stock of knowledge, from the present attended to situation, and from the anticipation of the future. Reality is thus fashioned on the basis of these interwoven factors; their shifting over time is the basis for the multiple character of reality.

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[470] I, pp. 91-119

[471] II, pp. 226-273.

[472] The spectrum between voluntary and involuntary offers an interesting topic for further work in relation to Schutz.

The Problem of Relevance: "the fundamental anxiety" and "the paramount reality"

Before drawing tentative implications for the ethical sphere, two remaining issues need to be discussed. The first, alluded to earlier, includes what Schutz defines as "the fundamental anxiety." It is the fear of death and provides the clue, for Schutz, to the origin of all other anticipations and to the activities that spring from them in the natural attitude. He writes in the only section in his published works on the subject more than two sentences long:

> The whole system of relevances which governs us within the natural attitude is founded upon the basic experience of each of us: I know that I shall die and I fear to die. This basic experience we suggest calling the fundamental anxiety. It is the primordial anticipation from which all the others originate. From the fundamental anxiety spring the many interrelated systems of hopes and fears, of wants and satisfactions, of chances and risks which incite man within the natural attitude to attempt the mastery of the world, to overcome obstacles, to draft projects, and to realize them.[473]

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[473] I, p. 228. Emphasis in original.

The lack of attention given in his published writings to the existential thought of men such as Husserl's pupil Heidegger[474] in part justifies Natanson's claim that Schutz's "fundamental anxiety" is not "existentialist" in the narrow sense and that, in fact, Schutz was dissatisfied with what he thought was an overly metaphorical bent in existentialist philosophy. However, what he _does_ mean by his highly cryptic comments just quoted remains a mystery. Because the necessary and primordial connection between death and the "whole system of relevance" is not immediately obvious, because other factors such as fear of _life_ or _zest_ for life appear equally cogent as the driving force behind relevance systems, because these limited remarks appear a bit simplistic, and because the issue is a crucial one, Schutz's neglect surprises us. His suggestion is not made clearer or more tempting when we remember his qualification, that the fundamental anxiety governs systems of relevance _in the natural attitude_. As Schutz has defined the _Lebenswelt_ it appears rather impervious to the anxiety about death. One of its distinguishing features is its taken-for-granted-until-further-notice character. The attention of the common-sense world brackets doubt in its existence which, we think, includes doubt in its end. At least there is sufficient disregard for it so that anxiety is anything but "_fundamental_" to the on-going life world. Death, however, suggests that life in the common-sense world can _not_ be taken for granted, that the pragmatic here and now _is_ problematic. Thus it seems probable that the fundamental anxiety stems from another realm of reality in which the continued existence of the Lebenswelt is radically questioned. Is it possible that, in contrast to Schutz, the most significant or definitive elements in human existence emerge in this radical posture? In other words, the Lebenswelt may be paradigmatic or paramount for the answering of certain questions but not for the solving of all, even the "most important" of them. This leads us to ask what Schutz means by asserting that the life-world is "the paramount reality" and brings us to the second remaining issue.

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[474] The one exception is his essay "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," I, pp. 180-203.

In relation to Schutz's systematization of the Lebenswelt, the world in which we live straightforwardly in our activity, the paramount reality is the "world of working." He says it best.

> The world of working as a whole stands out as paramount over against the many other sub-universes of reality. It is the world of physical things, including my body; it is the realm of my locomotions and bodily operations; it offers resistances which require effort to overcome; it places tasks before me, permits me to carry through my plans, and enables me to succeed or to fail in my attempt to attain my purposes. By my working acts I gear into the outer world, I change it; and these changes, although provoked by my working, can be experienced and tested both by myself and others, as occurrences within this world independently of my working acts in which they originated. I share this world and its objects with Others; with Others, I have ends and means in common; I work with them in manifold social acts and relationships, checking the Others and checked by them. And the world of working is the reality within which communication and the interplay of mutual motivation becomes effective. It can, therefore, be experienced under both schemes of reference, the causality of motives as well as the teleology of purposes.[475]

Why is this world "paramount" or, in our terms which give a decided shading to the meaning, unique? Schutz offers four reasons: (1) it is the sphere of physical things; (2) it is the realm of personal mobility and bodily movements met with resistance; (3) in it purposive projects are geared into the external world; and (4) it is a shared, intersubjective, and sociocultural sphere which allows communication and the we-relation. Of there distinguishing dimensions Schutz re-emphasizes the following at other places: communication,[476] the resistance of the outer world to us, the gearing in process, and bodily participation.[477] These are the things that set the world of working off as paramount. This paramount reality is in James' terms the "sub-universe of senses," a phrase which Schutz accepts but chastens with his understanding of its relation to meaning.[478] Thus far it can be said that the sphere of working is paramount because it evidences these elements in a manner and to a degree not possible in other related realms.

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[475] I, pp. 226-227

Does Schutz suggest that it is paramount in the sense that it is the absolute reality in relation to which others are inferior or less real? This is the interpretation that Robert Friedrichs gives in his essay on Schutz.[479] Here he claims that Schutz renders sociology a "refuge" in which "work" is denied, existential anxiety is outlawed, and where activity is less "real" than in the Lebenswelt. In our opinion this is a damaging misrepresentation of Schutz's stance in this regard and absolutizes or literalizes his statements about the paramount nature of the working world, wrenches this single notion from the socket of multiple realities, and overlooks explicit statements by Schutz which lead in a different direction. Unless Schutz has not learned one of the lessons he himself teaches so well, the working world is paramount in that, relative to its ingredients mentioned above, it is unique. This, however, does not make it absolute. Schutz's attitude toward multiple realities indicates his realization that any interpretative scheme, his own included, makes an incision at a particular point in a much larger field. Schutz's starting point, which reflects his own interests and systems of relevance, is the Lebenswelt. In relation to it and to his system working is paramount, the nexus in terms of which other spheres are derivatives or modifications. To claim anything else is to destroy or, better, contradict the notion of multiple realities that we have taken pains to thoroughly document in Schutz throughout the previous five chapters. Certainly, Schutz may have contradicted himself and may have become so convinced that his starting point was the "correct" one that an absolute continuum may have been implied. The possibility of this is present, but Schutz's own comments we think support our contention that "paramount" is a word used relative to his own over-all system and not in an attempt to suggest a socalled absolute reality. In this light, the world of working, the sphere of the we-relation, is the arena in which the basic components of his interpretive scheme are seen the most vividly. Schutz indicates the veracity of this viewpoint when he writes that the reality of our daily dife

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[476] Cf. I, pp. 294, 322, and 342.

[477] Cf. I, p. 342 and II, p. 150.

[478] Cf. I, p. 341.

[479] Cf. Robert W. Friedrichs, "Phenomenology as a 'General Theory' of Social Action," The Journal of Value Inquiry, II (Spring, 1968), pp. 3-5.

> is the only sub-universe into which we can gear with our actions, which we can transform and change by them and within which we can establish communication with our fellowmen. This fundamental characteristic of the reality of our daily life - or is it merely an axiom of our bestowing the accent of reality upon it? - is precisely the reason why

> this sub-universe is experienced by us as the paramount reality of circumstances and environment with which we have to come to terms.[480]

The interjection is crucial for it betrays the manner in which Schutz relativizes the very core of his own system. Daily life is paramount because our interest is in it - and in terms of our experience of life we may be often interested in it - and gives it the accent of reality. But this is not Schutz's last word. He more explicitly suggests the same thing when he affirms that daily life has no "higher dignity" than theoretical thought[481] and when he warns in a crucial footnote which in our opinion settles the argument:

> A word of caution seems to be needed here. The concept of finite provinces of meaning does not involve any static connotation as though we had to select one of these provinces as our home to live in, to start from or to return to. That is by no means the case. Within a single day, even within a single hour our consciousness may run through most different tensions and adopt most different attentional attitudes to life.[482]

This affirmation of the multiplicity of finite provinces - daily life being only one - justifies the relativization of the word "paramount."

Nonetheless, we do not mean to be defensive on Schutz's behalf nor do we desire to minimize the ramifications of the interpretational nature of his particular starting point. As Schutz himself has said, "The angle of approach determines everything."[483] Regardless of how much we agree with him that an investigation of lived-life opens avenues for sociological investigation and for understanding that other approaches prematurely close, the fact remains that this starting place influences his whole system. For instance, beginning as he does with the lived world, he inherits the predications of common-sense, on-going intersubjective relationships, the socialized adult, and the taken-for-granted stance of the "man on the street." This immediately establishes the nature and priority of his problems. He must account for intersubjectivity and, through reflection, peel back the predicative overlays in order to reach the prephenomenal stream of consciousness. He must account both for the nonproblematic or taken-for-granted attitude of the life world and for the emergence of a critical stance toward it. If he had begun with the dream world, the world of the baby, the reality of the mentally ill, or innumerable other worlds, he would have found other constellations of meaning fundamental and a different standard or "paramount" reality in terms of which to view other realms and to develop his system. This may have led him to underscore, in a manner reminiscent of certain Eastern thought, the possible, total identification of one person with another through a particular kind of "union" or the nonpragmatic contemplation of the world of trees and rocks. It may have led him to emphasize those existential themes such as anxiety, dread, or fate which emerge outside or by making problematic the taken-for-granted world of common-sense. Indeed, if he had begun elsewhere, "common-sense" may have been the common-sense of the scientist who certainly _lives_ his _life_ out of his understanding of the world but in terms of which the "common-sense" of "the man on the street" may not be considered common-sense at all but unreflective, naive _non_-sense. The point, however, is that Schutz did _not_ begin elsewhere and because of that fashioned his system in the manner in which he did. In taking his system as _our_ starting place, we inherit its inclusions and exclusions.

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[480] II, p. 150. Emphasis ours.

[481] Cf. I, p. 247, ftn. 32.

[482] I, p. 233, ftn. 19. Emphasis ours.

[483] P, p. 212.

Toward an Understanding of the Ethical Province

When "multiple realities" is taken seriously, the ethical province becomes a finite realm of *meaning*, not a midwife for the metaphysical. It has its own cognitive style and particular characteristics. But it also reflects divergence. Just as there are different sociological realities within what might be called the social-scientific province so there are multiple ethical systems of meaning. Since there is a certain homogeneity within a province, dialogue among ethical meaning systems or, better, among persons holding different ethical interpretations is possible. But, since the temptation to reduction must also, on the basis of Schutz's suggestions, be rejected, incommensurate systems will need to be adjudicated in some manner. More will be said about this matter as we move into the final chapter.

Chapter Six

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ETHICAL PROVINCE OF MEANING

Introduction

We now come to the final chapter in the dissertation. After carefully analyzing Schutz's multiple realities, our intention here is to draw out implications for the ethical province of meaning. By using the words "ethical province of meaning" it is obvious that we are remaining within the Schutzian tradition but nudging it into areas that Schutz himself did not enter. However, this attempt is consciously designed to be suggestive rather than definitive; these are implications as the title to this chapter indicates, not conclusions. Nonetheless, we do not want this kind of qualification to draw blood from the argument. It is our opinion that Schutz offers some rather impressive tools for carving out the ethical sphere. The two most evident are his phenomenological stance and his pluralistic conception of reality. The first suggests a level of analysis and the second an interpretive schemata that sets off a Schutzian treatment of the ethical domain from others. Let us begin by investigating the focus that a phenomenological approach provides and then move to a description of an ethical realm which relies upon a pluralistic understanding of meaning construction.[484]

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[484] Much of what follows, especially in this next section, bears the mark of Maurice Mandelbaum's The Phenomenology of Moral Experience (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955), a book now out of print but one which deserves another edition. We share Mandelbaum's appreciation for the phenomenological starting point but, because of the influence of Schutz, diverge from his position on other issues, especially over his, we believe, artificial distinction between "direct" and "removed" judgments.

A Phenomenological Approach to the Ethical Sphere

It is Schutz's phenomenological approach to social reality that distinguishes him from many other sociologists. His concept of intersubjectivity, his stratification of the social world, his view of human consciousness, and the other portions of his theory - all of these reflect his concentration upon and concern for what human beings directly experience. Thus, for instance, social stratification is seen not at the macro-social level, at the level of social class, but in terms of my body as the experienced 0 or center around which are positioned social relationships with varying degrees of anonymity and distance. A pictoral representation of the Schutzian scheme would show interconnected concentric circles rather than, as in the case of other stratification models, vertically tiered strata. The advantage of this conceptualization is obvious: it takes seriously the manner in which I experience my world and fears superimposing upon that an interpretative scheme developed in a different arena. The disadvantage is also evident: the impression - and we maintain that it is only an impression, a faulty one at that - is conveyed that Schutz is unjustifiably individualistic or atomistic, that his conception is not really _social_. But Schutz is not just interested in "what human beings directly experience." He chooses as his focal point what is experienced in the _Lebenswelt_, a world which is social through and through. In other words, his phenomenology deals with social common-sense experience and is wary of imposing categories from other realms upon the analysis.[485]

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[485] Even though "_Lebenswelt_" has come to mean, because of the Husserl-Schutz treatment of it, the common-sense-world, the literal translation is "the world of living" or "lived world." This has caused

By taking Schutz's lead, a phenomenological investigation of the ethical province begins with human, moral experience. It faces squarely what seems to be the fact: men at all times and places and in all societies make moral judgments. A phenomenology of the moral sphere analyzes those situations in which these normative judgments are made, the processes of evaluation and action that are in evidence, and the data open to moral consciousness.

Even at this stage the present approach diverges noticeably from others and, in relation to what is generally done in ethics, is rather anomalous. First of all, even though it does not rule out the efforts of rationalistic moral philosophy, psychology, and sociology, it does question their function as legitimate first-settlers of the ethical domain. The reason for this is basically two fold. Phenomenology, which is concerned about understanding moral experience as it lives an breathes, fears that these other approaches impute to the moral provin structures which artificially order the terrain, or, in Schutz's term reduce the reality of moral experience to the reality of another spher For this reason the phenomenological method is, to use Mandelbaum's phraseology, "eductive rather than deductive."[486] It seeks to caress out rather than to deduce from a set of presupposed categories. Thus, it does not begin with a metaphysical system, nor with the linguistic

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those who do not appreciate the technical use of this concept to chid Schutz for supposedly placing, for instance, theoretical-scientific reflection outside lived experience. Certainly, Schutz would both ag that theoretical-scientific reflection is lived and that it is not in- ferior to the reflection of the *Lebenswelt*. But he also argues that is significantly different from common-sense reflection.

[486] Maurice Mandelbaum, *The Phenomenology of Moral Experience* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955), p. 31.

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[486] Maurice Mandelbaum, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955), p. 31.

tools of analytical philosophy; it does not attempt to explain moral experience in terms of imposed psychological or sociological systems. But, at the same time, the phenomenological approach - and certainly one chastened by Schutz's conception of reality - does not disallow the investigations from these other perspectives if it is recognized that they - indeed as does phenomenology - move from within a particular frame of reference with all the ramifications that this has for the manner in which moral experience is perceived.

Secondly, the phenomenological treatment of the moral realm, at least as we conceive of it here, is generic rather than contentual. Using the generic elements of cognitive style as a touchstone and certain other Schutzian themes as guides, we are more interested in describing the general features of the province of ethical meaning, its processes and resources, than we are in treating the specific content of ethical judgments. We take this stance for two reasons. First, because of the wide divergence in content it seems highly unlikely that at that level any over-all pattern will emerge.[487] Second, and more importantly, specific content is the result - in Schutz's terminology the completed, expressive act - of an intentional, subjective process which antecedes it, and we are just as much concerned with this process of content-construction as we are interested in the finished product.

At this juncture, however, our phenomenological analysis will not create anything close to an ethical theory as such, although it will allow us to chart the geography of the ethical territory more accurately. Nonetheless any such ethical theory would rely exclusively upon those processes that are already implicit in man's moral judgments. Given the present state of ethical theory and the supposed, unbridgeable gap between the "is" and the "ought," the novelty in such a theory would rest in its claim that, even though the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive statements is sound, there is a prescriptive dimension to description even though the descriptive perspective hides it. To put it differently, the "is" is frozen "ought;" it is the shift in attentional focus which covers this over. Again, it is the multiple realities point which suggests that what we think is there is to a large degree what we think ought to be there or, in terms of meaning construction, the meaning that I create from the innumerable possibilities present is the meaning that I think, for various reasons and due to various circumstances, should exist.[488] But this takes us too far afield. Let us return to a phenomenological treatment of moral experience within a Schutzian frame.

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[487] In other words, we believe that the absolutist quest for an ultimate contentual standard is illusory. The inherently multiple character of meaning denies the possibility of a single moral-meaning system.

The Resources for Moral Experience

As was the case in Schutz's analysis, the starting point here is the experiencing person who is an adult within a social world. Regardless of the position this person occupys in other analytical systems and regardless of the disadvantages that this phenomenological perspective carries with it, the direct moral experience of the embodied person is the center in relation to which other factors are considered. The variously configurated moral-meaning systems within a society and the person's degree of access to them, the data of moral consciousness both given and appropriated, and the interaction with others which is at the core of all human, moral experience - all of these factors are viewed in terms of the person's experience of them.[489]

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[488] These statements are made at the general level of meaning, but they apply to judgments of moral goodness, which is a kind of meaning, also.

Based upon Schutz's descriptive work, there are certain resources which the person brings to moral experience. There is, first of all, his biographical situation, that constellation of past personal experiences with their cognitive, emotional, organic, and social overlays, which he has uniquely lived through. This does not deny their similarity to experiences others have had. But there are no two biographies alike, and each contributes its own unique part to present moral experience. It influences the person's self-image, concept of reality, and definition of the situation - three highly significant factors in the creation of an ethical meaning system.

Directly related to the biographical situation is the second resource: the social stock of knowledge.[490] Each person is born into

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[489] From a phenomenological perspective the Mertonian distinction between manifest and latent function is called into question, not because it is improper given Merton's frame of reference but because, phenomenologically, latency goes beyond the awareness of the experiencing person and, it is feared, may represent distortive imputation from another realm of reality, i.e. the social scientist's.

[490] Schutz calls this "the stock of knowledge," but the word "knowledge" implies a kind of scientific or cultural (public) certainty which we do not think appropriate, and the word "stock" makes the schemata appear too rigid, circumscribed, and available for precise inventory.

a society which passes from generation to generation its "recipe book" of knowledge as Schutz so often called it. It differs from most books in that it is not printed, bound, or displayed in a particular building or at a particular time. In fact, unlike a regular book, there is an intermixture of linguistic and conceptual styles, moving from the highly scientific to the vernacular. It also contains that non-verbal knowledge which is passed among persons and that unwritten knowledge which is only verbally expressed. In marked contrast to other books, furthermore, its content is scattered unevenly throughout society, the approved knowledge being often duplicated and widely appropriated and the disapproved knowledge suppressed and hidden. The books' contents also include priviledged material, open only to certain segments of society showing the proper credentials. Finally, the stock of knowledge has both stable and flexible portions, segments which remain unchanged over long periods of time and those which show quite striking changes.

One important factor should be underscored: the stock of knowledge does not exist in a plastic-sealed bag. From a phenomenological point of view it is always appropriated knowledge, socially shared and communicated knowledge which has become a part of a person's biographical situation. This does not necessarily make it individualistic or eccentric; knowledge is simply assimilated in various ways by the experiencing person. In Polanyi's terms it is "personal knowledge."[491]

The third resource that a person brings to moral experience is his ethical system of meaning. This includes his standard for moral goodness with which he has in the past evaluated human behavior, his own and others', and with which he comes to present moral experiences. It is a personal-social gestalt, a pattern of ethical meaning which is the product of that ever-recurring dialogue between the person and his society or, better, that polylogue among social persons. In arriving at this present constellation of ethical meaning a person engages at the ethical level in that kind of meaning-construction that Schutz so persuasively describes. This begins in the life of the child as he differentiates, through his relationship with others, between the shared ethical system of his society mediated at first by his parents and his own subjective responses, a process vividly portrayed from a psychological vantage point by Jean Piaget.[492] It includes the movement from pre-phenomenal to phenomenal awareness that we discussed in chapter one[493] and the concurrent building up of an ethical meaning system through a relational process. This meaning establishment at the ethical level obviously depends on the focus of consciousness upon an object, the reflective correlation of it with past sedimented and arranged experience, and the weighting of it in relation to that sedimented ethical knowledge. To detail this explicitly would take us far beyond the confines of this essay but would include a discussion of ethical meaning as a cognitive-emotive whole and as a product of the interaction between personal appropriation and social, moral standards.

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[491] Cf. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, Harper Torchbooks, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964).

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[492] Cf. Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgment of the Child, Translated by Marjorie Gabain, Collier Books edition (New York: Collier Books, 1962).

[493] It will be remembered that Natanson's terms "receptive awareness," "predicative spontaneity," and "conceptual thinking" helped to delineate the steps in this process.

A complete description would also take us into the heterogeneous stockpile of society's moral evaluations, their distribution, flexibility, concretion, and socially approved and disapproved character. If this were to be done, we would find at this level (as at others) that the distinction between individual and social is analytical at best.

For the sake of clarity, let us pursue this further. Whether one finds the distinction helpful depends upon one's concerns. If the focus is upon the human body, upon the categories of space especially, upon the expressive behavior of a person, or upon the uniqueness of an individual, then the individual-social dichotomy can be easily and, indeed, legitimately brought to bear. But, having learned our lesson from Schutz, if attention is shifted to meaning-construction, to the manner in which self-awareness emerges, and to the part that memory of social experience plays in the creation of human personality, then the distinction loses its power because from this vantage point the person is social through and through. We do not need to worship at the shrine of traditional social psychology to come to this conclusion either. Reflection upon our own direct experience, especially as its intersubjective dimension is portrayed by Schutz, leads us to the same conclusion. The experience of the we-relation in which, at a basic level, the experience of my self comes only through my awareness of the Other's responses to me documents the case. For these reasons we refrain from referring to the moral experience of the "individual," terminology which tempts the individual-social bifurcation, and write in terms of the moral experience of the "person," a melted gestalt. In the construction of an ethical meaning system the interplay between the person and others and between the retention of social experience and the retention of my part in that experience shatters, at this level, the analytical boundaries between the two spheres.[494]

To return to our discussion of the sedimented ethical system of meaning, it is not our purpose here to treat the content of this system. As far as we know every socialized person has a contentual system, although, as the cultural relativists of several years past have stressed, there is, within certain limits, striking divergence over what is considered morally good and bad. We are concerned with generic, moral experience, with those general processes and patterns in man's moral life regardless of the specific values, touchstones for the morally good, or definitions in terms of which the ethical meaning system is both concretized and evolved.

The ethical system of meaning, even though it may be ambiguous in spots, is usable until further notice. Moral experience includes, however, various experienced shocks to our meaning system. Situations or factors present themselves which challenge the efficacy of our present interpretation. Within the rules of our game a problem area arises or from outside our frame of reference there comes a challenge to our very constellation of rules. We can ignore the impingement, accept it as an anomoly, or rearrange our ethical system in order to face the problematic squarely. This last tack may force the creation of a new meaning scheme. But in all cases a person must deal in some way with his ethical system in process.

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[494] The easy confusion of another's ethical meaning with "my" own so that I forget what is "mine" and what is "his" suggests the experienced marriage of the two.

There is another resource of moral experience. In our scheme it is the fourth: the personal reality constellation. Our investigation of Schutz has underscored, first, the part that attention to a particular reality has in defining its boundaries and in walling out other elements that are not relevant to it and, second, the movement that is possible between realities. When we reflectively stand back from participation in one of these realities or, better, focus upon the reality of their interrelation, however, we find that each person ranks realities in a certain manner, even though over time this ranking may change. We would suggest that there is an interpretative center or home row so to speak which is the orienting point for the person's over-all conception of reality. To this he refers with varying degrees of consistency; it is to a certain degree solidified; in terms of it other systems of meaning such as the ethical are constructed; and it provides the clue to the order of the total reality pattern. For the mystic, for instance, the ranking of reality may involve considering the physical world a dust cover for a spiritual foundation. For the terminally ill cancer patient, the core of his reality may be the problematic and ephemeral character of his present life. For the socalled mentally ill person, the center of his reality may be his belief in himself as the Christ. For the criminal, the accepted mores of society may be a sham used by those in power to exploit him; his reality constellation may put the "liberation of merchandise" close to the center. For the sociologist enamored with latent functions, the heart of reality is underneath the obvious. The illustrations could be extended. But the point has been made: a particular problem at hand is not the only thing that shapes reality; persons bring to these problems what might be called a reality set. This is true in the ethical province as in others.

What we would call "enchantment" is the fifth of moral experience's resources. This is a rather strange word to use, we know, but it refers to the fascination, at some times even blind, with moral goodness. It is assumed that there is moral goodness, even though the standard for it is acknowledged to vary. This enchantment, which on its negative side brackets doubt in the possibility of the morally good,[395] is a positive, compelling factor, whatever its origin, in the ethical realm and manifests itself at the psychological level in the feeling of obligation or even from the outside as demand. At another level there is also enchantment with the possibility that there may be moral goodness. In this way the ethical realm ties into the future and into the hope both for change and for betterment that also exists in other lived provinces of meaning.

The sixth and final resource that we mention here is the pressure of lived existence. We order this rather vague category under four rubrics: (1) the pressure of plurality, (2) the pressure for response, (3) the pressure of existentiality, and (4) the pressure to project. By speaking of "the pressure of plurality" we refer to the fact that every human being is faced with innumerable "objects" which, theoretically, may be taken into consciousness. The word "objects," as at other places in this essay, is broadly conceived since it includes ideas, my own action and the action of others, environmental factors, states of affairs, and so forth. But, practically, a person can only turn to one or, at best, a limited gestalt at one time. The experience of plurality pressures evaluation and selection. It does not simply exist passively; it offers resistance to our desire for inclusiveness and challenge to our wish for mastery. In this sense it is pressure upon us, a pressure that is intensified through our recognition or decision that the plurality is not homogeneous or neutral. The objects, be they prephenomenal or phenomenal, are given weight relative to our personal needs and desires. And in this weighting process, a process using standards for measurement that often shift over time, the objects may clash or conflict, and the pressure for decision becomes greater. Moral experience is to a large degree based upon the pluralism of intention and behavior, the confrontation between an evaluating person and a plurality of differing intentional behavior claiming moral goodness.

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[395] Here we would position the epoché of the ethical sphere.

Plurality demands evaluation - in other words, response. But the pressure for response, our second category, is not only caused by multiplicity. It may also be engendered by a single Other, a single idea, or a single factor which offers either resistance or challenge. The human ability *to* respond is, of course, the other side of the coin, but it is called for so to speak by those things which stand as walls of resistance or as approaching armies of attack. At the moral level the intentions or actions of Others which resist our practice of (what we consider) the morally good or challenge our moral evaluations stimulate our ethical response.

Existential pressures also provide a resource for moral experience. Schutz began to touch upon this area when he talked of death as "the fundamental anxiety." But he never developed this, nor was his concern for those existential themes that permeate the literature of Europe since the Second World War. If he had moved in this direction, his treatment would have been more thoroughly social than much existential thought has been. With this in mind we suggest the pressure of existential existence as a resource for moral evaluation in the sense that anxiety, death, happiness, "inner history" - to use H. R. Niebuhr's concept - and other personally felt factors provide inputs for the development and revision of an ethical system of meaning. It is this constellation of factors which gives felt-intensity to the reality pattern mentioned above, a pattern which is thus lived out of at both a cognitive and an emotional level.

The fourth pressure is what we are calling the pressure to project. Based upon the attentionality of consciousness, the awareness of time - both inner time and outer time - and the demand for responsive action at various levels, the social being the most obvious, there is a pressure to project into the future. This projecting may take various forms, involving different levels of cognitive precision and extending to different points in the future. For instance, it may simply reflect the protention that we mentioned in chapter two and thus be the sense that one word will follow the other as our friend speaks to us. It may also include anticipation of a distant future in which we will bring a highly conceptualized plan to fruition. Projecting is thus related to the motile ability of human consciousness to imaginatively focus upon those things that are not yet present and project their actualization on the basis of our experience of the past or on the basis of our belief that we can "do it again." Moral experience at this level involves our evaluation of the moral good of this future-directed projecting with its projected acts. However, projecting may also be of those things past which are remembered and held up for the same kind of moral evaluation. But in all cases it is based upon the human ability to remove oneself to varying degrees from what is happening at the present moment if only by sensing the future of the next moment or the removed past or future.

The Province of Ethical Meaning

With these preliminary thoughts in mind, let us begin to phenomenologically explore moral experience, the experience of moral evaluation, meaning construction, and existence. At base, moral experience involves the person's relating of his moral system of meaning to various objects brought within his attentional focus (either volitionally or non-volitionally). What we will call the different levels of moral experience are directly related to the kinds of objects attended to. For the purpose of our analysis here, which is certainly only suggestive, we distinguish these three basic dimensions: (1) the experience of one's personal projecting, (2) the experience of one's personal act, and (3) the experience of another's act.

As we have learned from Schutz, the living person experiences his projecting of certain actions into the future which are designed, if acted out, to create a certain state of affairs. They are based upon an in-order-to motive and are to varying degrees concrete.[496] They may be fashioned for the action of the next moment or of the distant future. There is no guarantee that projected action of the distant future will be any more highly conceptualized than that of the next moment, but their placement in the distant future offers this opportunity. The projecting that is done can also be variously volitional or non-volitional (spontaneous). For instance, the spontaneous response that I make to my three-year-old son who has just fallen overboard is different from the projected response that is made to the opportunity for a new car. In any case, the projecting is subjective in character. It is only experienced by me until I communicate it to others through some kind of expressive action. Furthermore, the project of a particular action carries with it a constellation of in-order-to motives. I project the completion of this essay in-order-to meet the requirements for a doctoral degree but also in-order-to understand Schutz, in-order-to make a contribution to the field, in-order-to fulfill my needs for professional competence, and so forth. This constellation of in-order-to motives constitutes my conscious intentions or motives.[497] They, too, are subjectively held until communicated.

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[496] Indeed, it can be said that they are made finally concrete only through the process of acting them out.

Now, if I raise the question concerning the moral goodness of my projecting, at this level, I have moved into the province of ethical meaning. In other words, it is when I focus upon my in-order-to motives, my projected action, and the projected state of affairs that I hope to create and bring these objects into relationship with what we have called above my sedimented system of ethical meaning that we have entered the realm of moral experience, an experience which includes at this stage moral evaluation. But, just as from our standpoint projecting is variously cognitive or rational so this evaluation may take place at a highly cognitive level, at the level of felt-meaning, or at an intermediary level.[498] Regardless of its cognitive or emotional properties, however, moral evaluation involves the fitting of my present projecting, a projecting which is treated reflexively in stop-action form, into my sedimented system of moral meaning. This issue is raised: how does this projection fit with what I consider moral goodness. The notion of the fitting is highly significant. No matter what the ethical meaning system employed - indeed, regardless of the object being evaluated be it my projecting, my accomplished act, or the completed act of another - its moral goodness for me is determined by its relationship to, its fit with, my system of moral good, even though this system is to varying degrees shared by others or, indeed, the product of intersubjectivity.

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[497] The use of the word "intention" in this context is not the same as its use in the phrase "the intention of consciousness."

Moral experience at this level - the level of my projecting - does not simply involve this kind of present-tense evaluation. It is also the project of all those factors that we termed the "resources for moral experience" above. Furthermore, the act of projecting and the feeling of appropriateness or fit may be, in the first case, prompted by or, in the second case, correlated with a sense of demand or obligation. It is not our task here to answer the question of the origin of this demand in either psychological or sociological terms. From a phenomenological standpoint, the person experiences this demand to varying degrees just as he experiences a feeling of freedom while he is projecting.[499]

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[498] If one defines meaning with Schutz as " a certain way of directing one's gaze at an item of one's experience" (P, p. 42. Emphasis ours.), it is obvious that the volitional, cognitive, and isolating characteristics of meaning construction are underscored. Our own treatment of moral evaluation emphasizes the cognitive dimension, although we admit to weakness in such an approach. A fuller description of the ethical sphere would include moral evaluation stemming from the emotive dimension.

When the projecting is acted out, when the subjective dimension is translated into a completed act, then we move into the moral experience of one's personal act, what we have termed the second level of moral experience. There remains, of course, a continuity between the projecting and the act - a continuity that is seen best by the actor - but the published character of the act, which now gives it a life of its own so to speak and thus separates it from its author's on-going stream of consciousness, transforms, at this level, the person's moral experience. Now the question can be raised: did the act bring about the projected state of affairs? Furthermore, the inherent ambiguity and flexibility of projecting is now sedimented into an act which may be publicly observed, analyzed from a "detached" standpoint, and considered as a relatively stable entity with definite contours. It has fallen as ripe fruit from the tree of projecting and, as time processes, recedes further and further into the past and is increasingly removed, even in the mind of the author, from his on-going intentions. Project and act become two analytically and practically separated objects. Thus, with the completion of the act the possible disparity between the intention of the actor and the finished action as evaluated both by the actor and by others emerges. It is in relation to this actum that the author is held socially responsible, whereas at the level of his unexpressed projecting he is accountable only to himself. However, even though the possible disparity between motives and act, the act itself as an observable and publicly discussable entity, and the actually established state of affairs are open for perusal, moral experience at this level is also tied to the cognitive-emotional assessment of these elements in relation to one's standard for moral goodness. The question again is asked: how do these fit ethically? The shift from the first level of moral experience to this second level does not as much involve a change in the process of moral evaluation as it does a re-arrangement of and an increase in the number of objects attended to. Moral experience is re-highlighted, however, because of the additional dimensions.

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[499] The question of free-will and determinism seems to hinge, as do so many other questions, on the perspective used for analysis. The phenomenological vantage point is faced with experienced freedom whereas other perspectives may be met with determinism. Again, the multiple realities point presents a way to a solution of this dilemma.

There is often a slippage between the projected act and the accomplished act or the actualized state of affairs which is an important part of a person's moral experience. It may enter when what a person intends his action to be, e.g. the correct giving of artificial respiration, is different from what it is, e.g. improperly performed artificial respiration. It may occur, in this case, when an intended state of affairs such as the saving of a drowning person's life is not the actual state of affairs; because of improperly performed artificial respiration, the individual dies. Also, even though the projected action is the actual action, the state of affairs may not be the projected one; artificial respiration may be done correctly but the person dies anyway. Because of this slippage a person may speak of the moral goodness of his intentions but the moral badness of his action, the moral badness of his intentions but the moral goodness of the actualized state of affairs.

This introduces an interesting terminological issue which we can only tentatively deal with here. Is it proper to label a completed act, or an actualized state of affairs morally good or bad? We certainly do this in everyday parlance, but how accurate is it? We suggest that the words "moral goodness" are shorthand for a complicated meaning system of a particular kind. This system is designed to evaluate the goodness or badness of human motives, actions, and states of affairs. It is based upon the recognition of and reliance upon the human ability to consciously create meaning, to consciously will (motives, action, and states of affairs), to consciously judge among alternatives and to consciously act. Here, as at other places, we are not speaking contentually; this analysis is applicable to an ethical meaning system no matter what its specific content. The important issue is, however: "moral goodness" is always relative to a meaning system and moral evaluation is always made by experiencing persons. It follows from this that motives, actions, and states of affairs, be they the result of my creation or of another's are not morally good or bad in themselves. They become this in relation to an ethical meaning system. The fact that I intend to kill some one, that I actually shoot him, and that his death creates a different state of affairs I judge good or bad in relation to my system of moral goodness, a system which, nonetheless, is socially textured. As we have seen in Schutz, meaning is relationally fashioned; it does not exist apart from this. Part of this evaluation process also includes the relating of intentions, actions, and states of affairs to the context in which they emerge; killing, for instance, is differently evaluated in war than in peace. With these things in mind, what do we mean when we say that a completed act, for instance, is morally good? First of all, we mean that it fits positively within our ethical meaning system.[500] This is also true when we talk of the moral goodness of our own or other's intentions and of conditions that we or others construct. Yet, secondly, - and this will become more apparent when we discuss our judgment of another's intentions, actions, and results - our moral evaluations of intention, act, and result can take place at two quite different levels. We may judge them either in isolation or in relation to the originating person. When we treat these factors in separation from the author, the evaluation of moral goodness is solely related to _our_ level of awareness and to _our_ meaning system. However, when we judge moral goodness in relation to the constituting _agent_, then his level of awareness and ethical meaning system may be taken into account. But in either case moral goodness is related to moral _consciousness_, in the first case our own, in the second case our own and his. This point is a significant one for it suggests the reason for our claiming that a tiger's killing of another animal is amoral, whereas a person's killing of another is moral/immoral. It also indicates the reason for maintaining that a mentally deranged person is not morally responsible for his action. Our _moral_ evaluation of our own or another's actions is tied to the kind and degree of moral _consciousness_ or the ability to make moral decisions that we judge present. When we are experiencing our own projecting or when we are evaluating our finished act and its results in relation to our motives, we can relate it to our moral awareness, even though there may be slippage between our act/results and our moral consciousness-prompted motives. When we shift to the judgment of another's acts, however, this level of moral awareness is not as open to our scrutiny, and our moral experience is changed, is now based upon different data.

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[500] In checking for "fit" we consider, of course, the _situational_ factors surrounding the completed act.

With these comments setting the stage, we now move to the third level of moral experience: the experience of another's act. Because of the limitations of human perception - and "perception" here is not necessarily reduced to the traditional five senses - we can know another only through his acts,[501] be they as subtle as a light in the eye or as explicit as spoken words and accomplished deeds. The subjective intentions of the other become perceptible to us only through their expression. However, on the basis of our experience of our own consciousness, we believe that the other likewise experiences a subjective stream of consciousness with its phenomenal emergents, i.e. with its focus upon and creation of concepts and categories. Our moral evaluation of the Other's expressive acts is accomplished through typification. His action is related to our categories for moral activity and moral goodness. The farther we are removed spatially and temporally from his acts and the more that we are unable even in a face to face relationship to allow the uniqueness of his action to strike us the more that action is typified. The fewer indications that we have of his intentions, for various reasons, the more we are forced to typify them on the basis of our own schemes. Moral experience at this level, given all of its inherent limitations, follows a similar pattern. Moral goodness is judged on the basis of the fit of what we perceive the other's actions to be with our variously articulate system of ethical meaning, even if this system includes the belief that another should be allowed to and must live his life out of his own ethical evaluations. Moral judgments of the other are forced upon us, however, since we are social beings, existing together in a social world, be this social world conceived of in terms of a "world system" or in terms of a "societal system."

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[501] Here we include what Schutz would call involuntary activity as well as projected or voluntary activity.

Furthermore, moral experience includes more than the evaluation of individual intentions, acts, or states of affairs, be they mine or another's. There are also judgments that may be called judgments of character. These are related to the moral evaluation of my own intentions, action, and results as well as to that of another's action, results, and, through drawing implications from his actions, intentions. For this reason I may give a positive judgment regarding my own or another's composite intentions while deploring his specific acts or results.

In summary, then, moral experience is tied to moral evaluation be it highly cognitive and conceptualized or felt. From a phenomenological viewpoint, the process includes the experienced fit of intentions, actions, and results with my system of ethical meaning. Because of the structuring of human existence the focus shifts depending upon whether I am morally evaluating my own projecting, my own action, my own results or another's projecting, action, or results. The data open for my appraisal significantly shifts when I move from myself as focus to the other as focus as do the kind of evaluations, with their relevant kinds of typification, I am able to make.

Moral experience is related in various ways to intentions, actions, and results be they mine or another's.[502] But, in line with our discussion of Schutz, this province of reality has its own cognitive style, its own constellation of the seven elements we have analyzed at length. First of all, the focus or attention of consciousness is directed toward such things as intentions, human actions, and created states of affairs. Yet these are viewed _ethically_. That is to say, the matter is not _do_ certain intentions, actions, and results exist but _should_ they exist, _should_ they have been performed. The focus is not upon their existence as objects but as entities which are the result of human _choice_; this is the reason for claiming that an action is not good or bad in itself but only in relation to the intentions of a volitional human being. When making ethical evaluations, observable behavior and resultant conditions are related to questions such as: (1) Should he have done that? (2) If I were in the same situation would it have been morally good for me to do that? (3) Should others in the same situation do that? At the core of the ethical province is human choice between what is considered by the individual or the group to be good or bad behavior with the obvious gradations in between. But "choice" is a big word. It implies at least three other things: the ability to differentiate alternatives, the capacity to choose, and a standard for evaluating among alternatives. All this is to say nothing more than that in the ethical domain the focus of attention is upon intentions, actions, and results in relation to an appreciation for human choice and to the employment of a sedimented standard (however flexible) for moral goodness. Not only is ethical meaning created through the relation of focus and sedimented standard, but a choice is made among meanings and then acted upon.

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[502] There is a certain sense in which we talk about the moral responsibility or morality of groups of persons. In common parlance, for instance, we speak of the "immorality" of Dow Chemicals for producing naplam. However, this reflects a high degree of typification and reification. What we mean is that the decision makers, whomever they are, are immoral. The court's attempts to "fix blame" (upon individuals) in cases against companies indicate the level to which moral evaluation is directed.

Second, the epoché of the ethical province brackets doubt in human choice and in moral goodness. All talk of moral responsibility, for instance, is based upon the assumption that people can actually make choices, regardless of the influences upon these choices, that moral goodness and badness are not figments of one's imagination, and that ethical evaluation performs a positive function. The ultimacy of certain moral judgments may be doubted but not these other things if the moral province is to be created.

Third, both action that is put within an ethical framework and ethical evaluation are influenced by and reflect time-consciousness. Since ethical activity involves conscious choice, it takes place within the socalled wide-awake world with its various intersections of outer and inner time; we do not associate the non-volitional dream world with the ethical realm.[503] There is the sense of inner time from which my own activity flows, the inner time from which another's action springs, and the social time in terms of which my own and another's actions are judged and personally carried out. Law courts are forced to underscore outer time; at 12 noon a suspect alledgedly robbed a bank and could not produce anyone to claim he was at another place at that time, and so forth. There may be a tendency at the more personal level to take the other's experience of inner time seriously. For instance, the highway patrolman may not give a ticket to a man rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital, responding to his own and to his wife's experience of inner time. But this need not be the case either. At any rate, the sense of inner time is influential in making ethical decisions, regardless of how akin it may be to outer time. In so far as ethical activity is related to physical action it reflects the combination of inner and outer time associated with what Schutz calls working. At a different level it may mirror "appropriate" time, a social time which determines the socially approved moment for certain action.

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[503] Theoretically, if in the wide-awake world a human being is acting out of compulsion and not out of "free" choice we are not within the ethical domain either.

Fourth, personal ethical activity and evaluation may be influenced to varying degrees and in varying ways by one's own personal ethical system and by that of others. To the extent that it is my own it may be called subjective; to the extent that it is public it may be called objective. Emphasis upon personal conscience betrays the first, emphasis upon the public law reflects the second. But in both cases there are subjective ingredients in the objective and vice versa.

Finally, the experience of one's self, spontaneity, and sociality take on particular shades within the moral domain. Here self-experience is tied to the experience of choice, the weighting of alternatives. It is related to the self as valuer, as a decision-maker for the morally good. It is one thing to say that there is a "right" way to make atomic bombs and another to claim that it is "right" or morally good to build them. Self-experience in the moral realm is also meshed with the sense of the risking self; to make a moral choice is to risk the chance of being judged immoral by others. Thus, the experience of one's self in the ethical realm involves the sense of weighting, the awareness of choice, and the sense of risk in relation to the morally good. The spontaneity of consciousness is experienced as the on-going choice among moral alternatives; physical spontaneity is experienced when moral intentions are accomplished in the external world through "gearing in." In relation to the ethical sphere sociality may be experienced at different levels. It may emerge in the confrontation with fellow human beings as I act ethically on the basis of both my preconceived project and my typification of the other or of others. It may evidence itself in the process of projecting action or of evaluating past action as I keep in mind social relationships and persons with whom I am variously intimate. Sociality is also reflected in the ethical system that I carry with me; it is a product of my appropriation of social experience and societal values. Thus, the experience of and kind of sociality present in the ethical realm depends upon the point at which stock is taken. Projecting, on-going action, and completed act all have their own social overtones and their degree of actual present-tense encounter with others.

The Ethical Province of Meaning and Multiple Realities

One of Schutz's most significant contributions to our essay has been his understanding of meaning-construction. Based upon the motility of consciousness, meaning is established through relationality and sedimentation. It is shifted when the focus of consciousness changes and when the elements of meaning are thus related in a different manner. Because of the innumerable, subtle, and radical shifts in focus, meaning is pluralistic and may not be homogenized without reducing one meaning pattern to the terms of another, a disastrous reality mistake.

The concept of multiple meaning or multiple realities is as applicable in the ethical province as it is anywhere else. It suggests that ethical meaning systems will be non-reducibly pluralistic, a notion that frightens those who are on a quest for the wholly absolute.[504] They are this because the focus, the sedimented stock of knowledge, the individual-social setting, the constructed relevances, and so forth are pluralistic. This means that the projection of actions and the evaluation of moral goodness are also heterogeneous. An ethics of pleasure, for instance, and an ethics of duty represent two different meaning systems living together in the ethical province. Without benefit of an ultimate authority acceptable to both, there is no formula for transformation which could relate these two systems without reducing the one to the other. This does not deny that persuasion from either side may convince one or the other to change his opinion. But a change in opinion simply entails the acceptance of the other's rules.

To take an example - often the games are more alike than this - to play checkers by basketball rules, appears patently ridiculous, just as does the argument that checkers is "better" than basketball or that the rules of the two games can be amalgamated without changing either checkers or basketball. One can choose to play either game, even be convinced by a basketball fan that basketball is "better"[505] than checkers. But the games remain distinct, their rules distinguishible, and they cannot be played at the same time. They reflect different goals, starting points, and means; they have their own tempo and rewards. Within their province, rules can be challenged and modified even drastically, but a distinctiveness persists which cannot be legitimately changed from outside without destroying the game.

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[504] We do not wish to suggest either that "there are absolutely no absolutes" and play the absolutist game in reverse with our own rules. As we mentioned in chapter five, a pluralistic conception of reality, if it takes itself seriously, will relativize its own relations as well as the absolutism of other positions.

A Schutzian interpretation of meaning thus suggests that ethical systems will be non-reducibly pluralistic. Certainly, just the history of rational, moral philosophy indicates this as we consider the endless pages spent in developing ethical provinces or systems and in attacking the position of others. This says nothing about the disparities that exist within populations of people, divergences that are immediately obvious in conversations among neighbors and in discussions at the local bar.[506] This pluralism does not mean, however, that each person's moral experience with its evaluational scheme is completely unrelated to that of another's. This kind of atomism is foolish. Even a scantily clad notion of the social, interconnective dimensions to human life show this. Ethical pluralism does not deny the possibility of movement, as a result of persuasion or reflection, from one ethical meaning system to another. It does not deny the human necessity to select a particular system with which to live in the midst of plurality. But it does draw attention to what happens when the movement between disparate systems is attempted and underscores the impossibility of creating anything more than a particular system. For this pluralistic conception of the ethical province both reductionism and inclusivism (absolutism) are anemic.

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[505] This always means better in relation to something.

[506] Rational ethical systems are based upon the direct moral experience we have been discussing (i.e. the author's) but exist at a level removed from the one we have been dealing with in this chapter.

A Pluralistic Ethical Province and Ethical Conflict

If ethical pluralism is taken seriously, the conflict between ethical meaning systems is both expected and considered legitimate. How one faces this conflict at a theoretical as well as at a practical level is another issue. First of all, the era of ultimate authorities is over. At best we are left with reliance upon the relative authority of respect or the authority of acknowledged wisdom, in both cases heavily dependent upon our own evaluation. For this reason the settling of ethical meaning-conflict cannot be accomplished through fiat; we are too much aware of our personal responsibility and of the texturing which personal values give to moral evaluation to be duped into submission to an ethical "authority." Some may deem this the egocentric blasphemy of our time, but this simply betrays, from our vantage point, their own focus and commitment, two elements which do not necessarily convince us to follow their gods.

Secondly, an understanding of multiple meaning structures implies recognition of the process that takes place when meanings are changed. It implies knowledge, therefore, that the movement from one ethical meaning system to another is a matter of shift in preferred focus and relation rather than a movement from the meaningless to the meaningful.

A third point follows from this. With a Schutzian position in mind, one is forced to acknowledge the meaningful character of an opposing or disparate ethical system. Recourse to labels such as "unintelligent," or "stupid," or "petty," or "faulty" for the other's system of meaning betrays the inability to acknowledge the meaningful character which, from the other person's perspective, is a part of his schematization. It also simply indicates that the other person does not play the game according to my rules, something for which the other person need not and, from Schutz's standpoint, should not be maligned.

Fourth, if the meaningful character of the other's system is acknowledged and if this meaning is based upon an inner consistency or relationality of some sort, understanding demands that I enter the other's province and attempt to understand these relations from within, using his rules. Thus, real acceptance of the multiple character of ethical meaning can lead to a depth of understanding that previous so-called "understanding," which was only a subterfuge for conversion, did not reach.

Fifth, once within the system, inconsistencies can be pointed out, but only inconsistencies with the accepted rules of the province.

Sixth, since the utopia of complete agreement - a dubious *utopia* - is not expected within this pluralistic framework, only pragmatic amelioration is possible. Theoretically, there will always be divergence. For this reason political considerations enter the picture along with notions of majority will, political power, the right of dissent, and so forth. It is not our task here to develop a social ethic of pluralism, but it seems, from our perspective, that the *public* legislation of *private* morality denies the multiplicity that we find everywhere present and confuses provinces of meaning and activity which, although related as are all provinces of meaning, are distinguishible. It also seems that a social ethic of conflict management is inescapable.

Seventh, if ethical pluralism is taken seriously, all tendencies toward the imposition of absolutist ideologies should be thwarted, regardless of their "benevolent" intentions or "righteous" goals, and the necessity for a dissent which keeps the pluralism plural should be encouraged.

Finally, within a framework of the ethical pluralism we have been suggesting, it is contribution rather than imputation which moves to the fore. The attempt to surreptitiously impute my standards for moral goodness becomes suspect, regardless of the purity of motive, and open contribution to the understanding of human experience which may be rejected as well as accepted becomes attractive.

This brings us to the end of our discussion. It has been one that underscores the centrality of meaning and meaning construction in the establishment of reality, be it ethical, scientific, aesthetic, religious, or any other kind. We have seen that it is on the basis of meaning-shifts that multiplicity is created and that an understanding of this plurality calls for an appreciation of what takes place when meaning contexts change. In the process the legitimacy and the non-reducible character of each meaning-province has been emphasized without implying that interrelation does not exist. Indeed, at the practical as well as at the theoretical level it is the interrelation of personal and social realities which presents a challenge to human existence. This challenge emerges on the ethical front as well as at other places in daily life, but is met by the equally difficult task of keeping the pluralism plural.

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